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Abstract
In the years following World War II, the private security industry occupied only a 
very marginal position within the British security sector. It was disdained by the 
police, lambasted by the media and largely dismissed by the British population, who 
turned almost exclusively to the state when they encountered any trace of crime and 
disorder. In short, private security companies functioned with a bare minimum of 
legitimacy at this time. Moving forward to the opening decade of the twenty-first 
century, these companies are now a major force. The industry is more than double the 
size of the police, it is endorsed and licensed by the state and operates in partnership 
with a number of state institutions, often in the provision of highly visible frontline 
law and order functions. And, perhaps most importantly, it is increasingly being 
accepted by the British population as a central member of the ‘extended policing 
family’. In other words, private security companies are now operating with a much 
greater degree of legitimacy.
Against this backdrop, the aim of this thesis is to explore the following question: 
how have private security companies once again become legitimate providers of 
security functions within postwar Britain? The answer given here is that, faced with 
the British population’s expectation that security ought to be monopolised' by the 
state, these companies have attempted to portray themselves not as purebred market 
actors functioning in accordance with the logic of profit margins and private goods, 
but rather as state-deputised actors operating in line with the public good. They have, 
in other words, attempted to capture legitimacy from the state. Their main strategy 
for doing this has been to bring about a system of statutory regulation, for this would 
create an official partnership between the industry and the state, thereby conferring 
legitimacy upon their operations. This was a controversial strategy, however. And it 
was only after half a century of intense industry-state negotiations that such a 
regulatory framework was finally implemented. This thesis will therefore analyse 
these negotiations from 1945 until the passing of the Private Security Industry Act in 
2001. For these negotiations, more than any other factor, serve to explain the re­
legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
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Introduction
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1.1 Research Questions, Definitions and Debates
In the years following World War II, the nascent private security industry occupied 
only a very marginal position within the British security sector. It was, generally 
speaking, a loose collection of small companies providing rudimentary guarding 
services to factory owners who wanted to add an extra layer of protection to the 
security of their industrial premises. It was largely disdained by the public police, 
universally lambasted by the media and in most cases dismissed by the British 
population, who turned almost exclusively to the state when they encountered any 
trace o f crime and disorder. In short, private security companies functioned with a 
bare minimum of legitimacy at this time. For while they had a basic legal status as 
agents of private property, their existence did not resonate with the average British 
citizen’s normative expectations about how security ought to be delivered. This 
fundamental public good, it was widely considered, should only be legitimately 
provided by the state.
Moving forward to the opening decade of the twenty-first century, the private 
security industry is now a major force within the British security sector. It is more 
than double the size of the public police and is dominated by enormous and 
sophisticated multinational corporations such as Group 4 Securicor. It is endorsed 
and licensed by the British state, directly accountable to the Home Secretary and 
operates in partnership with a number of state institutions, often in the provision of 
highly visible frontline law and order functions. And, perhaps most importantly, it is 
increasingly being accepted by the British population as a central member of the 
‘extended policing family’. In other words, private security companies are now 
operating with a much greater degree of legitimacy within the British security sector. 
Indeed, it is commonly believed by many politicians, intellectuals and everyday 
citizens alike that these companies can and should be legitimately involved in the 
provision of the most fundamental of all public goods -  the maintenance of security 
and social order.
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Against this backdrop, the aim of this thesis is to explore the following research 
question: how have private security companies once again become legitimate 
providers of security functions within postwar Britain? In posing this research 
question, it is important to define the key terms from the outset. Drawing from the 
writings of Clifford Shearing, ‘security functions’ are taken to mean those activities 
contributing towards “ ...the preservation of peace, that is, to the maintenance of a 
way of doing things where persons and property are free from unwarranted 
interference so that people may go about their business safely”.1 As Shearing notes, 
one of the major advantages of this definition is that is does not conflate the 
‘provision of security functions’ with the activities of the public police forces and 
therefore immediately distances us from a state-centred conception o f security 
provision. Given our emphasis on non-state security provision throughout this 
investigation, this is an extremely important distinction to make.
Following on from this formulation, ‘private security’ is simply defined as the 
‘provision of security functions’ by commercial or market-based organisations, as 
distinct from the ‘provision of security functions’ by state institutions such as the 
public police. In addition to making this public-private distinction when defining 
private security, it is common practice to specify which particular private security 
activities we are concerned with -  for instance, manned guarding, cash-in-transit, 
CCTV monitoring and so on. We will not make this specification here, however. 
This is because the historical approach taken within this investigation means that we 
will witness the gradual evolution of different private security activities over the 
course of the subsequent chapters. We will therefore introduce these activities as we 
go along, rather than defining them here at the beginning. This said, it must be 
emphasised that all the activities analysed in this investigation relate only to 
‘domestic’ private security provision. We will not be concerned with ‘international’ 
private security provision, which is generally far more militaristic in its mode of 
delivery.2
1 Clifford Shearing, ‘The Relation Between Public and Private Policing’, Crime and Justice 15 (1992), 
pp.399-400.
2 For further clarification of the differences between private security companies and private military 
companies, see: Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, ‘Introduction’, in From Mercenaries to 
Market: The Rise and Regulation o f Private Military Companies, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia 
Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.2-3. For an overview of the activities of 
international private military companies, see: P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f  the 
Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, updated edition, 2008);
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While the key terms relating to ‘private security provision’ can dealt with fairly 
briefly, it is necessary to spend more time defining the final key term: ‘legitimacy’. 
For not only is legitimacy the most important and active term within the research 
question, it is also the most complex term, taking on very different meanings in 
different contexts. Drawing upon contemporary social science and criminal justice 
discussions of legitimacy -  especially the highly influential writings o f David 
Beetham and Tom Tyler -  it is possible to identify three interpretations of this key 
term. First, ‘legal’ legitimacy can relate to any activity which is conducted in 
accordance with a particular set of rules. As Beetham notes, these rules need not be 
codified in statutes: they “ ...may be unwritten, as informal conventions, or they may 
be formalised in legal codes or judgements”.3 But these rules must be recognised as 
having the authority of ‘the law’. With regard to security provision, then, any 
institution -  public or private -  can be viewed as being legitimate so long as it 
functions within the remit of an accepted legal framework.
The second interpretation centres around what is commonly termed ‘instrumental’ 
legitimacy. In this instance, a given institution’s legitimacy is not determined by its 
legal standing but by the effectiveness of its outputs (indeed, Fritz Sharpf uses the 
term ‘output-orientated’ legitimacy to describe this type of institutional equation).4 
So if a number of individuals -  acting as self-interested utility maximisers -  consider 
the output of an institution to be highly effective then, as Tom Tyler explains, they 
will in turn confer a greater degree of legitimacy upon that institution.5 And they will 
perform this act of conferral, Beetham adds, through a .demonstrable expression of 
consent”,6 which will vary according to context. With regard to security provision, 
then, those institutions -  public or private -  which score highly on the government’s 
or mass media’s crime control performance indicators will be endowed with greater 
levels of legitimacy, and vice versa.7 And this legitimacy will be conferred through 
the act of obeying and supporting these institutions.
Deborah D. Avant, The Market For Force: The Consequences o f  Privatizing Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
3 David Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1991), p. 16.
4 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp.6-11.
5 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p.3 and 21.
6 Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power, p. 18.
Adam Crawford, ‘Refiguring the Community and Professional in Policing and Criminal Justice: Some 
Questions of Legitimacy’, in Justice, Community and Civil Society: A Contested Terrain ed. Joanna 
Shapland (Collumpton: Willan, 2008), p. 128.
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The third and final interpretation of this complex term concerns what is generally 
called ‘normative’ legitimacy. This relates not to the legal standing of an institution, 
nor to the effectiveness of an institution’s outputs, but rather to the “ ...beliefs current 
in a given society about what is the rightful source of authority”. These ‘beliefs’ are 
difficult for the external observer to register, for they do not fall neatly into a 
framework of rules or reveal themselves in line with objective and measurable 
performance indicators. Rather they are inherently subjective, as Tyler notes: “A 
normative perspective leads to a focus on people’s internalised norms of justice and 
obligation”.8 9 But although these beliefs about the legitimacy of institutions are 
subjective and internalised, it is also clearly evident that clusters of individuals share 
similar beliefs, which in turn means that certain beliefs have a tendency to spread 
across society and assume an ‘inter-subjective’ quality. With regard to criminal 
justice and security provision, Tyler has repeatedly discovered that large cohorts 
within modern societies tend to confer legitimacy upon those institutions which 
represent the will of the majority through fair, predictable and universal procedures10 
(a formula which, notably, is also reflected in Fritz Scharf s conceptualisation of 
‘input-orientated’ legitimacy).11 Therefore, when citizens encounter a security 
provider which they believe to be both representative and fair, then the presence of 
this institution will make these citizens feel safe and they will in turn ob'ey and 
support the institution’s operations -  a scenario which translates into a higher level of 
legitimacy. Conversely, if  these same citizens encounter a security provider which 
they do not believe to be representative and fair, then the presence of this institution 
will not necessarily make them feel safe and they will be much less likely to obey and 
support to this provider’s operations -  a scenario which translates into a lower level of 
legitimacy.12
As Beetham remarks, it is important for all three types of legitimacy to be present 
for an institution to successfully wield power within modern society -  and this is 
especially the case for those institutions which often exercise physical force such as 
security providers, since their activities are more likely to contravene an individual’s
8 Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power, p. 17.
9 Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, p.4 [italics added],
10 See: Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, Tom R. Tyler, ‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy’, Annals o f  the 
American Academy o f Political and Social Science 593(1) (2004), pp. 84-99.
11 Scharpf, Governing in Europe, pp.6-11.
12 Crawford, ‘Reconfiguring the Community and Professional in Policing and Criminal Justice’, 
pp. 134-138.
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rights than less coercive agencies. However, Beetham continues, “[legitimacy is 
not an all-or-nothing affair”,13 4 it can be there to greater or lesser degrees. Richard 
Sparks and Anthony Bottoms continue and expand upon this theme:
...legitimacy is variously claimed, fought over, achieved, eroded and lost. One 
can easily see that states and institutions might ride a roller-coaster of waxing 
and waning legitimacy and, crucially, that they might wish to (or feel obliged 
to) orient their behaviour strategically towards recovering legitimacy when it is 
threatened.15
When defining legitimacy, then, we must be aware not only of the different 
interpretations of this complex term, but also of its dynamic nature. We must not 
view legitimacy as a steady, immutable condition, but as an ongoing process which 
has a number of different trajectories, such as ‘legitimation’, ‘de-legitimation’ and ‘re­
legitimation’.
With these definitions in mind, we can now proceed to map out how the term 
‘legitimacy’ will be understood and deployed throughout this investigation. The 
subsequent chapters will be concerned almost entirely with ‘normative’ legitimacy 
and the corresponding processes of ‘normative’ (re)legitimation. Indeed, one o f the 
central propositions advanced within this investigation is that it is this particular 
dimension of legitimacy which is central to understanding how private security 
companies have once again become legitimate providers of security functions in 
postwar Britain. For while private security companies have always been endowed 
with ‘legal’ legitimacy as agents of private property, and they have similarly always 
been free to accrue ‘instrumental’ legitimacy so long as they meet the requisite 
objective performance criteria,16 they have faced significant constraints in their 
attempts to accumulate ‘normative’ legitimacy. And these constraints have in turn 
translated into an ongoing struggle with British the state over this resource -  a 
resource which, it must be emphasised, is crucial to the successful provision of 
security functions in any society.
13 Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power, p. 19 and 40.
M Beetham, The Legitimation o f Power, pp. 19-20.
Richards Sparks and Anthony Bottoms, ‘Legitimacy and Order in Prisons’, British Journal of 
Sociolog}’ 46(1) (1995), p.49.
For an analysis o f these legal powers see: Philip C. Stenning, ‘Powers and Accountability of Private 
Police’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 8 (2000), p.331.
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The origins of this struggle can be traced back three hundred years or so, to the 
genesis of the modern state in Britain. For since the end of the seventeenth century 
renowned intellectuals such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, together with 
prominent state officials such as William Pitt and Robert Peel, have consistently 
justified the existence of the modem state by portraying it as the only possible 
solution to social disorder.17 * They have done this by constantly communicating a 
simple yet powerful institutional formula, namely contrasting the violence and 
iniquity of a privately secured social order with the peace and virtue of a publicly 
secured social order. Alongside this trend, moreover, the British state has become 
both more democratic as the franchise has been widened and more consistent and fair 
in its criminal justice procedures as state bureaucracy has been formalised, which has 
in turn served to reinforce the notion of the state as a universal and benevolent 
provider of security functions. The significant consequence of these interrelated and 
overlapping processes has been that during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries the majority of the British population gradually came to believe that the 
modern state ought to be the only provider of security functions.19 For many, it was 
the only security provider which made them feel safe and was, by extension, the only 
security provider to which they were inclined to offer their obedience and support. 
The modern state, in other words, gradual came to monopolise normative legitimacy 
within the British security sector during this era.
The important by-product of this process was that over the same period of time
*
private security providers were steadily stripped of their normative legitimacy -  that 
is, the majority of the British population gradually ceased to believe that private 
security providers had any rightful authority in the security sector. For as Philip 
Rawlings has remarked private security provision simply “did not form part o f the 
idea of policing that was being constructed” by the Britain’s political and intellectual 
elites.20 To use Les Johnston’s useful categorisation, in this period, the British 
criminal justice system in general and security provision in particular consequently 
shifted from a ‘private’, ‘informal’ and ‘local’ mode of delivery to a ‘public’, ‘formal’
17 Shearing, ‘The Relation Between Public and Private Policing’, p.402.
These historic trends will be explored in much greater depth during our discussion o f the ‘monopoly 
myth’ in Chapter 2.
David Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society’, British Journal o f  Criminology 36(4) (1996), pp.448-449.
Philip Rawlings, ‘Policing before the Police’, in Handbook o f Policing ed. Tim Newburn 
(Cullompton: Willan, 2000), p.61.
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and ‘central’ one.21 And, crucially, during the course of this historic shift most 
private security providers in turn experienced ever greater degrees of marginalisation 
and de-legitimation.
This trend arguably reached its apex in the decade following World War II, which 
could be described as a moment of high normative legitimation for the public police 
and a moment of low normative legitimation for private security (though it must be 
emphasised that this inverse relationship was contingent rather than necessary -  that 
is, the legitimation of one security provider does not automatically equate to the de­
legitimation of another, but in this case the conditions for the legitimation o f the 
public police during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries certainly contributed 
towards the de-legitimation of private security). For while at this time the public 
police were generally viewed as a source of national pride, commanding widespread 
respect and obedience, private security companies were largely derided by the 
majority of the British population. Yet since the time of this high-point for public 
policing in Britain, there has been a pronounced shift away from a monopolistic, 
state-centred mode of security provision towards a pluralistic, networked mode in 
which both public and private security providers function together as an ‘extended 
policing family’. And one of the key features of this transformation has been the 
normative re-legitimation of private security companies. For many British citizens 
now believe that private security companies do have some rightful authority in the
security sector and they consequently offer these institutions both obedience and
*
support. The objective of this thesis, then, is to put forward an explanation for this 
dramatic reversal in the status of private security companies since 1945. It will seek 
to understand how these companies have attempted overcome the two considerable 
challenges they faced in the accrual of normative legitimacy, namely a state which 
jealously guarded its virtual monopoly over normative legitimacy and a hostile 
population which was not inclined to believe in the authority of private security 
provision. It will, in short, proffer an answer to the question: how have private 
security companies attempted to re-capture normative legitimacy from state 
institutions within the postwar security sector? (It is important to note .that whenever 
the term ‘legitimacy’ is used hereafter we are referring to ‘normative legitimacy’, 
unless specified otherwise.)
Les Johnston, The Rebirth o f Private Policing (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.6-7.
2 1
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In brief, the answer to this question advanced here is that over the past fifty years 
private security companies have actively sought to develop official connections with 
the Home Office and police in an effort to communicate to the British population that 
they are not in fact purebred market actors functioning in accordance with the logic of 
profit margins and private goods, but are rather state-deputised actors operating in line 
with the public’s normative expectations that security ought to be provided by the 
state as a universal public good. The primary strategy used by private security 
companies to establish this official connection has been to lobby in favour o f statutory 
regulation. For they conjectured that such a regulatory system would serve to 
construct a concrete and highly visible relationship between the industry and the state, 
in the process facilitating the transfer of legitimacy from the Home Office and police 
to the private security companies. As we will see, however, these state institutions 
did not relinquish their legitimacy without a fight, and it was only after half a century 
of complex and intense political strategising that such a regulatory framework, in the 
form of the Private Security Industry Act 2001, was finally established. This thesis 
will thus analyse the negotiations between the private security industry, the Home 
Office, the police and a variety of other state institutions over the key resource of 
legitimacy within the British security sector from the end of World War II until the 
passing of this Act in 2001. For the contention of this investigation is that these 
negotiations, more than any other factor, serve to explain the re-legitimation of private 
security in postwar Britain.22
t
This particular research is very timely in one sense and timeless in another. It is 
timely for three reasons. First, there is virtually no detailed empirical research on the 
relationship between the private security industry, the British state, legitimacy and 
regulation. As O’Connor et al have recently observed, the literature which does touch 
upon these variables is generally concerned only with classifying different types of 
regulatory framework or developing normative proposals for future regulatory 
systems. They note, for instance, that “[rjigorous empirical research on the 
relationship between state regulation and security management protocols is largely
22 It should be mentioned that this analysis does not represent a direct explanation for the growth of 
private security in postwar Britain. For it does not explore the entire range of strategies for economic 
expansion employed by the private security companies, nor does it study all o f the contextual factors 
which served to facilitate the growth of the industry. Yet, as we will see, the re-legitimation narrative 
does overlap with the growth narrative at various stages.
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non-existent”.23 Indeed, the only empirical analyses of these interrelated themes can 
be found in the cursory accounts of Bruce George and Mark Button, which are both 
largely anecdotal (drawing upon George’s years in the House of Commons as a pro­
regulation lobbyist) and secondary to their main objectives of classifying the various 
dimensions of the industry and generating proposals for reform.24 In undertaking this 
research, then, this investigation will contribute towards the filling of a notable gap in 
the literature.
Second, now is an important time to conduct this research because the regulatory 
regime legislated for in the Private Security Industry Act 2001 is currently in the 
process of being rolled out across Britain. In April 2003, the Security Industry 
Authority, a non-departmental public body accountable to the Home Secretary, was 
established in order to implement the regulation. By March 2006, the resulting 
licensing and accreditation schemes had been activated in both England and Wales. 
In June 2006, they had been extended to Scotland, and are due to be extended to 
Northern Ireland during 2009. In addition, the European Commission is currently 
speculating about the creation of an internal market for private security and the 
harmonisation of regulatory regimes across member states.25 Given the currently high 
very levels of political activity in the private security policy arena, then, an in-depth 
discussion of the relationship between the private security, the British' state, 
legitimacy and regulation can be used to provide important background information 
for these political processes.
Third, this thesis contributes towards contemporary academic debates in both the 
criminology and political science disciplines regarding the changing nature o f state 
sovereignty in contemporary Britain. Criminologists are currently concerned with the 
extent to which the security sector, which is arguably the most sovereign o f all state 
domains, is witnessing the emergence of a radical new era of networked, pluralised 
security provision or the gradual evolution and extension of a traditional, state-centred
23 Daniel O’Connor, Randy Lippert, Dale Spencer and Lisa Smylie, ‘Seeing Private Security Like a 
State’, Criminology & Criminal Justice 8(2) (2008), p.205.
24 See: Bruce George and Mark Button, ‘Too Little Too Late? An Assessment of Recent Proposals for 
the Private Security Industry in the United Kingdom’, Security Journal 10 (1998), pp.2-4; Bruce 
George and Mark Button, Private Security (Leicester: Perpetuity Press, 2000), pp. 175-181.
25 See: Mark Button, ‘Assessing the Regulation of Private Security Across Europe’, European Journal 
of Criminology 4 (2007), 109-128; European Commission, Amended Proposal fo r a Directive o f  the 
European Parliament and o f the Council on Services in the Internal Market, Corn (2006) 160 Final, 
(Brussels: Commission o f the European Communities, 2006).
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system.26 In parallel, though at a slightly higher level of abstraction, political 
scientists are currently disputing the degree to which the modern, bureaucratic and 
hierarchical British state is being either ‘hollowed out’ or ‘re-constituted’.27 As we 
will see, the arguments advanced in later chapters serve to cut through the middle of 
these debates. For, interestingly, the re-legitimation of private security reveals the 
British social order in deep flux. It demonstrates how the private security industry, 
one of the vanguard industries of an emerging postmodern order, is actively 
reconciling its existence with the still resonant state-centric structures and social 
norms associated with the enlightenment. It is possible to assert, then, that private 
security provision is at once both eroding and reproducing the various dimensions of 
state sovereignty in Britain today. Understanding the relationship between private 
security, the British state, legitimacy and regulation thus has important implications 
for some of the central questions in contemporary criminology and political science.
In another important sense, however, the issues addressed in this investigation are 
timeless. This is because security impacts upon all people at all times. If individuals 
experience a subjective sense of security in their minds -  that is, if  they perceive the 
outside world to be secure and stable -  then they can construct life plans which 
directly reflect their personal desires and preferences. If individuals enjoy objective 
conditions of security in that outside world then, all other things being equal, they can 
go about translating these life plans into material circumstances. Therefore, security 
is for everyone a precondition of autonomy and liberty. As a consequence, politicians 
and intellectuals have for centuries been engaged in a dialogue about how best to 
maximise subjective experiences of and objective conditions for security. For this is 
tantamount to maximising one of the fundamental qualities of human life. To the 
extent that this investigation facilitates a greater understanding of security provision 
in Britain today, it will therefore be contributing towards a dialogue which has been 
gathering momentum for hundreds of years and will no doubt continue to do so for 
hundreds more.
26 See: Lucia Zedner, ‘Policing Before and After the Police: The Historical Antecedents of 
Contemporary Crime Control’, British Journal o f Criminology 46(1) (2006), pp.78-79.
27 For an example of the ‘hollowing out’ thesis, see: R. A. W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: 
Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 
1997). For an example of the ‘re-constitution’ thesis, see: David Marsh, David Richards and Martin 
Smith, ‘Unequal Plurality: Towards an Asymmetric Power Model of British Politics’, Government and 
Opposition 38(3) (2003), pp.306-332.
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1.2 Chapter Outline
To begin with, Chapter 2 will develop an organising perspective with which to
examine the relationship between the British state, private security and the legitimacy
to undertake security functions. It will begin by critiquing the dominant way of
conceptualising the relationship between these three variables within contemporary
political science, termed here the ‘monopoly’ paradigm. Within this paradigm, the
state is seen as exercising a legitimate monopoly over security provision and, by
extension, private security provision is viewed as a marginalized, illegitimate and
insignificant phenomena. By depicting such a one-sided, stable and immutable
relationship between the state, private security and legitimacy, it will be contended
that this conceptualisation serves to obscure and conceal the many processes of
negotiation and contestation within the security sector -  processes, moreover, which
are central to understanding the re-legitimation of private security. Chapter 2 will
argue that we need to move beyond the monopoly paradigm and instead inteipret the
interactions between the state, private security and legitimacy as a fluid, complex and
dialectical relationship, for this will provide us with a more effective lens through
which to view the many contrasting and conflicting political, economic and social
processes which characterise the security sector. The chapter will then proceed to
examine three ‘post-monopoly’ theoretical approaches -  the nodal governance,
anchored pluralism and state-in-society models -  in order to explore the various ways
in which they can usefully be drawn upon to add further depth and rigour to this
*
dialectical approach.
Following this theoretical discussion, the main body of this thesis is divided into 
five chronologically ordered empirical chapters, each of which explores a distinct 
phase of the negotiations between the state and private security institutions over the 
legitimacy to undertake security functions within postwar Britain. Chapter 3 will 
examine the period 1945-1959, which witnessed the first recorded contact between 
private security and state institutions. This rather low-key and informal phase o f the 
negotiations revolved around correspondence between the private security company 
Securicor and the Metropolitan Police. From this early stage it was clear that 
Securicor was acutely aware that the security services they provided were lacking in 
legitimacy. As a consequence, they attempted through a variety o f strategies to 
establish a series of publicly recognisable and official-looking connections with the
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Metropolitan Police so as to enhance the legitimacy o f the company. This would, 
they reasoned, serve to facilitate the expansion of their operations, since the British 
population would in turn be more willing to procure their services. The Metropolitan 
Police, however, were also acutely aware that any such connections could indeed 
result in such a transfer of legitimacy to the private security industry and immediately 
opposed this strategy, for they wanted to protect their own status and legitimacy 
within the security sector. Given the vastly superior resources and standing o f the 
Metropolitan Police within the security sector at this particular time, their agenda 
dominated these early negotiations.
Chapter 4 will analyse the period 1960-69 in which the rudimentary agendas set
down by Securicor and the Metropolitan Police were transferred to a broader set of
institutions, most notably the British Security Industry Authority (BSIA) and the
Home Office. This served to consolidate the respective agendas o f the private
security and state institutions within a far more structured and formal policy arena.
Moreover, it was during this period that the negotiations began to revolve primarily
around the issue of statutory regulation. The private security institutions were
strongly in favour of introducing regulation, for it represented the ideal institutional
mechanism through which to develop official connections with state institutions and
in turn capture legitimacy. The Home Office and police opposed statutory regulation
for exactly the same reason -  that is, they wanted to maintain the state’s control over
legitimacy within the security sector. Importantly, at this time the Home Office and
*
police were still more powerful than the private security institutions and on the whole 
continued to dominate the negotiations. This said, towards the end o f the 1960s there 
were nevertheless clear signs that the larger private security companies and the BSIA 
were becoming increasingly influential. From this period onwards, then, the 
negotiations started to look like a genuine political contest between the private 
security and state institutions.
Chapter 5 will explore the period 1969-79 in which the previously bifurcated 
negotiations over the constitution of the security sector started to become more 
complex. For while the private security and state institutions continued to battle over 
the regulation issue as before, a number of parliamentary actors -  both committees 
and individual MPs -  began to enter into the negotiations and in turn developed a 
third agenda. Like the Home Office and police, they were suspicious of the private 
security companies, viewing them as enemies of the public good. Yet their response
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to the threat posed by these companies was not to ostracise them but rather to 
advocate a system of statutory regulation which could be used to impose strict 
standards of training and accountability upon the industry, thereby bringing the 
industry’s operations in line with ‘good’ policing practices. This in fact served to 
both undermine the anti-regulation position of the Home Office and police and, at the 
same time, reinforce the pro-regulation standpoint of the industry. The private 
security institutions and the parliamentary actors therefore entered into a rather 
incongruous but nevertheless influential alliance -  an alliance which, crucially, 
enabled the private security companies to pursue more effectively their attempts to 
capture legitimacy. The Home Office and police did manage to continue enforcing 
their anti-regulation agenda upon the negotiations in the face o f this growing 
opposition, yet the pro-regulation agenda was now gathering a great deal of 
momentum.
Chapter 6 will examine the period 1979-1996, which did eventually see the 
emergence of a consensus around the pro-regulation agenda. However, the path to 
this consensus was complex and highly contested. In the new market-friendly 
neoliberal context, many private security companies abandoned their long-standing 
strategy of attempting to capture legitimacy from the state and were instead content to 
operate as ordinary commercial organisations providing ordinary services. 'A s  a 
consequence, these companies broke away from the pro-regulation lobby, in the 
process temporarily bringing to an end their alliance with the parliamentary actors. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, this neoliberal experiment began to falter as 
the private security companies began to once again experience an acute legitimation 
crisis. They accordingly re-established their alliance with the pro-regulation 
parliamentary actors in order to resume their previous strategy of attempting to 
capture legitimacy from the state. Furthermore, this reconstituted alliance was 
considerably strengthened at this time by the support of the Association o f Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) and Police Federation, who had now fallen in line with the 
parliamentary actors’ rationale for supporting regulation. Through persistent lobbying 
this newly empowered alliance had, by the mid-1990s, managed to manufacture a 
tentative pro-regulation consensus, which included a reluctant Home Office. It is 
important to note, however, that while the Home Office generally continued to oppose 
statutory regulation -  although to an ever-reducing degree as opposition increasingly 
mounted -  its rationale for defending this policy stance underwent a transformation
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during the 1980s. For over the course of this decade the Flome Office, too, 
experienced an internal neoliberal revolution. It now opposed regulation not because 
it would serve to re-legitimate the private security industry, but because it would 
create an unnecessary bureaucratic expense. Indeed, the Home Office was at this time 
increasingly contracting out formerly state monopolised security functions to the 
industry in order to relieve financial pressures on the exchequer and the over­
burdened police, in turn demonstrating that their concerns about the transfer of 
legitimacy to the industry were considerably diminished. In short, by the mid-1990s 
the establishment of a tentative consensus around the implementation o f statutory 
regulation, together with the changing policy stance of the Home Office, meant that 
from the perspective of the private security industry the possibilities for capturing 
legitimacy were promising.
Chapter 7 will analyse the period 1997-2001. This short but vital phase in the 
negotiations saw the tentative pro-regulation consensus between the private security 
institutions, the parliamentary actors, the Home Office and the police strengthened 
and concretised by the support of the New Labour government, whose partnership 
approach to crime control seemed to satisfy the preferences of all these public and 
private actors. Building upon this consensus, the government accordingly translated 
these preferences into the Private Security Industry Act 2001. Crucially, for the 
private security institutions this Act created the official and publicly identifiable 
connections through which legitimacy could be transferred from the state institutions 
to the private security companies. For the parliamentary and police reformers, on the 
other hand, the Act established institutional and legal mechanisms which could be 
used to impose more rigorous standards of training and accountability upon the 
private security companies. They generally recognised that this would have the 
additional effect transferring legitimacy to the industry, but this was generally 
regarded as a secondary consideration compared with benefits that regulation would 
bring to public safety. Either way, this Act represented a critical milestone in the 
process of re-legitimating the private security industry within postwar Britain.
Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude by developing two summative arguments and then 
identifying two areas for future research. First, it will provide an overview of the 
theory and evidence examined throughout the course of this investigation so as to 
clarify the processes by which private security companies have once again become 
legitimate providers of security functions in postwar Britain. Second, it will return to
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the important debates about the nature of British sovereignty at the beginning o f the 
twenty-first century. It will demonstrate how the arguments advanced in the 
preceding chapters can be used to contribute towards both the criminology 
discussions about transformation of security provision in late modern Britain as well 
as the political science debates over the extent to which the British state is being 
‘hollowed out’ or ‘re-constituted’. Finally, this chapter will illustrate how the 
arguments mapped out in this investigation can be used as a starting point for two 
further areas of research: first, a comparative study of the divergent trajectories of 
private security regulation in different countries; and second, the regulation o f those 
international private military companies which, since the conflict in Sierra Leone 
during the 1990s and then the current war in Iraq, have frequently made newspaper 
headlines.
(It is also important to note that Appendix 1 discusses the methodology used 
throughout the course of this thesis. It contains both a detailed analysis o f the 
procedures employed to gather data for the empirical chapters and an evaluation of the 
quality and status of the resultant data. This discussion has no definitive position in 
the chapter structure of this investigation -  hence its location in the appendices -  and 
can thus be visited at any point during the reading of this thesis.)
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BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
2Theorising the State, Private Security and Legitimacy
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to develop an organising perspective with which to 
interpret the relationship between the three core variables examined within this thesis: 
the British state, private security and the legitimacy to undertake security functions. 
An organising perspective is defined here as a coherent series of explanatory and 
normative propositions, together with a corresponding conceptual vocabulary, which 
can be employed to order, arrange and interpret empirical data.1 Once developed, it 
will be utilised as a lens through which to examine the empirical material presented 
throughout the remainder of this investigation, thereby generating a theoretically- 
informed narrative of the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain. In 
order to construct such an organising perspective, this chapter will be separated into 
five, cumulative sections.
Section 2.2 will critically appraise the traditional -  and often implicit -  organising 
perspective for analysing the relationship between these three variables, which is here 
termed the ‘monopoly’ paradigm. This perspective asserts that the modern state can 
and should be the only legitimate provider of security functions and, by extension, 
that private security provision is a marginalized and illegitimate phenomenon. In 
certain respects, this paradigm does have a degree of analytical purchase and should 
assume a key position in any theoretically-informed discussion of the contemporary 
British security sector. Yet it is also contended here that this formulation obscures as 
much as it elucidates. For, crucially, it puts forward an extremely static picture of 
how security can and should be provided which underplays and obfuscates the highly 
contested nature of this key sector. Most importantly for our purposes, it does not 
provide any analytical space in which to articulate and theorise the processes by 
which private security companies have over the past fifty years contested and eroded 
the role of the core state institutions within the security sector. Section 2.2 will thus 
conclude by arguing that while certain dimensions of the monopoly paradigm should
1 This draws upon the definition of ‘organising perspectives’ advanced in: Andrew Gamble, ‘Theories 
of British Politics’, Political Studies 38(3) (1990), pp.405-406.
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be integrated into our organising perspective, it does not in itself represent an 
appropriate analytical framework for studying security provision in contemporary 
Britain.
Following directly on from this critical discussion of the traditional way of 
conceptualising security provision, Section 2.3 will contend that the most effective 
way of comprehending the complex and dynamic relationship between the British 
state, private security provision and the legitimacy to undertake security functions is 
by reformulating it as a structure-agency dialectic. The objective of our organising 
perspective then becomes one of giving expression to the relationship between a 
particular structure (the British population’s normative expectations about how 
security ought to legitimately be provided) and a specific set of agents (private 
security and state institutions). This more fluid and flexible conceptualisation, it will 
be argued, facilitates a more sophisticated examination of the processes involved in 
the re-legitimation of private security. This section will also assert, however, that this 
reformulation represents only the beginnings of a new organising perspective. A 
cross-cutting analysis of other more established approaches is required in order to 
further develop and refine the characteristics of these structures and agents. In other 
words, it is only by probing this reformulation with contrasting and complementary 
insights from other established paradigms that we can begin to appreciate the depth 
and complexity of this new set of propositions. As a consequence, the subsequent 
three sections will critically evaluate those theoretical approaches which readily 
provide conceptual insights into various aspects of this structure-agency dialectic.
Section 2.4 will analyse the nodal governance paradigm which, it is contended, 
successfully articulates the agency side of the dialectic, but significantly underplays 
the influence of structure. Section 2.5 will then analyse the anchored pluralism 
perspective which, conversely, highlights very effectively the structural side o f the 
dialectic, but over-marginalizes the influence of agency. Finally, Section 2.6 will 
examine the state-in-society approach which, it is asserted, clearly expresses both 
sides of this dialectic. It successfully captures the way in which diffuse normative 
expectations about how security functions ought to be provided impact upon the 
agency of different state and private security institutions, thereby causing a kind of 
structured contestation within the security sector -  a dynamic which is key to 
understanding the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain. This chapter 
will therefore conclude by arguing that the state-in-society approach, when examined
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in conjunction with the structure-agency dialectic developed in Section 2.2, represents 
the most effective organising perspective with which to explore the complex and 
dynamic processes investigated within this thesis.
2.2 The Monopoly Myth
This section will begin by introducing the way in which the complex relationship 
between the state, private security and the legitimacy to undertake security functions 
is conceptualised within the monopoly paradigm. It will do this by briefly tracing the 
influence of this paradigm through the history of modern political thought. It will 
then criticise this paradigm for advancing an unrealistic state-centred account o f the 
connections between these three variables. For it gives the state a monopolistic and 
unchallenged power to control what is in reality a highly controversial and contested 
political function. Crucially, it is precisely within this contestation that we find many 
of the processes relating to the re-legitimation of private security. This is not to say 
that the monopoly paradigm does not have any analytical purchase, however, for it 
most certainly does. In particular, the historical dominance of this paradigm means 
that the ideas contained within it strongly influence the way in which politicians, 
intellectuals and everyday citizens alike think about how security functions ought to 
be provided, which is in itself a powerful force. Nevertheless, it does not on its own 
represent a complete organising perspective. Instead, this section will contend that 
the monopoly paradigm is a powerful myth which should assume one part of a more 
nuanced and dynamic organising perspective.
The monopoly paradigm has undoubtedly come to dominate political science over 
the past three hundred years, appearing explicitly and implicitly within countless 
analyses of both security provision and much broader social, political and economic 
phenomena. Yet despite its many contemporary manifestations, when introducing the 
key propositions of the monopoly paradigm social scientists repeatedly return to the 
mid-seventeenth century writings of Thomas Hobbes. This is not because Hobbes 
was the sole originator of the key propositions set down within the paradigm -  he was 
reacting to the ideas of his contemporaries and the turbulent political events of his 
lifetime -  but because Hobbes’s most famous work of political philosophy, 2
2 Alan Ryan, ‘Hobbes’s Political Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes ed. Tom 
Sorrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.218.
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Leviathan, still represents one the clearest and earliest formulations of the logic 
underlying the monopoly paradigm. Following this trend, we will turn to Hobbes’s 
political philosophy in order to introduce the specifics of this paradigm. For the 
purposes of this introduction, Hobbes’s conceptualisation of the relationship between 
the state, private security and the legitimacy to undertake security functions found 
within Leviathan can be divided into three main propositions.
First, any population in which each individual attempts to enforce his own private 
conditions for security will counter-productively result in widespread, destructive 
chaos. This is because the ends pursued by each individual will not naturally 
harmonise, in turn forcing individuals into perpetual conflict with one other as they 
struggle to protect their own portion of the scare resources available. For Hobbes, 
“ [competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, 
enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is 
to kill, subdue, supplant or repel the other”. The “life of m an...” in such 
circumstances, Hobbes famously wrote, is therefore “ ...solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short”.3 4 For our present purposes, then, the key proposition here is that private 
security provision essentially results in anarchy.
Second, in order to transcend this violent, war-like existence, Hobbes contended that
mankind must move away from a state of nature in which each individual approaches
security and social order as a private good and concomitantly move towards a
collective institutional arrangement in which security and social order is realised as a
*
universal, public good. This could only be achieved, Hobbes reasoned, by each 
individual relinquishing his private powers of security provision and transferring them 
to a single public institution: the Leviathan (or modern state). The Leviathan will 
then “ ...use the strength and means o f them all, as he shall think expedient, fo r  their 
peace and common defence”.5 This results in the following institutional formula: 
while private security equates to anarchy, public security equates to peace and 
stability.
Third, it is important to add a final and too often overlooked element into this 
formula: legitimacy. The transition from a private to a public social order is not, for 
Hobbes, an externally imposed one, but rather an endogenous, voluntary agreement -
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.66.
4 Hobbes, Leviathan, p.84.
5 Hobbes, Leviathan, p.l 14 [italics in original].
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or social contract -  entered into by rational, far-sighted individuals. It is, Hobbes 
writes,
made by covenant of every man with every man, in such a manner, as if  every 
man should say to every man, I  authorize and give up my right o f  governing 
myself to this man, or to this assembly o f  men, on this condition, that thou give 
up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.6
Crucially, then, in consensually relinquishing their rights o f governing themselves, 
these individuals are surrendering their natural right to privately organise their own 
conditions for security and social order. Private security, in other words, is rendered 
illegitimate. Conversely, when these individuals concomitantly cede their rights of 
self-government to ‘this assembly of men’, the Leviathan (or modern state) becomes 
the only legitimate provider of security. Hobbes’s complete institutional formula can 
thus be seen to read: private security is illegitimate and equates to violent anarchy, 
whereas public security is legitimate and always equates to peace and stability.
Given that Hobbes was writing in the seventeenth century, it is remarkable how 
closely this formulation has been reproduced throughout the subsequent history of 
modern political thought. Its greatest impact, however, has undoubtedly been upon 
the development of liberalism during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, of which Hobbes is often seen as being a kind of early precursor.7 8 To be 
sure, a number of significant modifications have been made by liberal thinkers over 
the years. For instance, the power of the modern state to legitimately proscribe the 
activities of individuals in order to maximise public security have since been 
constitutionally limited in most theorisations — an innovation which was most 
famously and influentially mapped out in John Locke’s conception of property rights 
in his Second Treatise on Government. And few liberals now believe that the 
concentration of executive powers in the modern state can be justified with reference 
to a tacit and hypothetical social contract, arguing instead that it must be legitimated 
through a democratic mandate. Yet despite these important transformations, the three 
core propositions of Hobbes’s formulation have had an enormous influence over the 
development of modern liberal thought. For whether we examine the classical
6 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 114 [italics in original].
7 John Gray, Liberalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2"d edition, 1995), p. 12.
8 John Locke, Two Treatises o f  Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988).
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liberalism of F. A. Hayek, the reformist liberalism of L. T. Hobhouse, the liberal 
elitism of Max Weber or the liberal pluralism of Robert Dahl, we find repeated and 
explicit references to the fundamental proposition that the state is the only legitimate 
provider of security functions and, by extension, that private security is illegitimate 
and equates to some kind of violent, anarchical social order.9 10 So while to varying 
degrees these writers see public-private contestation in a variety of political arenas, 
when it comes to security provision none of them account for any contestation 
whatsoever -  the security sphere is simply viewed as being legitimately monopolised 
by the modern state.
Moreover, we can trace the influence of the monopoly paradigm even further than 
modern liberalism. For not only does it dominate liberal political thought, but has for 
many years permeated the major textbooks on the state within contemporary political 
science. And these, in their use as teaching resources for university syllabuses across 
the world, arguably have even more immediate impact today than the classic liberal 
treatises listed above. Take three recent influential textbooks: Patrick Dunleavy and 
Brendan O’Leary’s Theories o f  the State: The Politics o f  Liberal Democracy, John 
Hall and John Ikenberry’s The State and John Hoffman’s Beyond the State: An 
Introductory Critique. Each emphasises the diversity of the modern state in both 
theory and practice, yet at the same time each asserts that with regard to security^ the 
enforcement of law and the maintenance of social order, the state is the only 
legitimate actor. No other institution is seen to contest the supreme legitimacy of the 
modern state in this fundamental sphere. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to assert, 
then, that the monopoly paradigm has come to assume a kind of default position for 
conceptualising the security sector throughout contemporary political science.
9 See: F. A. Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 19-20; L. T. 
Hobhouse, Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.78; Max Weber, ‘Politics as a 
Vocation’, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology eds. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: 
Routledge, 1991), p.78; Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970),
p. 12.
10 See: Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary, Theories o f  the State: The Politics o f  Liberal 
Democracy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), p.6; John Hall and John Ikenberry, The Slate (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), p.l; John Hoffman, Beyond the State: An Introductory Critique 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.34.
It should be noted, however, that in their concluding chapter to a recent popular textbook on the state, 
Michael Lister and David Marsh do point towards a more nuanced interpretation of the monopoly 
paradigm, though they fall short o f the comprehensive analysis offered in the nodal governance, 
anchored pluralism and state-in-society approaches. See: Michael Lister and David Marsh, 
‘Conclusion’, in The State: Theories and Issues eds. Colin Hay, Michael Lister and David Marsh 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.257.
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It is contended here, however, that this paradigm does not represent an adequate 
organising perspective for studying the contemporary security sector. For as 
subsequent chapters demonstrate it conceals the crucial processes of contestation 
within the security sector. The state has never occupied its position within the 
security sector without challenge, as many revisionist and radical (or non-liberal) 
analyses of law and order in Britain have indeed made clear.11 Instead, the state has 
always been forced to negotiate and struggle with non-state agencies for this position. 
And, crucially for our purposes, the complex processes relating to the re-legitimation 
of private security in postwar Britain represent one very important example of these 
negotiations and struggles. For since 1945 -  when according to many liberal histories 
the British state was supposedly at the peak of its powers within in the security 
sector12 -  the private security industry has been engaged in negotiations with the 
British state over the right to provide domestic security. Moreover, the industry has 
over the years made significant progress within these negotiations, to the extent that 
by the opening decade of the twenty-first century it was commonly viewed as being a 
(relatively) legitimate provider of security functions within Britain. Clearly such 
observations run contrary to the very foundations of the monopoly paradigm, which 
conceptualises private security as an illegitimate purveyor of anarchy. It is for this 
reason that we need to move beyond the monopoly paradigm so as to develop an 
alternative organising perspective for understanding the complex and dynamic 
relationship between the state, private security and the legitimacy to undertake
0
security functions.
This said, in developing a new organising perspective we must be careful not to 
lose sight of the enduring impact of the monopoly paradigm, not so much for its 
(highly problematic) empirical analysis of the security sector, but more for the 
normative ideas it puts forward about how security provision ought to be constituted. 
For while the writings of Hobbes and his followers have never really captured an 
actually existing institutional arrangement, it should be emphasised that they have 
given expression to and helped to perpetuate a common way of thinking about 
security. These intellectuals, together with other such notables of British political
11 See, for instance: E. P. Thompson, The Making o f the English Working Class (Middlesex: Penguin, 
1968); Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull, ‘Social Control in History and Sociology’, in Social Control 
and the Stale: Historical and Comparative Essays eds. Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1983), pp.1-16.
12 T. A. Critchley, A History o f the Police in England and Wales (London: Constable, 2nd edition, 
1978).
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history as Henry Fielding, William Pitt the Younger, Patrick Colquhoun and Robert 
Peel (among countless others), have collectively made the idea that the state ought to 
be the only legitimate provider of security functions one of the most important, 
immutable and pervasive streams of enlightenment political thought.13 Indeed, they 
have ensured that this simple idea has permeated the British national consciousness, 
influencing how many everyday citizens think about security -  a phenomenon which 
has been noted by Robert Reiner, who terms it “police fetishism”.14 This useful term 
does not imply that the British population is necessarily familiar with the 
philosophical rationales behind a state-centred mode of security provision, but rather 
that they have been persuaded by the dominant monopoly discourse that state 
institutions ought to monopolise crime control. To be sure, this fetishism is not 
universally shared, as Marxist analyses of repressive police behaviour suggest.15 
Indeed, it would be fallacious to proclaim, for instance, that the miners picketing in 
Yorkshire during the 1984-1985 strikes experienced any fetishism whatsoever for the 
police -  quite the opposite in fact. Yet enough people in contemporary Britain do 
display this fetishism, it is contended here, to provide it with an inter-subjective 
quality -  to make it a generalised ‘world view’. Importantly, this begins to explain 
why private security companies have been so concerned with developing linkages 
with the British state in order to enhance their legitimacy within the postwar era -  
because in most people’s eyes the state (or more specifically the police) is the only 
institution with the requisite legitimacy to undertake security functions.
The monopoly paradigm, then, does not betray a reality but rather creates and 
reproduces a myth -  and a very powerful one at that. And the ability to explain and 
understand this myth must be integrated into any organising perspective for studying 
the contemporary security sector. For the myth must be accounted for alongside the 
complex and contested concrete reality in which state and non-state institutions 
compete for control and legitimacy over the provision of security functions. In this 
way, the monopoly paradigm ceases to become a theoretical framework in itself and 
instead starts to become part of the historical narrative about the relationship between 
the state, private security and legitimacy which any viable organising perspective
13 On the role of these politicians, see: Charles Reith, The Police Idea: Its History and Evolution in 
England in the Eighteenth Century and After (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp.3-122
14 Reiner, The Politics o f the Police, (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 3rd edition, 2000), p.l.
15 For a clear example of such a Marxist analysis, see: Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John 
Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order (London: 
Macmillan, 1978).
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must explain. Hobbes and those reproducing his philosophical propositions are 
therefore viewed here less theorists of the relationship between these three variables 
and more as propagators of the monopoly myth which serves to link these variables 
together in such a way as to constitute and reproduce the phenomenon of police 
fetishism. We will now turn to the task of bringing together these theoretical 
arguments into one coherent organising perspective, which first involves introducing 
the structure-agency dialectic.
2.3 The Structure-Agency Dialectic
This section will begin the process of developing an organising perspective which is 
capable of articulating the contestation between state and private security agencies 
over the institutional space within the British security sector while, at the same time, 
allowing for the influence of diffuse but powerful normative expectations about how 
security ought to be provided (conceptualised in the previous section as the monopoly 
myth). For it is only with such a framework that we can successfully analyse the 
various political processes involved in the re-legitimation of private security in 
postwar Britain. It is contended in this section that the best way to begin constructing 
such an organising perspective is to draw upon the language of the ‘structure-agency 
dialectic’.
Over the past three decades or so, the structure-agency dialectic has become an 
increasingly popular heuristic device for critiquing overly' static and simplified 
conceptions of social phenomena and in their place theorising the existence of 
complex and dynamic sets of political, social and economic relationships.16 In basic 
terms, structure refers to “ ...the setting within which social, political and economic 
events occur and acquire meaning”, whereas agency concerns “ ...the ability or 
capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in doing so, to attempt to realise his or her 
intentions”.17 These two components are seen to exist within a dialectical relationship 
to the extent that each constantly and simultaneously impacts upon and transforms the 
constitution of the other, which in turn precipitates ongoing social, political and 
economic change in the social world.
16 For a review of this trend, see: Stuart McAnulla, ‘Structure and Agency’, in Theory and Methods in 
Political Science eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 
2002), pp.271-291.
17 Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.93.
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The popularity of this terminology is in part due to its flexibility. Agents can either 
be individuals or they can be different types of institutions, ranging from societal 
groupings and particular state institutions, through to entire states or even supra-state 
institutions. Structures can be yet more heterogeneous, for they can be reduced to 
actors constraining one another in the form of networks or expanded to include 
broader political-economic processes such as globalisation. And at other times they 
can refer to diffuse, inter-subjective socio-cultural norms which exist more in the 
ideational world than in the material world. The way in which structures and agents 
are conceptualised together is for some social scientists a very formulaic process 
which serves to generate a comprehensive and cohesive social theory -  for instance, 
Bob Jessop and Colin Hay’s strategic-relational perspective or Margaret Archer’s 
morphogenetic approach.18 For others, however, it is a more pragmatic, problem­
solving process, in which a miscellany of structures and agents are brought together in 
accordance with the specifications of a particular research question.19 It is this second 
route which will be taken within this section. For the structure-agency dialectic will 
be employed here to specifically articulate the complex and dynamic relationship 
between the state, private security and the legitimacy to undertake security functions 
in postwar Britain.
To do this, it is first necessary to demonstrate how agency will be conceptualised
within this investigation. The principal actors over the subsequent chapters will be
institutions -  as opposed to individuals -  and will be separated into two categories.
/
On one side we will have the numerous state institutions involved in the security 
sector negotiations, including the Home Office, the powerful police organisations 
such as ACPO and the Metropolitan Police, and a variety of both permanent and ad 
hoc parliamentary committees. On the other side we will have the private security 
institutions participating within the security sector negotiations, including the larger 
companies such as Group 4 and Securicor, together with the major industry trade 
associations such as the BSIA.20 For the purposes of this thesis, these institutions will
18 Hay, Political Analysis, pp.126-134; Margaret Archer, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic 
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
19 Mark Blyth, ‘Institutions and Ideas’, in Theoiy and Methods in Political Science eds. David Marsh 
and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2ml edition, 2002), p .310; Vivien Schmidt, 
‘Institutions’, in The State: Theories and Issues eds. Colin Hay, Michael Lister and David Marsh 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 116.
20 It is a limitation o f this research that the opinions and experiences of smaller private security 
companies are generally not accounted for.
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be anthropomorphised -  that is, they will take on the characteristics of unified and 
strategically calculating actors who are endowed with the ability to realise their 
preferences. This characterisation is obviously an abstraction, for all institutions are 
ultimately comprised of individuals. What this useful abstraction serves to capture, 
however, is the frequently observed phenomenon that those individuals working 
within a particular institution -  say, a central government department or a private 
company -  have a tendency to follow institutionally-defined patterns of behaviour and 
protocols as opposed to their own, personal strategic calculations (these observations 
are usually associated with the theoretical tradition of historical institutionalism).21 
This in turn gives that particular institution the appearance of being a kind of 
collective actor. Asserting that an institution has pursued a certain set o f preferences 
is therefore shorthand for saying that the combined agency of all the individuals 
working within that institution have collectively pursued these preferences. As we 
will see over subsequent chapters, this is the most suitable level of analysis for 
comprehending the political processes involved in the re-legitimation o f private 
security in postwar Britain. To be sure, where appropriate the level of analysis will be 
downsized so as to take account of institutional divisions and the role of influential 
individuals. Yet this will be the exception rather than the rule, for the ensuing 
investigation will be pitched primarily at the institutional level.
The most important consequence of viewing both state and private security
institutions as autonomous, strategically calculating actors is that it enables us to
*
conceptualise the way in which these institutions have come into conflict with one 
another as each attempts to out-negotiate and out-manoeuvre the other within the 
security sector. It will, in other words, set down the analytical foundations for giving 
expression to institutional contestation within the security sector and, by extension, 
provide a window into the processes relating to the re-legitimation of private security. 
This therefore represents a significant break away from the monopoly paradigm which 
essentially allocates agency only to state institutions within the security sector, 
thereby denying the possibility of public-private conflict within this sector. Yet while 
this is an important conceptual leap, these public and private institutions should not be 
viewed as acting without constraints. Instead, this contestation must be seen as being 
constrained by the structural context of the security sector.
21 For an overview of historical institutionalism, see: Schmidt, ‘Institutions’, pp. 104-106.
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On the structural side of the dialectic, this investigation will focus on how the 
British population’s widespread normative expectation that the state ought to be the 
only security provider within the security sector serves to constrain and facilitate the 
strategic calculations of both the state and private security institutions. By theorising 
structure in this way, this thesis will be drawing upon the sociological or cultural 
institutionalism tradition, which defines structure “ ...to include, not just formal rules, 
procedures and norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates 
that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action”. The ideas about the 
state, private security and legitimacy advanced by Hobbes and his diverse followers -  
that is, the monopoly myth -  will not therefore be seen as having a tightly demarcated 
material existence, but rather as being ingrained within the collective ‘world view’ of 
the British population, in turn creating a powerful inter-subjective social structure. 
And this structure will be seen to impact upon the way in which both the public and 
private institutions within the security sector formulate their preferences, for to some 
extent they will have to give consideration to these normative expectations if they are 
to avoid encountering widespread cultural resistance to their activities. Significantly, 
then, this conceptualisation of structure brings the influence of the monopoly myth 
back into our organising perspective and situates it alongside the agency of both state 
and private security organisations.
It is important to note, however, that other forms of structure will also be integrated
into this thesis where appropriate. For instance, reference will be made to the way in
*
which localised network structures, such as policy networks, are constructed when 
different state and private security institutions facilitate and constrain the activities of 
one another during the course of their political negotiations. Furthermore, extra 
reference will similarly be made to those capitalist structures, such as the economic 
imperative to roll back the welfare state during the 1980s, which also impacted upon 
the security sector negotiations in the period 1945-2001.2 34 These alternative structural 
explanations will nevertheless be the exception rather than the rule. For in order to 
make sense of the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain, analytical
22 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, 
Political Studies 44(4) (1996), p.947.
23 See: David Marsh and Martin J. Smith, ‘Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a Dialectical 
Approach’, Political Studies 48(1) (2000), pp.4-10.
24 See: Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the Slate (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000), pp.50-69.
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emphasis must be placed upon the ideational influence of the monopoly myth above 
all other types of structure.
We have now demonstrated that the language of structure and agency can be 
employed to conceptualise both public-private institutional contestation within the 
security sector and the influence of the normative expectations about how security 
ought to be provided. It is now important, then, to indicate how these newly 
formulated variables fit together within a dialectical relationship. For it is only by 
introducing the dialectic that we can begin to develop a clearer sense o f the 
complexity and dynamism facilitated by this reformulation. In relatively abstract 
terms, the dialectic runs as follow. While the normative expectations about legitimate 
security provision serves to shape the preferences of the state and private security 
institutions, these actors are by no means automatons who internalise and reproduce 
these social norms in exactly the same mechanical manner. They are strategically 
calculating actors endowed with some genuine autonomy. As a consequence, these 
private security and state institutions use their autonomy to interpret this ideational 
structure in a variety of ways, in the process translating it into contrasting sets of 
political preferences. And these contrasting preferences in turn create contestation 
within the security sector. Yet despite this contestation, there is also continuity. For 
as we have seen each set of preferences has been derived from an interpretation o f the 
same ideational structure, which means that each contains elements of the monopoly 
myth in some shape or form. So when these preferences are played out in the political 
arena, the outcome will to some extent reproduce this structure. The re-constituted 
structure is then ready to be reinterpreted by another set of actors in the next circuit of 
the dialectic. This dialectical process, it is argued here, provides an excellent heuristic 
device through which to begin to comprehend the complex and dynamic processes 
relating to the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
Indeed, the heuristic value of the structure-agency dialectic can be further 
demonstrated by briefly showing how it can be employed to interpret the empirical 
material from later chapters. For instance, during the immediate postwar decades the 
police institutions generally interpreted the normative expectations about security 
provision to quite literally to mean that they were the only institution endowed with 
the requisite legitimacy to undertake security functions and that they should 
accordingly set about marginalizing or shutting down private security companies. 
Yet, at the same time, the private security companies interpreted these same social
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norms to mean that if they were to operate with legitimacy within the security sector 
then they would have to associate themselves with the police, for this would enable 
them to capture the ‘stateness’ considered to be so essential for legitimately operating 
within the security sector. Immediately, then, we are confronted with two contrasting 
sets of preferences. For while the police wanted to undermine the private security 
companies, these very same companies wanted to build professional relationships 
with the police. This example serves to show how different strategically calculating 
actors encountered the same social structure in completely different ways, in the 
process generating contrasting sets of political preferences.
Despite this contestation, however, there was also a strong current continuity 
running through these negotiations, since each set of preferences articulated, in 
different ways, the same normative expectation that the state ought to be the only 
security provider. In the case of the police, this articulation was literal and self- 
evident. In the case of the private security companies, this articulation was more 
subtle, but nevertheless present. For they were not formulating their preferences in 
accordance with the logic of the unfettered market, but were rather attempting to 
capture legitimacy from the state, because this dovetailed with the normative 
expectations of the British population. In this way, then, the contrasting preferences 
of the police and the private security companies were, in various ways, imbued with 
the structural imperative of the monopoly myth. This structure was therefore being 
approximately reproduced throughout the course of these negotiations, in the process 
completing the dialectical circuit.
This more concrete example has now demonstrated more precisely how the 
structure-agency dialectic can be used as the basis for theorising the relationship 
between the state, private security and legitimacy. Reformulating these variables as a 
structure-agency dialectic does not, however, represent the completion of the process 
of developing an organising perspective for this investigation, but rather just the 
begimiing. For while this conceptualisation constitutes a very effective heuristic 
device for cutting into the main research question, it only provides the basic 
foundations for a fully developed organising perspective. It maps out the.structure- 
agency dialectic, but does not give these components a great deal of substance, 
character or analytical weight. To be sure, these details will to a large extent be 
determined empirically over the course of this investigation. But prior to this stage of 
the research process, it is important to draw upon those theoretical frameworks which
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to varying degrees have already addressed some of the conceptual issues raised by this 
structure-agency dialectic, for this will maximise the theoretical insights with which 
to inform the ensuing empirical analysis. By probing this structure-agency dialectic 
from other perspectives, in other words, we will achieve a deeper understanding of the 
various propositions advanced over the course of this section. It should also be 
mentioned that this exercise will also serve an important secondary purpose of 
situating this investigation within the extant academic literature on security provision. 
This cross-cutting theoretical review will be the task of the remaining three sections of 
the chapter.
In undertaking this review, however, it is very notable that we cannot draw upon 
many of the most commonly used theoretical approaches in contemporary political 
analysis, since they still tend to be explicitly or implicitly aligned with the 
problematic monopoly paradigm. We will therefore turn towards two approaches 
which are currently gaining a great deal of popularity within the disciplines of 
criminology and legal studies: the nodal governance and anchored pluralism models. 
And one approach which is still on the periphery of political science, although it is 
becoming increasingly popular: the state-in-society model. For in a variety of ways 
each of these three models moves beyond the restrictive assumptions o f the monopoly 
paradigm and contributes towards the further development of the structure-agency 
dialectic outlined in this section.
2.4 An Agential Model: Nodal Governance
The nodal governance approach is one of the two dominant paradigms for studying 
private security within the criminology and legal studies literature today -  the other 
main paradigm is the anchored pluralism approach, which will be examined in the 
next section -  and has been developed over the past two decades by a number of 
associated criminologists, including David Bayley, Benoit Dupont, Les Johnston, 
Clifford Shearing, Philip Stenning and Jennifer Wood. This section will critically 
examine this paradigm in order to assess the extent to which it can contribute towards 
the further development of the structure-agency dialectic mapped out above. It will 
contend that the nodal governance approach does enable us to further elucidate the 
agency side of the dialectic, specifically through its exploration of the legal 
foundations of private security authority and through its corresponding model for
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conceptualising the relationship between state and private security agency. This 
approach, in other words, helps us to understand the processes of contestation and 
negotiation within the security sector. This said, the nodal governance model 
significantly underplays the way in which the widespread normative expectations 
about how security ought to be provided within postwar Britain have the effect of 
constraining and facilitating the preferences and activities of the state and private 
security institutions, thereby structuring the negotiations between these actors in a 
particularly distinctive way. Consequently, this section will conclude by asserting 
that this approach can only make a limited contribution towards the refinement of the 
structure-agency dialectic outlined above.
To begin with, it is necessary to explore the way in which the nodal governance 
theorists conceptualise the legal foundations of private security authority which, for 
them, provides the concrete basis for private security agency. Despite the fact that 
these theorists adopt an extremely critical stance towards the family of liberal 
doctrines as a way of understanding private security -  mainly because these doctrines 
tend to unquestioningly accept the propositions of the monopoly paradigm -  they 
rather paradoxically argue that it is precisely the ongoing material realisation of 
liberal property arrangements which in fact serves to empower private security 
companies in the first instance.25 This is because they follow Shearing and Stenning’s 
observation that the increased agency of private security companies over recent 
decades has been largely dependent upon the emergence of mass private property -  
that is, large geographical tracts of privately owned public space such as shopping 
malls, industrial complexes, gated communities and so on.26 27 Within these spaces, 
Shearing and Stenning argue, the state-enforced rights of individuals to deploy their 
private property towards whatever ends they desire, so long as it does not contravene 
the property rights of others, allow the landlords to contract out security functions to 
private security companies. For Shearing and Stenning, these legally grounded 
property rights equate to what they consider to be the “legitimation of private security 
authority”. Moreover, they continue, the degree of this legitimate authority is
25 This paradoxical relationship with the theory and practice of liberalism is acknowledged, however. 
See: Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning, ‘Reframing Policing’, in Private Policing eds. Philip 
Shearing and Philip Stenning (London: Sage, 1987), pp.9-18.
26 Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning, ‘Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications’, 
Crime and Justice 3(1981), p.228.
27 Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning, ‘Private Security -  Implications for Social Control’, Social 
Problems 30(5) (1983), p.497.
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considerable: “While modern private security guards enjoy few or no exceptional law 
enforcement powers, their status as agents of property allows them to exercise a 
degree of authority which in practice far exceeds that of their counterparts in the 
public police”.28 2930 Significantly, these observations have provided the nodal 
governance theorists with a foundation upon which to theorise the relationship 
between private security and state agency (state agency does not, for these theorists, 
require any specific demonstration, it is simply assumed to exist).
In constructing this model, the first analytical specification the nodal governance 
theorists propose involves making a clear distinction between ‘auspices’, which are 
responsible for organising and directing security strategies, and ‘providers’, which 
actually undertake the corresponding security operations. They then contend that 
following the emergence of mass private property both o f these functions have 
become privatised to varying degrees. As a result, they maintain, it has become 
increasingly necessary to conceptualise auspices and providers in a relatively fluid 
and flexible manner, with no set boundaries between the functions o f public and 
private security actors. Bayley and Shearing correspondingly note that: “Auspices 
may be either public (governmental) or private (non-governmental); so, too, may 
providers. Furthermore, they may be combined in four ways -  public/public, 
public/private, private/public, private/private”. Next, these theorists argue that the 
various auspice-provider combinations resulting from this categorisation should be 
conceptualised within networks defined by power dependence.31 This means that all 
institutions, regardless of whether they are public or private, are dependent on one 
another for the realisation of their objectives -  no single institution, in other words, 
has the capacity to monopolise security provision. The security sector is thus 
characterised by contestation and negotiation between a variety of public and private 
institutions.
28 Shearing and Stenning, ‘Private Security’, p.497. For an updated version o f this assertion, see: 
Michael Kempa, Philip Stenning and Jennifer Wood, ‘Policing Communal Spaces: A Reconfiguration 
of the ‘Mass Private Property’ Hypothesis’, British Journal o f Criminology 44 (2004), pp.576-77.
29 David Bayley and Clifford Shearing, The New Structure o f  Policing: Description, Conceptualization 
and Research Agenda (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2001), p.3.
30 Bayley and Shearing, The New Structure o f Policing, p.3.
31 See: Benoit Dupont, ‘Security in the Age of Networks’, Policing &Society 14(1) (2004), pp.76-91. 
For a discussion of power dependence within a British context, see: R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh, 
‘Policy Networks in British Politics: A Critique of Existing Approaches’, in Policy Networks in British 
Government eds. David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp.10-11.
40
Furthermore, it is with regard to this process of exploring and conceptualising 
security networks that the nodal governance theorists advance, for our purposes at 
least, their most important theoretical point. For they argue emphatically that when 
examining the constitution of security networks we must not presuppose that state 
institutions have any special analytical priority over private ones. Put differently, we 
must not assume that, although private security companies occupy an increasingly 
prominent position within the contemporary security sector, they must as a matter of 
principle be positioned hierarchically below state institutions in the final analysis. 
According to these theorists, to make such state-centric a priori assumptions would 
essentially mean regressing back towards the monopoly paradigm they are explicitly 
seeking to transcend. Instead, they stipulate, we must regard the above-mentioned 
combinations as “empirically open questions”, free from the distorting legacy of the 
Flobbesian tradition.
This said, the nodal governance theorists are quick to acknowledge that upon 
application this framework does not automatically reveal private security agency and 
public-private contestation. For as one would realistically expect “ ...a t certain times 
and places state governments are empirically significant and powerful”,34 in turn 
orientating the nodal governance model more towards something like the traditional 
monopoly paradigm (though never all the way). Yet in other instances, Shearing 
observes, this is clearly not the case: “Rather [security] governance takes place 
through the ‘forging of alliances’ in which the state and non-state authorities seek to 
manage each other in an attempt to produce effects that they regard as desirable”. 
Shearing and Wood continue this theme:
For state nodes, the capacity to enlist others in the pursuit of state-centred 
objectives serves to enhance their resource base and their strategic capacity. For 
corporate nodes, the capacity to enlist state and ,other nodes in realizing their 
corporately defined objectives achieves high levels of self-direction and 
autonomy.36
32 Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, Governing Security>: Explorations in Policing and Justice 
(London: Routledge, 2003), p.22.
33 Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy and the New. Denizens’, 
Journal o f  Law and Society 30(3) (2003), p.404; Jennifer Wood, ‘Research and Innovation in the Field 
of Security: A Nodal Governance View’, in Democracy, Society> and the Governance o f  Security, eds. 
Jennifer Wood and Benoit Dupont (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p .218.
34 Shearing and Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy and the New Denizens’, p.405.
35 Clifford Shearing, ‘Reinventing Policing: Policing as Governance’, in Policing Change, Changing 
Police: International Perspectives, ed. Otwin Marenin (New York: Garland, 1996), p.287.
36 Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing, Imagining Security (Cullompton: Willan, 2007), p.97.
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With this analytical framework, then, a heterarchical and relational distribution of 
power is allowed to emerge within the security sector, with a variety of public and 
private actors, multiple sets of preferences and no clear overall winner. Indeed, as 
Wood and Shearing note, this “ ...conceptual architecture...is equally comfortable 
with the idea that [security] governance can be contested and uncoordinated as it is 
with the idea that it can be cooperative and coordinated”.37
It is now clear that the nodal governance approach advances some very useful
conceptual specifications which serve to add theoretical rigour to the agency side of
our dialectic. For the way in which these theorists approach the construction of
security networks, where public and private institutional relations are ‘empirically
mapped’ and free from the distortions of the monopoly paradigm, provides us with
some valuable guidelines for interpreting the empirical material in later chapters. We
can draw upon this model, for instance, to illustrate how private security companies
and their trade associations, together with the Home Office, police and various
parliamentary committees, have been engaged in reciprocal and hotly contested
negotiations over the key resource of legitimacy within the postwar security sector.
To be sure, during the actual course of these negotiations the state institutions did in
fact tend to exercise more control over the political agenda for much o f the time, as
later chapters will illustrate. Yet at other moments the private security companies did
appear to be genuinely steering the policy making process. And the important point
/
made by the nodal governance theorists is that we should not be prejudiced against 
recognising these moments by only searching for the agency o f state institutions. 
Regardless of whether we are examining the steering or rowing o f security functions 
we must not, in other words, be influenced by the analytical distortions o f the 
monopoly paradigm.
However, it is precisely because the nodal governance theorists argue for such an 
outright rejection of the monopoly paradigm that we cannot use their model for 
understanding the complete structure-agency dialectic outlined above. For they do 
not account for the structural influence of the monopoly myth — that is, the way in 
which the widespread normative expectations about how security ought to be 
legitimately provided serves to constrain and facilitate the agency of the private
37 Wood and Shearing, Imagining Security, p.28.
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security and state institutions. This blindness to structure is manifested both 
implicitly and explicitly within the nodal governance literature. It is, for instance, 
implicit within Shearing and Stenning’s interpretation of the legal foundations of 
private security authority. For while one of the unintended consequences o f liberal 
property arrangements is that legitimacy is conferred upon private security companies 
in narrow ‘legal’ terms, this does not necessarily mean that private security companies 
suddenly become legitimate in every sense of the word. They also need to satisfy the 
conditions for ‘instrumental’ and ‘normative’ legitimacy. Crucially, in the case of 
private security provision, these ‘normative’ expectations are not satisfied, for 
generally speaking British citizens expect this function to be performed by the state. 
And this normative dissatisfaction represents as an extremely important constraint. 
The empirically orientated and legalistic approach advanced by these theorists thus 
causes them to largely exclude the less tangible but nonetheless vital influence of 
inter-subjective social norms from the remit of their analysis, which in turn results in 
an overly agential model.
At other times, however, the nodal governance theorists’ rejection o f the structural 
influence of the monopoly myth is far more explicit. For these theorists are so 
anxious to distance themselves from the state-centred analyses o f the security sector 
that even on those few occasions when they do openly consider the ideational power 
of the monopoly myth they choose to actively eliminate it from their analysis. 
Shearing writes, for instance, that
...we should perhaps cease to place such a heavy normative burden on this idea, 
even as a convenient fiction, as this inevitably leads us towards the notion o f a 
benign Leviathan...As useful as the chimera of a public interest has been 
politically, we should perhaps accept, albeit reluctantly, that its day as a useful 
normative concept may be over.38
It is contended here that this is a flawed conclusion. The normative concept of a 
‘benign Leviathan’ protecting the ‘public interest’ was one of the most important 
political ideas of the enlightenment and has now firmly entered into the collective 
consciousness of large sections of the British population. And given that it is the 
British population which, on one side, provides governments with their democratic
38 Clifford Shearing, ‘Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments’, in 
Democracy, Society and the Governance o f Security, eds. Jennifer Wood and Benoit Dupont 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.29-30.
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mandate and, on the other, procures a significant proportion of the services offered by 
private security companies, their ‘world view’ cannot not be dismissed if we are to 
properly comprehend the complex dynamics of security provision in postwar Britain.
This section has demonstrated, then, that the nodal governance modal can be utilised 
to develop the agency side of our dialectic, but it cannot be employed to comprehend 
the structural side. For while it can be used to further articulate the agency o f private 
security companies, it cannot explain why these companies were so actively seeking 
to capture legitimacy from the state institutions by lobbying for statutory regulation. 
It cannot, in other words, conceptualise the enormous structural influence of the 
monopoly myth within the postwar British security sector. It is for this reason, then, 
the nodal governance paradigm is only of limited use to this investigation.
2.5 A Structural Model: Anchored Pluralism
The anchored pluralism approach is the other major paradigm for studying private
security within the extant criminology and legal studies literature and has been
developed over the past decade by Ian Loader and Neil Walker. This section will
critically appraise this approach so as to assess the degree to which it can be employed
to elaborate upon the structure-agency dialectic outlined above. In direct contrast"to
the nodal governance approach, it will be argued that Loader and Walker’s model
serves to further elucidate not the agential but rather the structural side o f the
*
dialectic. For it explores in detail how the activities of various security institutions 
are influenced by powerful normative expectations about security provision -  that is, 
by the structural influence of the monopoly myth. Like the nodal governance 
approach, however, the anchored pluralism model only helps us to further understand 
one side of the structure-agency dialectic, for it is contended here that it substantially 
downplays the impact of private security agency upon the constitution of the security
, 40sector. 3940
39 The term ‘anchored pluralism’ was not actually coined by the authors until 2006 in the publication: 
Ian Loader and Neil Walker, ‘Necessary Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the Production of 
Security’, in Democracy, Society and the Governance o f  Security, eds. Jennifer Wood and Benoit 
Dupont (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.194. But all related publications by the 
authors in the decade leading up to 2006 are taken to be a coherent body o f work which can all be 
examined under the title ‘anchored pluralism’.
40 It should be acknowledged from the outset that Loader and Walker often use the anchored pluralism 
model as a normative framework as opposed to an explanatory one. Following Adam Crawford, 
however, it is argued here that this model, used selectively, can also be employed as an explanatory
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The basis for this model is a series of culturally orientated observations about the 
nature of public and private security provision within contemporary Britain. Loader 
remarks, for example, that despite increasing crime rates during the 1980s the police 
are still “ ...an institution possessing a great deal of symbolic power”.41 This is 
because, he argues, the positive cultural feelings and attitudes towards this institution 
“..create an underlying reservoir of support upon which the police can rely”.42 As 
such, “ ...the police’s entitlement and capacity to speak about the world is seldom 
challenged. They start from a winning position”.43 In contrast, Loader observes, 
“ ...privately employed officers lack what one might call the ‘symbolic aura’ o f the 
public police”.44 Private security companies thus start from a losing position in 
relation to the public police. Loader and Walker then proceed to integrate these 
interesting and important observations into a model for understanding security 
provision within contemporary Britain.
On a more concrete level, Loader first illustrates how the cultural superiority o f the 
public police can be traced to its established iconography -  something which private 
security in Britain does not possess. For while public police officers are fitted with 
almost universally recognisable uniforms, hats, truncheons, badges and so on, private 
security guards only have access to inferior copy-cat versions of these notable 
symbols. As a consequence, people generally have a stronger cultural attraction 
towards the public police when compared with private security.45 For Loader and 
Walker, however, a superficial familiarity with these symbols does not illuminate the 
underlying reasons for the ‘winning position’ of the public police -  these symbols are 
merely concrete signifiers of a much deeper social meaning which has come to be 
attached to this institution. Furthermore, and significantly for our purposes, it is 
precisely in examining these deeper cultural categories that Loader and Walker start 
to explore the structural influence of normative expectations about security provision 
upon public and private security institutions.
model. See: Adam Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State: Steering, 
Rowing and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security’, Theoretical Criminology 10(4) (2006), 
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41 Ian Loader, ‘Private Security and the Demand for Protection in Contemporary Britain’, Policing and 
Society 7 (1997), p.153.
42 Ian Loader, ‘Policing and the Social: Questions of Symbolic Power’, The British Journal o f  
Sociology 48(1) (1997), p. 11.
43 Loader, ‘Policing and the Social’, p.3.
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On this deeper level, then, Loader and Walker argue that the underlying reason for 
this symbolic power can be found in the strong and enduring cultural connection 
between the public police and the Hobbesian (and later liberal) ideal of an egalitarian, 
universal and state-protected social order. They write, for instance, that
[a]s an institution intimately concerned with the protection o f the state and the 
security o f its citizens, one that is deeply entangled with some profound hopes, 
fears, fantasies and anxieties about matters such as life/death, order/chaos and 
protection/vulnerability, the police remain closely tied to people’s sense of 
ontological security and collective identity, and capable o f generating high, 
emotionally charged levels of identification among citizens.46
This suggests that the public police are, for many people, the symbolic vanguard of 
the enlightenment project to vanquish ‘death, chaos and vulnerability’ and maximise 
‘life, order and protection’ through the establishment of a legitimate state monopoly 
over security provision. And, crucially, the public police draw their symbolic power 
and legitimacy from this connection. They start from a ‘winning position’, in other 
words, because their existence resonates with people’s beliefs and expectations about 
how security ought to be provided -  or, as Loader and Walker put it, the public police 
harmonize with our “social imaginary... the most basic grid of meaning through which 
we see the world”.47 So because the majority of the British population think that 
security should only be legitimately provided by the state, they are predisposed 
towards accepting the activities of the police (and other state institutions). This is 
therefore a case of an ideational structure facilitating agency, for the structural 
influence of prevailing social norms within postwar British security sector has the 
effect of facilitating and legitimating the agency of the police (and, it must be added, 
the agency of other state institutions operating within the security sector such as the 
Home Office).
According to these theorists, however, we find the exact opposite with private 
security. Loader writes, for instance, that “ ...the logic of market allocation offends 
against the social meanings that have come to be attached to security in liberal
46 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, ‘Policing as a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections Between 
Policing and the State’, Theoretical Criminology 5(1) (2001), p.20.
47 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p.44.
46
democracies”.48 By challenging the notion of an egalitarian, universal and state 
protected social order and instead promoting a more atomised and particularistic 
vision of security provision, private security grates against the idea of security 
provision which so many British citizens believe in. And, significantly, this grating 
creates cultural resistance, as Loader comments: “[rendering the police symbolically 
less important to the maintenance of social order may for many require a significant 
re-organisation of the se lf’.49 At the same time, accepting the services o f private 
security companies would, Loader and Walker assert, require transforming a world 
view -  or ‘social imaginary’ -  which is now so “ ...established and sedimented in our 
everyday understanding, it is treated as natural and unremarkable”.50 This is therefore 
an instance of an ideational structure constraining agency, for the structural influence 
of normative expectations about security provision within postwar Britain serves to 
curtail and de-legitimate private security agency.
It is clear, then, that the nodal governance theorists lay down some valuable 
conceptual propositions which can in turn be employed to increase the theoretical 
precision of the structural side of our structure-agency dialectic. For Loader and 
Walker map out with great clarity the structural influence of the monopoly myth on 
the public and private actors within the British security sector. They illustrate, in 
particular, the double-edged nature of this ideational structure, for the British 
population’s normative expectations about how security ought to be provided serves 
to facilitate and legitimate the agency of state institutions and, at the same time, 
constrain and de-legitimate the agency of private security institutions. This 
corresponds with Hay’s assertion that structure generally “ ...presents an unevenly 
contoured terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for 
certain outcomes while militating against others”.51 In other words, the structural 
influence of the monopoly myth, as Loader and Walker have shown, simultaneously 
‘favours’ the police and ‘militates against’ private security.
However, the anchored pluralism model cannot be employed quite so effectively to 
give expression to the agency side of the dialectic. For while it recognises the 
existence of private security, it cannot be used to adequately reveal the processes by
48 Ian Loader, ‘Thinking Normatively About Private Security’, Journal o f Law and Society 24(3) 
(1997), p.381.
49 Loader, ‘Policing and the Social’, p.6.
50 Loader and Walker, Civilizing Security, p.44.
51 Hay, Political Analysis, p. 132.
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which private security companies in postwar Britain have strategically assessed the 
‘unevenly contoured terrain’ of the security sector and then autonomously constructed 
and carried out an action plan for re-legitimating their operations -  a plan which, 
moreover, has brought them into direct conflict with the various state institutions. 
This is because within the anchored pluralism framework ideational structure appears 
to determine -  that is, facilitate or constrain -  agency to the extent that actors have 
only a very diminished capacity to exercise their agency outside the specifications of 
this structure. As a consequence, within this model it almost appears predetermined 
that the public police will remain powerful and legitimate and private security 
providers will be relegated to the margins of the security sector. Loader and Walker 
comment, for instance, that “ ...the state structures the security network both in its 
presence and in its absence, both in its explicit directions and in its implicit 
permissions”. It is this kind of structural (or cultural) determinism which causes 
Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor to criticise those investigations which advocate a 
strong sociological institutionalist approach -  as Loader and Walker’s certainly does -  
for being “curiously bloodless”. There is no impetus for change coursing through 
their model of the security sector, for on the whole the state and private security 
institutions simply conform to their culturally determined roles as specified by the 
monopoly myth. There is, most problematically for our present purposes, no 
analytical space in which the private security and state institutions can reinterpret and 
manipulate the British population’s normative expectations about security provision,
4
in the process translating them into clashing political agendas.
This section has illustrated, then, that while the anchored pluralism model can be 
employed to add theoretical rigour to the structural side of the dialectic outlined 
earlier, it cannot be used to specify the agency side. This is because, it is contended 
here, without an appreciation of the way in which, private security and state actors 
autonomously and strategically interact with the structural influence of the monopoly 
myth, it is impossible to understand the processes relating to the re-legitimation of 
private security within postwar Britain. For this reason, the anchored pluralism 
approach, like the nodal governance approach, is only of limited value to this 
investigation. 523
52 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, ‘State of Denial? Rethinking the Governance o f  Security’, Punishment 
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2.6 A Dialectical Model: State-in-Society
This chapter has set up the following challenge: to develop an organising perspective 
which can articulate the complex dialectical relationship between, on one side, the 
agency of private security and state institutions within the postwar British security 
sector and, on the other, the structural influence the British population’s normative 
expectations about how security ought to be legitimately provided. As we have now 
seen, while the nodal governance and anchored pluralism approaches have proven to 
be valuable in further elucidating the dynamics of these agential and structural 
dimensions respectively, they have not provided any further insight into the dialectical 
nature of the relationship between these dimensions. This is because, put simply, in 
the nodal governance framework agency tends to determine structure, whereas in the 
anchored pluralism framework structure tends to determine agency. Against this 
theoretical backdrop, this final section will examine the state-in-society approach 
which has been developed over the past three decades by Joel Migdal and currently 
sits near the periphery of contemporary political science (although it is attracting an 
ever-increasing number of followers). Significantly, it is contended here that this 
approach can be employed to elaborate upon the entire structure-agency dialectic 
outlined above. For although this approach has never before been used to study 
private security, the theoretical propositions put forward by Migdal are highly 
effective at giving expression to the ways in which both private security and state 
institutions have actively contested the constitution of the security sector within 
postwar Britain while under the structural influence of the monopoly myth.54 This 
approach can therefore be used to significantly deepen our understanding of the 
relationship between the three main variables analysed within this investigation. As a 
consequence, this section will conclude by asserting that the state-in-society approach, 
when used in conjunction with the structure-agency dialectic advanced in Section 2.2, 
constitutes the best organising perspective with which to order, arrange and interpret 
the empirical material throughout the remainder of this investigation.55
54 Migdal initially developed the state-in-society approach to understand state-society dynamics in 
volatile third world countries. For a clear exposition of this side of his writings, see: Joel S. Migdal, 
Strong Societies and Weak States: Stale-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).
55 The theoretical discussion in this section also has a secondary consequence, which should not be 
overlooked. For within currently criminological circles there is a debate between the nodal governance 
and anchored pluralism theorists over the relative merits of their paradigms. To date, no compromise 
has emerged between the two schools of thought and they remain counterposed in many respects. This
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Importantly for our purposes, Migdal begins his analysis with a critique o f those 
theoretical frameworks in which the state is assumed to be the only legitimate 
provider of security functions within a given territory -  that is, he takes issue with the 
majority of the political science literature which unquestioningly accepts the core 
propositions advanced within the monopoly paradigm. Fie argues, for instance, that
[t]he assumption that only the state does, or should, create rules and that only it 
does, or should, maintain the violent means to bend people to obey those rules 
minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that 
occur in every human society among multiple systems of rule.56 57
For Migdal, then, non-state agency is clearly apparent in those domains which are 
considered by many to be the very essence of the state. In particular, the domain in 
which laws are made and, most importantly, enforced is not seen as being 
monopolised by the state but rather characterised by a ‘rich negotiation, interaction, 
and resistance’ between state and non-state actors. This recognition is, of course, 
essential if we are to comprehend the re-legitimation of private security in postwar 
Britain.
Yet in challenging these state-centric assumptions, Migdal does not completely 
eschew the monopoly paradigm as a heuristic device for understanding state-society 
relations, as the nodal governance theorists do. Nor does he conceptualise only a 
nominal degree of societal agency in an otherwise culturally determined and state- 
centred social order, as the anchored pluralism theorists do. 'Rather he cuts a ‘third 
way’ in between these counterposed models by advancing a dual definition of the 
state:
The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and 
shaped by (1) the image o f  a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, 
which is a representation o f the people hounded by that territory, and (2) the 
actual practices o f  its multiple parts.
section will show, however, that through the state-in-society approach the central propositions o f the 
nodal governance and anchored pluralism models can, in fact, be conceptualised alongside one another 
within a single analytical framework. This theoretical synthesis, of sorts, has interesting implications 
for the debate.
56 Joel S. Migdal, Slate in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.15.
57 Migdal, Stale in Society, pp. 15-16 [italics in original].
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Migdal is arguing here, then, that we must interpret the state and its relations with
society simultaneously through two lenses: through one lens (the image), we must
view the state as it has been portrayed in the monopoly myth; through the other lens
(the practices), we must see the state as an inherently fractured institution, in constant
negotiation and contestation with society. This dual definition, it is contended here,
can be used to add theoretical rigour to the entire structure-agency dialectic outlined
earlier. In order to demonstrate this assertion, the remainder o f this section will
proceed by first analysing in more detail Migdal’s conceptualisation of ‘practices’,
then examining the contrasting influence of the ‘image’, before finally turning to the
dialectical relationship between the practice and image of the state.
In developing the notion of practices, Migdal immediately calls into question those
perspectives which “ ...have assigned the state an ontological status that has lifted it
apart from the rest of society”, since this serves to eliminate any possibility of
interaction, negotiation and contestation between state and non-state actors.
Importantly, such an ontological separation is precisely what is achieved by assuming
that the state has a legitimate monopoly over security provision. For this gives the
state a quality, power and designation which society does not have access to. The
state is allocated a domain in which only it can exist, an independence o f being. On
the practice side of Migdal’s framework, however, no such domain is conceptualised.
The state is rather viewed as a fragmented institution which is constantly exposed to
the influence of non-state agency. He asserts, for instance, that the
*
[vjarious parts or fragments of the state have allied with one another, as well as 
with groups outside, to further their goals...These alliances, coalitions or 
networks have neutralized the sharp territorial and social boundary that the first 
portrayal of the state has acted to establish, as well as the sharp demarcation 
between the state as the pre-eminent rule maker and society as the recipient of 
these rules.58 9
In distancing himself from an ontological separation of state and society, especially in 
those spheres supposedly monopolised by the state such as making and enforcing 
rules, Migdal is branching off from the majority of contemporary political analysis. 
For while many political perspectives -  especially those related to the pluralist and
58 Joel S. Migdal, ‘The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination’, in Stale Power and 
Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, eds. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and 
Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 17.
59 Migdal, State in Society, p.20.
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governance traditions -  see a significant amount of public-private contestation and 
negotiation within most political domains, very few of them conceive of such 
‘messiness’ in the security sector. This is because the security sector is viewed as the 
untouchable base which both guarantees the freedom to negotiate in the first instance 
and then enforces the outcomes of these negotiations. Yet Migdal, like the nodal 
governance theorists, sees such public-private contestation in all political domains, 
without exception. The security sector is not viewed as an ontologically separate 
domain which is immune from societal pressures, but is rather constantly exposed to 
the demands of non-state agency. Crucially, then, Migdal’s concept o f state and 
society practices allows us to conceptualise a significant degree of agency in both 
state and private security institutions within the postwar British security sector. We 
should expect the security sector to be characterised by contrasting sets o f public and 
private practices, in the process transforming this key sector into a highly contested 
domain.
Unlike the nodal governance theorists, however, Migdal’s analysis does not end 
here. For his writings pose a key question which the nodal governance theorists 
conspicuously disregard: given the degree of conflict and instability in those domains 
which supposedly represent the heart of the state, why do states continue to exist in 
approximately the same form across the global political system? Why do so many 
social orders continue to be defined by such similar state institutions? For virtually all 
countries have institutional equivalents of the Home Office and the police, which are
s
in theory responsible for constructing and enforcing a hierarchical and state-centred 
social order. Crucially, it is in answering this very important question that Migdal 
introduces the ‘image’ of the state and in turn integrates into his model the influence 
of people’s normative expectations about what the modern state ought to do.
The image of the state does not correlate with the disaggregated and fragmented 
state and society practices. For, Migdal asserts, “ ...the ‘idea of the state’ is through 
its law and regulations, to impose a single standard of behaviour in a given territory, 
one that is legislated, executed, and adjudicated by the various parts of the state 
organization”.60 Significantly, this forceful, coercive image of the state is-then given 
a softer, more legitimate edge when it is also portrayed as “ ...the representative of the 
general, collective will of the people, even as it controls them. It derives from the
60 Migdal, Slate in Society, p.48.
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people’s unity and then itself polices that unity”.61 The image thus closely resembles 
the monopoly myth -  Hobbes’s ideals about what the state ought to do. Migdal then 
employs this image to answer the questions outlined above. He argues, for instance, 
that because this image has been so consistently used as a central organising principle 
throughout modern political history, it has now entered into the consciousness of 
“ ...laypeople the world over”.62 It has become naturalised: “Naturalization means 
that people consider the state to be as natural as the landscape around them; they 
cannot imagine their lives without it”.63 And, crucially, it is the pervasiveness o f this 
image which explains why states continue to exist in approximately the same form 
throughout the world. Migdal comments, for example, that “[i]f that belief [in the 
image] is widespread, it provides a powerful antidote to disintegrative forces, even in 
the face of continued weakness in delivering goods, effecting policy, and gaining 
efficiency”.64 So the image of the state therefore has a powerful structural influence 
over the activities of individuals and institutions. For while these actors, both state 
and non-state, may challenge the integrity of the image with their practices, the extent 
of this challenge is limited by people’s normative expectations about what state and 
non-state institutions ought to do. The image of the state, in other words, imposes a 
kind of structural limit on state and society practices.
In translating the image of a universal, legitimate and monopolistic state-centred
system of security provision into an ideational structure which expresses people’s
normative expectations about what the state ought to do, Migdal’s state-in-society
0
approach displays many continuities with the anchored pluralism model. For both 
theorise the existence of an ‘unevenly contoured terrain’ which simultaneously 
‘favours’ (legitimises) the agency of state institutions and ‘militates against’ (de- 
legitimises) the agency of private security. Like the anchored pluralism model, then, 
the state-in-society approach adds theoretical precision to the structural side of our 
structure-agency dialectic. Yet there is one critical difference between the image of 
the state advanced by Migdal on the one hand and by Loader and Walker on the other.
61 Joel S. Migdal, ‘Studying the State’, in Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in 
a Changing Global Order eds. Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Lichbach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 3,d edition, In press) p.9 [Note: this book chapter was obtained through personal 
correspondence with Joel Migdal since the edited volume is currently in press. Consequently, the page 
numbers referenced here will not correspond with the page numbers in the published edition when it 
comes out].
62 Migdal, ‘Studying the State’, p.6.
63 Migdal, Slate in Society, p. 137.
64 Migdal, Stale in Society, p. 137.
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For in Loader and Walker’s model, this image appears to have an independent 
ideational existence in the sense that it is not constantly exposed to the conflicting 
agency of state and private security institutions. It is, in other words, seemingly 
impervious to contradictory social forces. However, Migdal’s image of the state has a 
far more contested status, for it is reinterpreted and remoulded by the contradictory 
practices of state and societal actors. This in turn places the cohesive image of the 
state and the fragmentary state and society practices within a dialectical relationship.
For Migdal, the dialectical relationship between the practices o f state and societal 
actors and the image of the state is one of the most important dimensions of the 
contemporary political world: “ ...the central political and social drama o f recent 
history has been the battle between the idea of the state and the often-implicit agendas 
of other social formations (which may very well include parts o f the state itself) for 
how society should be organised”.65 And this iterative and contest-ridden process, of 
course, triggers change. Indeed, Migdal remarks that the state-in-society approach
...is not a prize-fighter model in which each combatant remains unchanged 
throughout the bout and holds unswervingly to the goal of knocking out the 
other...[rather]...[t]he dynamic process changes the groupings themselves, their 
goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting.66
These theoretical specifications inject a significant degree of heuristic flexibility and 
vitality into the state-in-society model, for they facilitate the conceptualisation of a 
wide variety of different image-practice scenarios. Indeed, this flexibility is clearly 
demonstrated by the multifarious applications of the theory in contemporary political 
science research.67 For our present purposes, however, these specifications will be 
taken to mean that while the nature of state and society practices may contradict and 
diverge from the image of the state, they will not diverge too far because this will 
begin to grate with people’s normative expectations about what the state ought to do 
and in turn trigger cultural resistance. This means that while the practices o f state and 
societal institutions will precipitate contestation and change in all political domains, 
the possibilities for such contestation and change will be structurally limited by the
65 Migdal, State in Society, p.49.
66 Migdal, State in Society, p.23.
67 This diversity is best exemplified by the papers given at the conference ‘Policy from the Grassroots: 
How Social Forces Shackle and Transform Policymakers’, which was held at the University of 
Washington between 25lh-27lh February 2007 in honour of Joel Migdal.
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unifying influence of the image. However, it must also be acknowledged that over 
time the image itself will gradually change shape in line with the corrosive impact of 
these same practices, in the process leading to new strands of contestation.
Crucially, it is contended here that this image-practice dialectic significantly 
deepens our understanding of the relationship between both state and private security 
agency within the postwar security sector and the structural influence of the British 
population’s normative expectations about how security ought to be provided. For 
with the concept of ‘practices’, we now have a formulation of agency which is 
particularly appropriate for conceptualising the interactions between state and private 
security institutions. This is because it denotes a type of state and non-state agency 
which penetrates all political domains, regardless of whether or not they are supposed 
to be controlled exclusively by the state. It is a concept, in other words, which evokes 
notions of public-private contestation and alliance-building in all segments of the 
state-society sphere, especially those which are generally considered to be the very 
essence of the state, such as the security sector. For this reason, then, it is a concept 
which is ideally suited to the task of distancing our analysis from the state-centred 
propositions of the monopoly paradigm and, in turn, articulating the type o f agency 
involved in the negotiations between the state and private security institutions over the 
legitimacy to undertake security functions within the postwar security sector.
With the concept of ‘image’, it is contended here, we have both a far-reaching
conception of ideational structure which, again, is particularly suited to explaining the
*
context of the postwar security sector and, at the same time, a more sophisticated 
mechanism for understanding exactly how this structure serves to influence different 
actors (or state and non-state practices). In the first instance, the image of the state 
represents an excellent way of giving further expression to the British population’s 
normative expectations about how the security sector ought to be constituted -  that is, 
it advances a hierarchical, universal, bureaucratic and state-centred picture of the 
political landscape which captures very effectively the British population’s state­
centric preferences for security provision. In the second instance, through the process 
of ‘naturalization’ it allows us to comprehend more precisely how it is that the image 
of the state exerts such a strong and decisive ideational influence over the institutional 
practices of both state and non-state actors. We have, in other words, a mechanism 
for explaining why the private security and state institutions are compelled to
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assimilate state-centred ideas of legitimacy into their operations within the postwar 
security sector.
This illuminating theoretical synthesis, then, in which the image-practice dialectic is
used to give greater analytical weight and depth to the structure-agency dialectic
outlined in Section 2.2, will constitute the basis of our organising perspective for
interpreting the empirical material examined throughout the subsequent chapters. To
demonstrate the heuristic value of this organising perspective, we can return to the
more concrete example used earlier. We can say, for instance, that in one important
set of practices within postwar Britain (later termed the ‘monopoly’ practices) the
police interpreted the image of the state to mean that they were the only institution
endowed with the requisite legitimacy to undertake security functions. They
accordingly set about undermining the status of the private security companies. Yet
in another set of practices (later termed the ‘pluralist’ practices) the private security
companies interpreted the image to mean that if  they wanted to operate with
legitimacy in the postwar security sector then they would have to somehow associate
themselves with the police -  through statutory regulation, for instance -  since this
would allow them to capture the quality of ‘stateness’ which most of the British
population considered to be so crucial to the legitimate provision o f security. They
accordingly set about constructing official-looking linkages with the centrarstate
institutions, primarily by attempting to bring about a system of statutory regulation.
In this example, then, we immediately find two contrasting sets of practices which are
*
responsible for setting in motion political processes of negotiation and contestation 
within the security sector. But, critically, because both sets of practices were 
necessarily drawing upon the same image of the state, elements of this image were 
constantly incorporated into the outcome of these negotiations. So despite the 
contestation caused by these conflicting practices, the structural influence of the 
image served to continuously reproduce the British security sector broadly in line with 
the image of the state, with of course a degree of variation over time.
Over the subsequent chapters, we will introduce not two but four distinct sets of 
practices -  the monopoly, pluralist, reformist and neoliberal sets o f practices. As we 
will see, each of these practices was brought into existence when a combination of 
private security and state actors strategically interpreted the image of the state in a 
different way during the postwar era, in the process leading to complex political 
negotiations over the legitimacy to provide security functions in Britain. To conclude,
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then, this chapter has demonstrated that the explanatory propositions and conceptual 
vocabulary advanced in the state-in-society approach (in particular the image-practice 
dialectic), viewed in conjunction with the structure-agency dialectic outlined earlier 
(and against the background of the nodal governance and anchored pluralism models), 
represents the most effective organising perspective with which to interpret the 
empirical material examined throughout the remainder of this investigation. And it is 
to this theoretically-informed empirical narrative that we will now turn.
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BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
3Emerging Agendas: Securicor and the Metropolitan Police
(1945-1959)
3.1 Introduction
The opening phase of negotiations between the private security and state institutions 
regarding the constitution of the security sector in postwar Britain was a relatively 
low-key affair. It involved only two actors, Securicor and the Metropolitan Police, 
and was conducted within a rather informal institutional environment, which was 
unsurprising given that such matters had not been seriously (re)considered within 
government circles since the decade following the passing of the Metropolitan Police 
Act in 1829.1 Indeed, the actual negotiations between the two institutions, which 
lasted for almost a decade, amounted to little more than series o f polite letters. No 
face-to-face contact was made, no ultimatums were issued and no media statements 
were circulated. Yet despite this lack of ceremony, these exchanges are extremely 
revealing and important, for they chronicle the initial formation o f those private 
security and state agendas which would come to assume a central position in these 
negotiations over the next fifty years. And they also glimpse the beginnings of the 
crucial processes through which the private security companies began to slowly and 
steadily accumulate power and legitimacy within the postwar security sector.
On one side, then, we find the emerging agenda of Securicor, which can also be 
used fairly accurately to indicate the attitudes held within the industry as a whole at 
this time. Confronted with the structural constraints of the image o f the state -  that is, 
the majority of the British population’s state-centric normative expectations about 
how security ought to be provided -  Securicor used a variety of resourceful methods 
to develop publicly recognisable linkages with the Metropolitan Police in an attempt 
to capture legitimacy from this core state institution. This in turn signified the 
foundation of what we will term here the ‘pluralist’ set of practices. Those 
institutions adopting this pluralist position, which over the decades would stretch to
1 It was in 1839 that the security arrangements set down in the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 were 
finally made permanent. See: Sir Cyril Philips, ‘Politics in the Making of the English Police’, in The 
Home Office: Perspectives on Policy and Administration, Bicentenary Lectures 1982 (London: Royal 
Institute of Public Administration, 1983), p.52.
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include a miscellany of public and private actors, operated on the conviction that the 
security sector could be populated by private security providers so long as they 
somehow conformed to the prevailing state-centric conceptions o f legitimacy depicted 
within the image of the state. The pluralists were therefore interpreting the image of 
the state in quite a loose manner. For they understood the structural influence of 
state-centric ideas of legitimacy and security provision, but reasoned that these ideas 
could be manipulated to their own private ends. In developing linkages with the state 
institutions, the pluralists were therefore attempting to disguise or obscure their 
privatised security solutions under a veil o f ‘stateness’.
On the other side, we find the emerging agenda of the Metropolitan Police, which 
directly contrasted with these pluralist practices. Drawing upon their substantial 
resources and privileged status within the postwar security sector the Metropolitan 
Police sought to protect the state’s position as the pre-eminent security provider in 
Britain by attempting to undermine Securicor’s political strategising. This in turn 
marked the beginnings of what we will term here the ‘monopoly’ set o f practices. 
Those institutions assuming this monopoly position, which again over the years came 
to include a wide variety of public and private actors, contended that the security 
sector ought to be monopolised by the state and that any non-state institution 
attempting to penetrate this domain -  by attempted to siphon-off state legitimacy, for 
instance -  should accordingly be cast aside. In promoting the monopoly set of 
practices within the postwar security sector, then, the Metropolitan Police were
0
formulating their preferences around a very literal and direct interpretation of the 
image of the state. They were, in a sense, the bearers and perpetuators of the 
monopoly myth.
This chapter will illustrate how the negotiations between the pluralist practices of 
Securicor and the monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police unfolded over the 
course of the late 1940 and 1950s. It will demonstrate that while the Metropolitan 
Police dominated this phase of negotiations, for this was a period when the British 
state enjoyed great institutional power and popularity, especially in matters o f security 
and social order, there were signs towards the end the 1950s that the pluralist practices 
of Securicor was gaining momentum. And as the influence of Securicor increased, so 
too did the degree of contestation over the key resource of legitimacy within the 
postwar security sector. In order to map out these interactions this chapter will be 
divided into five sections, each representing a distinct stage o f the negotiations.
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Section 3.2 will first provide some contextual information about the constitution of 
the security sector within immediate postwar Britain, before moving on to the first 
round of correspondence between Securicor and the Metropolitan Police which 
unfolded in 1950. Next, Section 3.3 will explore the next round o f negotiations 
during the mid-1950s, which followed a relatively similar path to the preceding round 
and therefore marked the gradual formalisation of the pluralist and monopoly 
agendas. Section 3.4 will then examine the negotiations in the first half of 1959, 
which represented the emergence of a more assertive and independent pluralist stance 
by Securicor. Next, section 3.5 will investigate the exchanges between these two 
institutions in the second half of 1959, which signified the first dent in the 
Metropolitan Police’s monopoly agenda and a corresponding advance in Securicor’s 
attempts to capture legitimacy. Finally, Section 3.6 will provide a few theoretically- 
informed conclusions about this opening phase of the negotiations. It will, more 
specifically, illustrate how the dialectical processes of contestation and continuity 
which were revealed in the preceding empirical sections -  and which were expressed 
through the state-in-society concepts of image and practices -  serve to explain the re­
legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
3.2 Plurality Versus Monopoly
To begin with, this section will set down some important contextual information 
about the Metropolitan Police and Securicor, emphasising in particular the way in 
which the ‘unevenly contoured (ideational) terrain’ of the postwar security sector 
served to facilitate and constrain the operations of these two actors. It will then 
analyse the opening round of negotiations between them, which were initiated by 
Securicor in an attempt to advance their pluralist practices, but were then instantly 
stifled by the Metropolitan Police who were pursuing their ideologically counterposed 
monopoly practices.
Postwar British culture was strikingly characterised by a strong attraction towards 
something approximating Migdal’s image of the state. Following victory in World 
War II, a profound sense of national unity and a belief in the virtues of the British 
state permeated the majority of the population. As a consequence, a sizeable 
proportion of British citizens in the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s were 
drawn towards the idea of a stable and universal social order guaranteed by the
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benevolent British state. Indeed, this idea formed a central component of what has 
widely been termed the ‘postwar consensus’.2 Within the British security sector -  and 
indeed beyond -  the public police at this time were commonly viewed to be one of the 
pre-eminent symbolic manifestations of this image. Robert Reiner captures this status 
when he writes that “ ...by the 1950s the police had become not merely accepted but 
lionized by the broad spectrum of opinion. In no other country has the police force 
been so much a symbol of national pride”.3 And, he continues, despite their necessary 
recourse to coercion, the public police “ ...were purported to be accountable through 
an almost mystic process of identification with the British people”.4 To be sure, it is 
important to note that this attraction to the police institution was not -  and indeed 
never has been -  universal. Ian Loader and Aogan Mulcahy, for instance, are quick to 
emphasise that sentiments towards the police are certainly not homogenous, but are 
rather “ ...structured by such axes of division as class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and 
age”.5 Yet at this particular point in postwar British history, such divisions were 
relatively shallow. And as a consequence, the Metropolitan Police, as the most 
distinguished and best resourced police force in the country, were endowed with 
extremely high levels of legitimacy in the immediate postwar years. All said, then, 
the prevailing cultural attitudes of this period closely correlated with the monopoly 
myth -  there was a widespread normative expectation among the population that the 
state ought to be the only legitimate provider of security functions.
The circumstances of Securicor and the nascent private security industry at time
/
could not have been more contrasting. Securicor has always been considered to be 
one o f the pioneering private security companies in Britain. For instance, in their 
analysis of the British private security industry Bruce George and Mark Button have 
commented that Securicor “ ...marked the beginning of the first ‘modern’ security 
companies”.6 Another commentator of the industry, Hilary Draper, has reinforced 
this assertion when she writes that Securicor “ ...can claim to be the precursor of the 
modern guard company in England”.7 Yet in 1945 Securicor -  or Night Guards Ltd
2 Dennis Kavanagh, The Postwar Consensus’, Twentieth Century British History 3(2) (P992), pp.175- 
190.
3 Reiner, The Politics o f  the Police, p.48.
4 Reiner, The Politics o f  the Police, p.55.
5 Ian Loader and Aogan Mulcahy, Policing and the Condition o f  England: Memory, Politics and 
Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.52.
6 Bruce George and Mark Button, Private Security (Leicester: Perpetuity Press, 2000), p.26.
7 Hilary Draper, Private Police (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 19.
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as it was registered until 1953 -  employed only two security guards who patrolled 
their clients’ premises on bicycles.8 This simple observation serves to effectively 
illustrate just how small the private security industry was within immediate postwar 
Britain. Indeed, the fact that there appear to be no estimates of the size o f the private 
security industry in 1945 itself suggests that its status was so insignificant that no-one 
considered it worthy of measurement. Moreover, in addition to its diminutive size, 
the private security industry at this time experienced considerable public relations 
problems. For the flip-side of the British attraction towards a state-centred social 
order was a deep cultural resistance towards the very idea of private security 
provision, which grated against the majority of the British population’s normative 
expectations about how security ought to be provided. Tom Clayton, for instance, 
remarks that during Night Guards’ early days “[pjress, public and police were 
uniformly hostile to the idea of private night watchmen”.9 In other words, while the 
public police were endowed with a huge amount of legitimacy within the immediate 
postwar era, private security companies were noticeably lacking in this important 
resource.
But despite these constraints, by the early 1950s the private security industry was
starting to expand. By 1951 Night Guards employed 170 security guards who were
primarily engaged in the protection of ordinary industrial facilities, such as the
Vauxhall Motors spare parts depot in Barnet, North London.10 Furthermore, one
estimate suggests that total private security industry sales within Britain at this time
*
amounted to approximately £5 million,11 which indicates that there were now 
numerous other private security companies populating the security sector alongside 
Securicor.12 In fact, it is worth noting one particular private security company which
8 Nigel South, Policing For Profit: The Private Security Sector (London: Sage, 1988), p.21.
9 Tom Clayton, The Protectors: The Inside Story o f  Britain’s Private Security Forces (London: 
Osbourne, 1967), p. 12.
10 Sarah Underwood, Securicor: The People Business (Oxford: CPL Books, 1997), p. 18.
11 W. E. Randall and P. Hamilton, ‘The Security Industry of the United Kingdom: Its Growth, Role, 
Accountability, and Future’, in The Security Industry in the United Kingdom: Papers Presented to the 
Cropwood Round-Table Conference July 1972, eds. Paul Wiles and F. H. McClintock (Cambridge: 
University o f Cambridge Institute of Criminology, 1972), p.67.
12 Indeed, drawing upon the 1951 census data, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn have observed that there 
were no less than 46,950 individuals working in ‘Security occupations’ at this time -  see: Trevor Jones 
and Tim Newburn, ‘Policing Public and Private Space in Late Modern Britain’, in Crime Unlimited: 
Questions fo r the 2 1'1 Century eds. Pat Carlen and Rod Morgan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999), p. 102. 
This certainly seems to confirm that Securicor were now one of many private security companies. 
However, it must be recognised that not all of these individuals were employed in industrial facilities 
protection and similar guarding activities, for the census data was based upon an extremely broad 
categorisation of ‘security occupation’. It included, for instance: Tidesman, Signalman, Meteorological
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was created in that same year, since it would eventually become, together with 
Securicor, the other major market-leader within the British private security sector. In 
1951, Erik Philip-Sorensen founded Plant Protection Ltd above a grocer’s shop in 
Macclesfield,13 and this company -  which became Group 4 seventeen years later -  
came to assume a central position in political negotiations regarding the role o f private 
security companies within the security sector. So the early 1950s was a period of 
growth within the British private security industry, and an era in which the future 
market-leaders were establishing themselves. Yet because these companies were 
expanding from such a modest base, and were experiencing such acute public 
relations difficulties which resulted from their perceived lack of legitimacy, their 
impact upon the security sector as a whole was still extremely limited. Professor Sir 
Leon Radzinowicz, for instance, has commented that at this time “ ...the private 
security industry had barely gained a foothold in Britain”.14
It is within this context of small-scale growth and public relations difficulties that
Night Guards first initiated contact with the Metropolitan Police, in the process laying
down the beginnings of what would become the pluralist set of practices. This
contact came in the form of three letters sent by the Managing Director o f Night
Guards, R. D. Godfrey, to the Commissioner and a Captain of the Metropolitan Police
between June and August 1950. In these letters, Godfrey informed these high-ranking
police officers that Night Guards had recently started an ‘Investigations Branch’ run
by an ex-C.I.D./Special Branch officer and, in order to expand this new service,
*
Nights Guards wished to employ more ex-C.I.D. officers. Godfrey then enquired 
whether the Metropolitan Police would be willing to offer any assistance in this 
recruitment strategy.15 Given that this correspondence represents the first recorded 
instance of any private security company contacting one the of the core state
Reporter, Park Ranger and Coast Guard, to name but a few -  see: General Register Office, Census 
1951, Classification o f  Occupations (London: HMSO, 1956), p. 111. This discrepancy is symptomatic 
of wider problem. For, as Jones and Newburn note elsewhere, it is extraordinarily difficult to obtain 
consistent and reliable information on the growth of the private security industry -  see: Trevor Jones 
and Tim Newburn, ‘How Big is the Private Security Sector?’, Policing and Society 5 (1995), pp.221- 
232.
13 G4SInternational, June 2006, p.33.
14 Leon Radzinowicz, ‘Opening Address’, in The Security Industry in the United Kingdom: Papers 
Presented to the Cropwood Round-Table Conference July 1972, eds. Paul Wiles and F. H. McClintock 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Institute of Criminology, 1972), p. 13.
15 The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, 
Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and Papers Concerning Securicor. These letters are dated 
19"'June 1950,26"’ July 1950 and 24"’ August 1950.
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institutions within the British security sector, it is important to examine the rationale 
behind these seemingly innocuous letters in some detail.
To begin with the obvious, Godfrey’s request could simply be taken at face value -  
it could be interpreted as nothing more than a means o f optimising Night Guards’ 
recruitment strategy. For these ex-police officers would probably require less skills 
training when compared with someone recruited from a non-security background. It 
could also be conjectured, however, that Night Guards wanted to employ ex-police 
officers because they represented a direct linkage to the key resource o f legitimacy 
within the postwar security sector. By employing these particular individuals, in other 
words, Night Guards could have begun the process of establishing a visible and 
relatively official-looking connection between themselves and the Metropolitan 
Police. This in turn would potentially have served to communicate to the British 
population that Night Guards were organising their operations in accordance with the 
widely held normative expectations about how the security ought to be provided. To 
be sure, Night Guards would remain a private organisation, but if  they employed ex­
police officers then they would at least have a degree o f ‘stateness’ integrated into 
their services. Furthermore, if  these individuals were recommended by high-ranking 
Metropolitan Police officials then this ‘stateness’ would appear to be even more 
concrete. If Godfrey’s correspondence is viewed as a strategy to capture legitimacy 
from the Metropolitan Police, then, this suggests that Night Guards were indeed at
this early stage forming their preferences in line with a loose reading of the image of
*
the state.
To give this interpretation more credibility, however, it is important to demonstrate 
how this legitimacy could then be translated into a commercial advantage, for as a 
commercial organisation Night Guards were ultimately driven by the imperative to 
increase their profit margins. Indeed, it is especially important to demonstrate this 
given that the early 1950s was already witnessing a period of growth within the 
private security industry. What was the advantage, then, of investing time and 
resources in attempting to capture legitimacy from the Metropolitan Police if  an 
adequate customer base already existed? It is contended here that there are two 
convincing answers to this question. First, it has frequently been observed that 
customers often regard private security services as a ‘grudge purchase’.16 This
16 Interview with Patrick Somerville, conducted on 29lh June 2007.
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involves recognising that, in accordance with their normative expectations about how 
security ought to be provided, the majority of the British population would generally 
prefer their security demands to be satisfied by the public police. Consequently, it is 
only when this is not possible that they reluctantly turn towards private security 
provision. This attitude is described very effectively by Ken Livingston and Jerry 
Hart when they write that:
In common with another equally old and well-established profession, it [private 
security] has often provided a service considered somewhat shady and 
unsavoury -  regardless of the size of demand -  rarely something to be paraded 
publicly and certainly not as an icon of public integrity.17
For private security companies such as Night Guards, then, this prevailing attitude 
equated to a customer base which was unwilling to pay high prices for private security 
services, and as a result profit margins were low (indeed, this was -  and to an extent 
still -  is an industry-wide phenomenon). From the perspective of these companies, 
then, enhancing their legitimacy could be viewed as a way o f placating this reluctant 
attitude and in turn increasing their profit margins.
Second, the industrial facilities protection sub-sector into which companies such as 
Night Guards were expanding in the 1950s represented only a very small proportion 
of the entire British security sector. During the 1940s and 1950s, in particular, the 
majority of this sector was dominated by the police. And this dominance constituted 
a very significant barrier of entry. For in those areas where the police were long- 
established as the main security providers, the widespread normative expectation that 
the state ought to be the only legitimate provider of security was especially strong, 
since the actual presence of the police served to reinforce this cultural norm. In order 
to penetrate these state-dominated sectors of the security sector, private security 
companies such as Securicor were thus even more compelled to capture the key 
resource of legitimacy from the state, since this was one of the only methods of 
overcoming the barrier of entry to these new markets. Both of these answers, then, 
provide support for the argument that Securicor were indeed beginning an attempt to 
siphon-off legitimacy from the Metropolitan Police with their correspondence. And if 
this was the case, we can assert that Securicor were, in effect, laying the foundations
17 Ken Livingstone and Jerry Hart, ‘The Wrong Arm of the Law? Public Images of Private Security’, 
Policing and Society 13 (2) (2003), pp. 160-161.
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for the pluralist set of practices -  that is, they were interpreting the structural influence 
of the image of the state to mean that private security companies could feasibly 
populate the security sector alongside the state institutions so long as they somehow 
conformed with the majority of the British population’s state-centric normative 
expectations about how security ought to be provided. As we will now see, however, 
the Metropolitan Police proved to be extremely protective over its legitimacy.
Prior to Godfrey’s correspondence, the Metropolitan Police were certainly aware of 
the growth of the private security industry and had already developed the beginnings 
of a policy stance towards these organisations. For instance, a letter sent by the 
Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to the Chief Constable of 
Birmingham in the early 1950s stated that:
In 1948... the question was considered of taking action against these firms under 
S. 10 of the Police Act, 1919 (covering uniform) and S. 2 o f the Public Order 
Act, 1936 (usurping the duties of the police), but the Director of Public 
Prosecutions considered there to be insufficient evidence to support a 
prosecution but recommended they should be closely watched and the Home 
Office informed as to their activities.18
This letter demonstrates that the emergence of the modern private security industry 
greatly troubled the Metropolitan Police. In one sense, by invoking Section 10 of the 
Police Act 1919 they were clearly concerned that British citizens might mistakenly 
identify a private security guard as a policeman, thereby indirectly undermining the 
status of the public police. Indeed, as the next chapter will illustrate in more detail, 
the strategy of intentionally blurring the distinction between the uniforms of the 
public and private police came to be viewed as another method through which private 
security companies could capture legitimacy from the state.
In a more profound sense, however, the Metropolitan Police were concerned that 
companies such as Night Guards could actually be interpreted within the remit of 
Section 10 of the Public Order Act 1936, which proscribes the activities o f any non­
state groupings “organised or trained or equipped for the purpose of enabling them to 
be employed in usurping the functions of the police or of the armed forces o f the 
Crown”.19 Interpreted in these terms, Night Guards were seen as a private army
18 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This letter is dated 1 l lh September 1951.
19 Public Order Act 1936 (c.6), Section 2 (l)(a) (London: HMSO).
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seeking to overthrow the universal social order guaranteed by the state. The slight 
historical irony regarding this interpretation is that the Public Order Act 1936 was 
passed in response to the violence and public disorder which resulted from the 
growing Fascist movement during the interwar years.20 Yet Night Guards were 
established in 1935 precisely “ ...to protect Mayfair residents from East End 
undesirables and Mosley Fascists”.21 2 In this respect, then, Night Guards and the 
Public Order Act 1936 essentially represented complementary public and private 
sector responses to the same events. This historical nuance made no impression on 
the Metropolitan Police, however, who were inclined towards an aggressive policy 
stance towards the private security companies. Yet they were not permitted to shut 
down the these companies since, as the Assistant Commissioner’s letter asserted, the 
Director of Prosecutions determined that it was not possible to undermine the legal 
status of companies such as Night Guards using the Police Act 1919 or the Public 
Order Act 1936. So the Metropolitan Police decided instead upon the less aggressive 
strategy of ostracising the private security companies so as to avoid conferring any 
legitimacy upon their operations. This policy stance was in part exemplified by the 
fact that Godfrey received no response to his three letters.
At this juncture, it is useful to consider in more detail the rationale behind the 
Metropolitan Police’s attempts to exclude private security companies such as Night 
Guards from the British security sector. There are two possible motivations for this 
policy stance. First, we could interpret this strategy from the rather cynical public 
choice perspective, in which the Metropolitan Police could be seen as selfish utility 
maximisers jealously protecting their professional domains -  or ‘bureaus’ -  from the 
emerging competition of the private security companies. Second, we could view 
this strategy from the more optimistic public interest perspective, in which the 
Metropolitan Police could be seen as benevolent ‘plutonic guardians’, protecting the 
public order from the destabilising effects of private security provision.23 In the
20 Robert Reiner, ‘Policing, Protest, and Disorder in Britain’, in Policing Protest: The Control o f  Mass 
Demonstrations in Western Democracies, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Hertbert Reiter (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p.42.
21 Johnston, The Rebirth o f Private Policing, p.19.
22 James Buchanon, ‘From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development o f Public 
Choice’, in The Economics o f Politics, eds. James Buchanon, Charles Dowley, Albert Breton, Jack 
Wiseman, Bruno Frey and A. T. Peacock (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), p. 12.
23 The illuminating phrase ‘plutonic guardians’ has been coined by Ian Loader. See: Ian Loader, ‘Fall 
of the ‘Platonic Guardians’: Liberalism, Criminology and Political Responses to Crime in England and 
Wales’, British Journal o f  Criminology 46 (2006), pp.561-586.
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event, it is probable that both motivations were present in the development o f this 
strategy. However, research conducted by Robert Reiner suggests that the plutonic 
guardian rationale may have been dominant. For in his investigation of the attitudes 
of Chief Constables who began their careers before the 1960s, he discovered that 
“ ...their reasons for joining... [the force were]... predominantly an attraction to the job 
itself: 54 per cent gave purely non-instrumental reasons, 30 per cent mixed, with only 
16 per cent instrumental. This is unusual in their generation”.24 This evidence 
indicates that many police officers in the 1950s and 1960s -  especially the ambitious 
ones who eventually ascended to the apex of the profession -  were driven more by 
non-instrumental public interest motivations than by instrumental selfish motivations. 
This is an important point because it suggests that the Metropolitan Police’s policy 
towards the private security companies was more likely than not being constructed in 
line with the public interest -  that is, the British population’s prevailing normative 
expectations about how the security sector ought to be constituted. Viewed from this 
perspective, then, we can assert that the Metropolitan Police were setting down the 
foundations for the monopoly set of practices -  that is, they were forming their 
preferences in accordance with a very literal and direct interpretation o f the image of 
the state, in which the state institutions such as the police were viewed as being the 
only legitimate actors within the postwar security sector. Based on this interpretation, 
then, we can assert that it was in the promotion of their monopoly practices that the 
Metropolitan Police were attempting to exclude Night Guards from the security 
sector.
This section has drawn upon the first recorded exchanges between the private 
security and state institutions within postwar Britain to demonstrate that these actors 
were from the outset entering into the negotiations over the constitution o f the 
security sector from opposing positions. In laying' the rudimentary foundations for 
their pluralist practices, Securicor were interpreting the image of the state rather 
loosely to mean that private institutions could provide security functions so long as 
they somehow conformed with the majority of the British population’s normative 
expectations about how security ought to be provided. Their strategy for doing this 
was to capture legitimacy from the state. In setting down the beginnings o f the
24 Robert Reiner, ‘Chief Constables in England and Wales: A Social Portrait of a Criminal Justice 
Elite’, in Beyond Law & Order: Criminal Justice Policy and Politics into the 1990s, eds. Robert Reiner 
and Malcolm Cross (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 69.
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monopoly practices, the Metropolitan Police were interpreting the image of the state 
very directly to mean that only state institutions were endowed with the legitimacy to 
undertake security functions. They therefore set about undermining Securicor’s 
attempts to capture legitimacy from the state. At this early stage, then, we are 
confronted with two sets of contrasting practices, each derived from a particular 
interpretation of the same image of the state. This in turn illustrates how in the 
immediate postwar years the constitution of British security sector was being 
contested by both state and non-state institutions, but that this contestation was being 
structured along particular lines which served to reproduce to some extent the image 
of state. It is important to note, however, that at this early juncture the degree of 
contestation was nominal. The monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police 
dominated the proceedings, for they easily diffused Securicor’s initial strategy for 
capturing legitimacy. Given the dominance of these monopoly practices, it is possible 
to observe that in the immediate postwar years the British security sector did actually 
resemble quite closely the institutional arrangements envisaged in the monopoly 
myth. As we will see, however, over the subsequent rounds of negotiations the 
pluralist practices developed by Securicor would slowly gather momentum, in the 
process gradually eroding these monopolistic institutional arrangements.
3.3 Consolidating Agendas
a
This section will analyse the next phase of negotiations between Securicor and the 
Metropolitan Police which took place in 1953. This phase essentially signifies the 
consolidation of the contest between the emerging pluralist and monopoly practices 
which was set up three years earlier. To be sure, the outcome was very similar-, with 
the monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police again dominating proceedings. 
However, this phase does mark the beginning of reciprocal correspondence between 
the two institutions -  as opposed to the one-way dismissals of the previous phase -  
which in turn indicates a very small increase in the influence of Securicor’s pluralist 
practices. Before we start analysing the content of these negotiations, however, a 
couple of contextual points first need to be made.
70
During the early 1950s, Night Guards became known by the British public as 
Security Corps.25 In response, the Home Office quickly banned the company from 
trading under this name so as “...to pacify those who alleged the company was little 
more than a private army”.26 27 As a result, the company was registered as Securicor -  
an amalgamation of name Security Corps -  on 1st January 1953. This sequence of 
events is interesting for two reasons. First, it suggests that the Metropolitan Police 
were not alone in their concern that private security companies could potentially usurp 
the police in their role as the guarantors of the British social order, for it seems that 
others too regarded them as threatening ‘private armies’. Second, it also illustrates 
that the Home Office were prepared to constrain the activities of private security 
companies when required -  although for now this was an isolated intervention, since 
the Home Office did not become properly engaged in the negotiations until the early 
1960s. It is also worth noting for contextual purposes that Securicor had doubled in 
size over the previous two years, employing 360 guards and protecting £350 million 
worth of property throughout London in 1953. Yet despite this market growth, 
Securicor nevertheless continued their strategy of attempting to capture legitimacy 
from the Metropolitan Police.
Given his apparent failure to provoke a response from the Commissioner o f the 
Metropolitan Police, in 1953 Godfrey changed targets and instead sent a letter to 
another high-ranking official -  the Commander of the Criminal Investigations 
Department. He explained that Securicor were publishing a poronation issue o f the 
in-house magazine called Securicier and optimistically mentioned that: “We are very 
anxious to include an article on Scotland Yard by somebody o f repute”.28 This 
seemingly innocuous request, it is contended here, can again be interpreted as part of 
a strategy to capture a degree of legitimacy from the state. For such an article could 
certainly have be used by Securicor to portray' some kind of linkage between 
themselves and the Metropolitan Police. It could have been employed, in other 
words, to communicate to the British public that the Metropolitan Police were 
endorsing the services provided by Securicor, in the process infusing the company 
with the ‘stateness’ which was considered so essential for legitimately operating
25 Underwood, Securicor, p.l 8.
26 Underwood, Securicor, p. 18.
27 Underwood, Securicor, p. 19.
28 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This letter is dated 28lh January 1953.
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within the postwar British security sector. Like their attempts to gain employment 
referrals from the Commissioner, then, this strategy illustrates how the company was 
interpreting the image of the state to mean that if  commercial organisations were to 
successfully and legitimately operate alongside state institutions within the security 
sector, then these organisations would have to somehow communicate publicly that 
they were structuring their operations in line with the British population’s widespread 
normative expectations about how the security ought to be provided. This strategy 
can therefore be viewed as a further stage in the ongoing development of Securicor’s 
pluralist practices.
Records show that the Commander neither ignored this letter nor provided a direct 
response, but instead referred Godfrey’s request to the Public Information Department 
of the Metropolitan Police. A few of days later, this Department’s secretary 
accordingly dispensed the following advice to the Public Information Officer in an 
internal communication:
An article by somebody from Scotland Yard on the work of Scotland Yard in 
the Coronation number of Securicier would, no doubt, help indirectly to 
publicise the work of Securicor Ltd, and in view of the correspondence in these 
files [of the Office of the Commissioner] it would not appear to be the desire of 
the Police to associate themselves too closely with this organisation.29
Concurring with the Departmental Secretary’s advice, the Public Information Officer 
wrote on the same day:
I think that the inference might be drawn from the publication of such an article 
that there was some association between the company and this force; or at least 
approval of the company by the Commissioner. I agree that we should send a 
polite refusal.30
The records show that a ‘polite refusal’ was accordingly sent to Securicor four days 
later.
These internal notes reveal the gradual consolidation of the Metropolitan Police’s 
policy stance regarding private security companies such as Securicor. For Securicor
29 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 2"d February 1953.
30 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 2nd February 1953.
72
were now consistently being viewed by the Metropolitan Police as an undesirable and 
illegitimate intruder into the postwar British security sector and therefore represented 
a threat to the status quo. As a result, the Metropolitan Police were once again clearly 
attempting to actively dissociate themselves from Securicor in order to avoid the 
possibility of communicating to the British population that the state was in any way 
connected to such companies. Crucially, the Metropolitan Police reasoned, this would 
serve to prevent the conferral of any ‘publicity’ or ‘approval’ -  i.e. legitimacy -  upon 
the operations of Securicor, thereby ensuring that such private security companies 
would remain marginalized within the British security sector. It is important to note, 
then, that this exchange seemed to represent a further stage in the consolidation o f the 
Metropolitan Police’s monopoly practices, for it was once again premised on a very 
literal and direct interpretation of the image of the state in which only public 
institutions such as the police were seen to have the requisite legitimacy to operate 
within the postwar security sector. And any institution which contradicted these 
monopoly practices would accordingly be viewed not only as an opponent o f the 
Metropolitan Police but an opponent of the public good more broadly.
It is also important to recognise that while the negotiations were still clearly 
proceeding in accordance with the monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police, 
there was slightly more reciprocation in this episode compared with the previous 
exchange between these two institutions. For while in 1950 Godfrey’s letters 
received no response whatsoever from the Metropolitan Police, during this round of
4
correspondence his efforts were at least rewarded with a ‘polite refusal’. To be sure, 
this was only a very nominal concession and hardly signified the emergence o f any 
power dependence on the part of the Metropolitan Police. But it did nevertheless 
establish some kind of precedent for a two-way relationship to develop within the 
negotiations between the pluralist practices of Securicor and the monopoly practices 
of the Metropolitan Police. This in turn illustrates how instead of being monopolised 
by the state, the security sector was in fact very gradually becoming characterised by 
negotiation between public and private institutions promoting two divergent sets of 
practices, as the state-in-society approach would suggest.
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3.4 Fabricating Legitimacy
This section will move forward to the first half of 1959, which proved to be an 
eventful and decisive year in the ongoing negotiations between Securicor and the 
Metropolitan Police. It will examine the way in which Securicor temporarily ceased 
their strategy of attempting to capture legitimacy directly from high-ranking 
Metropolitan Police officials and instead started to fabricate connections with this 
institution in the process of marketing their services to potential customers. It will 
then analyse the Metropolitan Police’s reaction to this new pluralist strategy, which 
again primarily entailed undermining Securicor’s operations. This section therefore 
represents another episode in the developing contest between the pluralist practices of 
Securicor and the monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police.
Before investigating this phase of negotiations, however, it is again important to 
introduce some contextual information. By the end of the 1950s, Securicor had once 
more doubled in size, now employing 650 guards. Furthermore, many other private 
security companies also appeared to be expanding successfully. For instance, Plant 
Protection had by now moved into the Birmingham market and was employing some 
200 security guards.31 2 * This again suggests that despite their lack of legitimacy, 
private security companies were nevertheless extending their operations. But as we 
will see, regardless of this organic economic growth it was equally clear that these 
companies were still actively pursuing their strategies o f attempting to capture 
legitimacy from the state institutions. Therefore, they still clearly viewed their
4
opportunities for long-term expansion to be dependent upon the legitimacy o f their 
operations. In addition, it is important to note that two years previously, in 1957, Sir 
Philip Margetson retired from his position as Assistant Commissioner in the 
Metropolitan Police to become a board member of Securicor. Significantly, 
Margetson’s employment history was utilised in subsequent years to increase 
Securicor’s leverage in its interactions with the Metropolitan Police. This signifies 
the beginning of another pluralist strategy which continues to this day -  that is, 
private security companies putting former high-ranking police officers on their boards 
in order to both blur the distinction between public and private security provision and 
to enhance the bargaining position of the industry. Yet despite this notable addition to
31 Underwood, Securicor, p.21.
32 G4SInternational, June 2006, p.33.
Clayton, The Protectors, p.21.
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Securicor’s negotiating team, the opening events of 1959 were not directly initiated by 
the company.
In early 1959, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police received a letter from
the security officer of Crown Agents -  the public company representing the interests
of British colonial administrations -  enquiring about Securicor. For in their efforts to
win the contract for guarding Crown Agent’s head office, Securicor had informed this
security officer that the they “ ...work in close liaison with Scotland Yard”.34 As a
consequence, the security officer wanted to discover the nature o f this ‘close liaison’.
To begin with, this exchange is interesting because it demonstrates that in order to
promote their services within the British postwar security sector, Securicor were again
not content to simply market their services as ‘Securicor products’, but were rather
compelled to advertise a connection between themselves and the prominent state
institutions such as the Metropolitan Police. For this state connection served to give
the appearance that their operations were endowed with a greater degree o f legitimacy
than would otherwise be the case. This can be seen as another example, then, of
Securicor constructing their preferences in accordance with a loose interpretation of
the image o f the state, in which they attempted to somehow conflate their inherent
‘privateness’ with the ‘stateness’ considered to be so essential for the legitimate
provision of security in postwar Britain. It represented, in other words, another stage
in the development of the company’s pluralist practices. Furthermore, the fact that the
attraction of this connection prompted the Crown Agents security officer to contact
*
the highest-ranking police officer in the country indicates the importance of this 
association in the mind of the security consumer, and therefore seems to vindicate this 
strategy.
On this occasion, the Commissioner delegated responsibility for dealing with this 
Securicor related enquiry to Assistant Commissioner ‘A ’, who in turn appeared to be 
perplexed by the company’s claims of any close liaisons with Scotland Yard. For in 
an internal communication to Assistant Commissioner ‘D ’ he asserted that “ ...the 
organisation...has never received any police approval, and it cannot be said that the 
liaison between us amounts to any more than the normal relationship between Police
34 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This letter is dated 13lh February 1959.
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Ti . .
and other privately employed watchmen”. In the same communication Assistant 
Commissioner ‘A ’ then proceeded to speculate upon the source of this seemingly 
unfounded claim. He wrote that:
At the recent exhibition of diamonds at Christie’s Sale Rooms... Securi cor were 
engaged on the internal security and on this occasion, because of the great value 
of the exhibits, arrangements were made for a direct telephone line to be 
installed between Christie’s and West End Central Police Station and for guards 
to telephone the station at half hourly intervals during the time the exhibition 
was closed. This was an additional security measure and would have been 
afforded to any firm responsible for the security arrangements on such an 
occasion. This instance would hardly be grounds to the claim of working in 
close liaison with Scotland Yard.35 6 37
Taking this exhibition to be the foundation of Securicor’s specious claim, a couple of
weeks later a letter was accordingly sent to the Crown Agents security officer denying
the existence of any ‘close liaison’. Importantly, this series of communications
demonstrates that six years after the previous recorded exchange between the two
institutions, the Metropolitan Police’s policy stance towards Securicor had remained
constant. Securicor should be approached with caution and under no circumstance
was any ‘police approval’ or legitimacy to be conferred upon company’s operations
by allowing connections -  formal or informal, fabricated or authentic -  to develop
between the institutions. Once again, then, the same monopoly practices o f the
Metropolitan Police’s were holding firm in the face of Securicor’s evolving pluralist
0
agenda. So while non-state actors were actively contesting the constitution o f the 
security sector, as the state-in-society approach would predict, the magnitude o f this 
contestation should not be over-emphasised, for the state institutions did remain at 
this time firmly in control.
Before we move on to the next episode in Securicor’s ongoing interactions with the 
Metropolitan Police, which took place during the second half of 1959, it is worth 
briefly examining further the significance of this diamond exhibition. In an interview 
conducted by the reporter Tom Clayton during the mid-1960s, Sir Philip Margetson 
was asked to pinpoint key the moments when Securicor’s operations really started to
35 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 13the February 1959.
36 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 13lh February 1959.
37 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This letter is dated 2nd May 1959.
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thrive. He response was: “On the day that de Beers, the diamond people, awarded us 
the contract to guard the Ageless Diamond Exhibition at Christie’s showrooms in 
January 1959. For fifteen days we had diamonds worth over five million pounds in 
our care”.38 Indeed, Clayton comments that the diamond exhibition contract “ ...gave 
security companies a new status, both business and professional”.39 So regardless of 
whether or not this exhibition was the basis for fabricated claims of cooperation 
between Security and the Metropolitan Police, and regardless of the Metropolitan 
Police’s continuing efforts to suppress the private security industry’s status, it appears 
that successful private security companies such as Securicor were still performing 
well within the sector, in the process allowing them to accumulate more resources 
with which to augment their power in the ongoing negotiations with the Metropolitan 
Police, as the next section will illustrate.
3.5 The Changing Constitution of the Security Sector
This section will examine the final phase of the negotiations between Securicor and 
the Metropolitan Police, which took place in the second half of 1959. It will show 
that after Securicor’s failed attempt at fabricating legitimacy they returned to the 
strategy they first adopted in 1950 -  that is, writing to the Commissioner -of the 
Metropolitan Police in an effort to obtain an official endorsement from the most 
prominent police institution in the country. But whereas in 1950 this strategy barely 
registered on the radar of the Metropolitan Police, in 1959 this request was taken far 
more seriously. This final exchange thus serves to illustrate very effectively the 
relative progress of the pluralist practices of Securicor and the monopoly practices of 
the Metropolitan Police over the course of the 1950s. This section will conclude by 
illustrating how by the end of this decade the security sector was becoming 
increasingly characterised by contestation between these two conflicting sets of 
practices and was accordingly moving further away from the institutional 
arrangements embodied in the monopoly myth.
In July 1959, Godfrey sent another letter -  which, significantly, was co-signed by 
Sir Philip Margetson, now a Director of Securicor -  to the Commissioner o f the
38 Clayton, The Protectors, p.21.
39 Clayton, The Protectors, p.21. Indeed, if you access the Group 4 Securicor website’s history section 
today, the entry for 1959 reads “Securicor won the high-profile contract to guard the ‘Ageless Diamond 
Exhibition’ at Christies” -  see www.g4s.com/home/about/history.htm.
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Metropolitan Police so as to inform him that Securicor were establishing a ‘mobile 
patrol’ service. He also asked in this letter if  the Commissioner would care to 
comment upon this new service and, in what can certainly be construed as an attempt 
to influence the nature of any such comment, subsequently remarked that: “I might 
add that something similar is in being in the Birmingham area and is, I believe, well 
received by the local police”.40 Two important points stem from this letter. First, in 
expanding their operations into the mobile patrolling sub-sector, Securicor were 
clearly still finding new opportunities for organic economic growth. Second, in a 
manner very similar to their earlier expansion into the investigative services sub­
sector, they wanted these new operations to be approved by the Metropolitan Police 
so as to endow them with a greater degree of legitimacy than otherwise would have 
been the case, since this would make these new operations more attractive to potential 
customers. As we have seen, this endorsement-seeking strategy represented a now 
relatively standard component of Securicor’s pluralist practices. Yet this particular 
pluralist strategy was especially important in this instance when it is considered that 
mobile patrol services had traditionally been closely associated with the actual 
concrete operations of the public police and had therefore been imbued with a 
particularly strong sense of ‘stateness’. In other words, the structural influence o f the 
image of the state was very pronounced in this region of the security sector. 'State- 
endorsed legitimacy was thus a central resource in this projected expansion of 
Securicor’s operations.
*
Significantly, the Commissioner did not disregard Godfrey’s letter as he had done 
nine years previously, but instead delegated the matter to one of his Assistant 
Commissioners and maintained his own involvement throughout. Two weeks later, 
Assistant Commissioner ‘A’ wrote the following internal communication to Assistant 
Commissioner ‘C’ with regard to Securicor’s new ‘mobile patrol service’:
The extension of the activities of Securicor to visiting various premises, 
involving as it must do movement through the streets by car and, no doubt, the 
examination of the exterior of premises, raises the problem of whether they are 
likely, because of the similarity in uniform, to become identified with the police
40 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This letter is dated 27lh July 1959. It is worth noting that at this time the 
other services offered by Securicor, according to a 1958 article in the company’s house magazine now 
entitled Security, were internal security guarding, control room services and tele-contact services. See: 
Marquess of Willingdon, ‘Securicor: Its history, Its Objects and How It Achieves Them’, Security 
January 1958, pp.4-5.
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in the eyes of the public, and in this respect it seems to be a most undesirable 
development.41
Here again, then, we come across one of the key components o f the Metropolitan 
Police’s policy stance with reference to Securicor -  that is, an acute concern that the 
British population might begin to conflate the operations of the company with those 
of the public police. For such conflation could, from the Metropolitan Police’s 
vantage point, result in two unsettling consequences. First, it could serve to confer 
legitimacy upon Securicor’s new operations by communicating an association with 
the state institutions. Second, it could simultaneously begin to undermine the 
activities of the Metropolitan Police by blurring the distinction between public and 
private security provision. Both of these potential outcomes were antitheses to the 
monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police.
Understandably, then, this latest development in the pluralist practices of Securicor 
clearly represented an ongoing concern for Assistant Commissioner ‘A ’, for he soon 
afterwards submitted the following internal communication to the Commissioner 
regarding Securicor’s proposed ‘mobile patrol service’:
The Midland Bank has already instituted a system to visit and check their own 
premises. The patrols wear bank messengers’ uniform which could not'be 
mistaken for police uniform. It is one matter, however, to look after one’s own 
premises, but a different proposition when a body of uniformed security agents 
is maintained to be hired out to any firm prepared to pay for them.42
This communication is significant not only because it once again reinforces the 
Metropolitan Police’s ongoing portrayal of private security companies as something 
approximating a ‘private army’, but because it also specifies more clearly what type 
of private security provision falls into this particular category. This specification 
involves making a distinction between what has subsequently been termed ‘in-house’ 
and ‘contract’ private security.43 In-house private security refers to the process 
whereby a variety of public and private organisations recruit and equip their security 
staff internally, as the Midland Bank were doing in the above quote. In contrast,
41 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office o f the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 1011' August 1959.
42 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 19th August 1959.
43 See: Alison Wakefield, Selling Security: The Private Policing o f  Public Space (Cullompton: Willan, 
2003), p.58.
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‘contract’ private security refers to the process whereby these same organisations 
procure security staff from external organisations such as Securicor. As the Assistant 
Commissioner’s comments illustrate, and subsequent evidence suggests, in-house 
private security operations were considered to be less problematic than contract 
private security activities within government circles.
This viewpoint seems to be in part influenced by the notion that while in-house 
private security corresponds quite closely with the traditional rights of the individual 
to protect their own private property -  that is, their right to self-defence -  contract 
private security can potentially be hired out to protect any kind of property.44 This is 
often seen to be a more sinister scenario because there is no connection between, to 
use a common phrase, ‘a man’ and ‘his castle’. These companies could in theory be 
procured by ‘any man’ to protect ‘any castle’, which in one sense amounts to a 
corrupted invocation of traditional property rights. In addition, this hostility may also 
have been related to the fact that the everyday operations of in-house private security 
staff generally include many non-security functions such as public relations and 
reception duties, whereas contract private security staff are more directly engaged in 
conventional security provision, thereby giving them a more coercive edge.45 Indeed, 
it is when these two notions are put together that contract private security could begin 
to resemble something like a ‘private army’ from the perspective o f critical- eyes. 
Either way, it is important to recognise this classification at this early stage and to 
note that for the remainder of this thesis we are mostly concerned with the activities of
ê
contract as opposed to in-house private security providers, for it is these organisations 
which were more openly contesting the constitution of the security sector.
Returning now to the undertakings of Assistant Commissioner ‘A ’ in July 1959. It 
appears that his concerns regarding Securicor’s new ‘mobile patrol’ operations were 
sufficient for him to eschew the Metropolitan Police’s decade-old policy in which 
Securicor’s operations were to be actively disregarded or ‘freezed out’. For in a 
maimer reminiscent of the police’s aggressive reaction to private security companies 
in 1948, he suggested to the Commissioner in a further internal communication that 
the Metropolitan Police should resurrect the idea of undermining the .legal basis of 
private security companies using Section 10 of the Police Act 1919 and Section 2 of
44 Shearing, ‘The Relation Between Public and Private Policing’, p.411.
45 Trevor Jones and Tint Newburn, Private Security and Public Policing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p.56.
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the Public Order Act 1936. Furthermore, in order to execute this legislation more 
effectively, he raised the possibility of involving the Home Office for purposes of 
reinforcement.46 This aggressive solution again reveals the growing levels o f disquiet 
within the Metropolitan Police about the threat that the expanding private security 
industry represented to the what they viewed as their rightful monopoly position 
within the security sector. It also demonstrates that a very literal and direct 
interpretation of the image of the state continued to prevail among the Metropolitan 
Police staff. They continued to serve, it seems, as the conscious or unconscious 
bearers and perpetuators of the monopoly myth.
Rather than pursuing the confrontational strategy outlined by his Assistant, 
however, the Commissioner opted instead for a far more measured course of action, 
replying that:
I am still in doubt about this whole project. There is the question of similarity 
o f uniforms as well as H.O. [Home Office] points, and there are other grounds 
for objection we could put forward. I think we might as well see the writers 
[Godfrey and Margetson] now and give them our views and objections. I would 
prefer to adopt this procedure and to keep H.O. out of it at this stage. They can 
always be informed later if  necessary.47 48
Importantly, there is no evidence that any such meeting between Godfrey, Margetson
and the Metropolitan Police ever occurred -  indeed, records suggest that no face-to-
face meetings between the private security and state institutions were to take place
*
until the mid-1960s. Instead, it appears that the Commissioner was content to write a 
letter to Godfrey a week later explaining that Securicor could proceed with their 
‘mobile patrols’ expansion, but that the company must acknowledge the proscriptions 
set down in Section 10 of the Police Act 1919 and Section 2 of the Public Order Act 
1936. In addition, he also firmly requested that the company continue to provide the
48Commissioner’s Office with updates of the scheme’s progress.
46 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This position is mapped in internal communications dated 19th August 
1959 and 25th August 1959.
47 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This internal communication is dated 26lh August 1959.
48 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office of the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. This letter is dated 2"d February 1959.
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This exchange highlights some important developments in the interactions between 
Securicor and the Metropolitan Police. To begin with, Securicor’s ongoing attempts 
to enhance the legitimacy of their operations by establishing official connections with 
the Metropolitan Police were no longer being met with a universally uncooperative 
and dismissive response. For while high-ranking officials within the Metropolitan 
Police were clearly still harbouring substantial reservations about engaging with 
Securicor -  as evidenced in the revived proposals to enforce the Police Act 1919 and 
the Public Order Act 1936 -  the Commissioner eventually, though rather reluctantly, 
consented to Securicor’s new ‘mobile patrol’ services. This response can hardly be 
described as an endorsement and did not therefore facilitate the transfer o f any great 
degree legitimacy from the Metropolitan Police to Securicor. But it did mark a 
significant shift away from the ‘freezing out’ policies which they had implemented 
towards the beginning of the decade. It also set down a more reliable institutional 
channel through which Securicor could continue with their attempts to capture 
legitimacy from the core state institutions in the future.
Over the course of the decade, then, it seems that Securicor’s status within the
postwar British security sector had become more concretised, for they were now
exercising some genuine agency in their negotiations with the Metropolitan Police.
As a consequence, it can be observed that the pluralist practices of Securicor were
gradually gaining a minor foothold in the security sector and that the monopoly
practices o f the Metropolitan Police were at the same time necessarily conceding
*
some ground. The key resource of the legitimacy, in other words, was no longer 
concentrated so securely within the orbit of the central state institutions and was in 
turn becoming a more attainable target for the legitimacy-starved private security 
industry.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that by the end of the decade the postwar security 
sector was characterised by the emergence of two contrasting and conflicting sets of 
practices. And, crucially, each set of practices was consciously designed to bring into 
existence a different ensemble of institutional arrangements. Securicor were seeking 
to develop a pluralised system of security provision, in which both public and private 
security providers were able to legitimately function alongside one another within the
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security sector. Conversely, the Metropolitan police were attempting to defend and 
reproduce a monopolistic system of security provision, in which only public security 
providers were able to legitimately function within the security sector. Importantly, 
then, to the extent that these two contrasting sets of practices were coming into 
conflict with one another -  which, admittedly, was relatively infrequent during this 
period -  it is possible to observe that the postwar security sector was increasingly 
being characterised by processes of contestation and change generated by conflict 
between state and society actors. As the state-in-society approach would suggest, in 
other words, even those domains which have generally been viewed as the very 
essence of the modern state -  such as the security sector -  have actively been 
contested by different sets of state and society practices.
Yet this chapter has also illustrated that in tandem with these processes of
contestation and change, the postwar security sector was also characterised by a
strong current of continuity. For as we have seen, the interactions between these
different sets of practices within the security sector were also being clearly shaped by
the structural influence of the image of the state. So regardless of the fragmented
reality of the security sector, it seems that a large proportion o f the British population
continued to believe that the modern state ought to be the only legitimate provider of
security functions -  that is, they continued to believe in the monopoly m yth." This
image of the state had, in other words, become naturalised within their collective
consciousness. As a consequence, the various institutions functioning within the
*
security sector were all compelled to somehow integrate this image of the state into 
their respective sets of practices, for not doing so would cause them to encounter a 
significant degree of cultural resistance. In the case of the Metropolitan Police, the 
structural influence of the image of the state was clearly evident in their attempts to 
create a monopolistic security sector -  indeed, they can be seen as the direct bearers 
and perpetuators of the monopoly myth. In the case of Securicor, however, the 
influence of the image of the state was more complex, for their very existence grated 
with the idea of a universal, state-centred system of security provision. And this 
sizeable disjuncture meant that they could not directly integrate the image of the state 
into their pluralist practices. Their interpretation of the image was therefore much 
more subtle and indirect. They interpreted it to mean that if  they were to legitimately 
function alongside the state within a pluralised security sector then they would have to 
somehow capture legitimacy from the state, for this was one of the only conceivable
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ways to bring their operations more closely in line with the majority of the British 
population’s normative expectations about how security ought to be provided. As the 
state-in-society approach would suggest, then, the structural influence of the image of 
the state was causing a strong current of continuity to course through these divergent 
state and society practices, since whatever the outcome of these negotiations, key 
elements of the image of the state would to some extent be reproduced.
It is important to emphasise that it is this dialectical process of continuity and
change, expressed here through the state-in-society concepts of image and practices,
which serves to explain the complex political processes relating to the re-legitimation
private security in postwar Britain. For on one side, it was the fluid nature o f state
and society practices in the security sector during the 1950s which explains how
Securicor began to push their pluralist agenda in the face of state opposition. On the
other, it was the strong current of continuity created by the structural influence o f the
image of the state which explains why Securicor harnessed their agency not to
function as purebred market actors within the security sector but rather to capture
legitimacy from the state. It is the dialectical interplay between these two processes,
then, which explains the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
Furthermore, in the next chapter we will witness this two-way dynamic even more
clearly, since during the 1960s the security sector negotiations began to take on much
greater proportions. For during this decade, the pluralist practices o f Securicor and
the monopoly practices of the Metropolitan Police were gradually translated into a
*
larger number public and private institutions and were transferred into a more formal 
policy environment.
84
BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
The Regulation Debate: The Home Office and the BSIA
(1960-1969)
4
4.1 Introduction
During the 1950s the negotiations between the private security and state institutions
over the legitimacy to undertake security functions in the postwar British security
sector took place within a rather ad hoc institutional environment. Yet despite these
informalities two clear and coherent sets of practices began to emerge. First, the
pluralist practices of Securicor, which centred around their ongoing attempts to
capture legitimacy from the Metropolitan Police so as to enhance the company’s
position within the security sector. Second, the monopoly practices o f the
Metropolitan Police, which involved consistently undermining and marginalizing
Securicor’s activities wherever possible so as to promote the state as the only
legitimate security provider functions within postwar Britain. This chapter will
demonstrate how during the 1960s these pluralist and monopoly practices were first
transferred into a new set of institutions, most notably the Home Office and the
British Security Industry Association (BSIA), and were then systematically translated
into a more formal and structured institutional environment. Furthermore, as the scale
*
of the negotiations between these powerful public and private institutions assumed 
greater proportions, so the reality of the security sector moved ever further away from 
the institutional arrangements mapped out in the monopoly myth. For as we will see, 
by the end of the 1960s the security sector was a far more contested domain than it 
had been a decade earlier.
This chapter will also illustrate how these evolving negotiations gradually came to 
revolve around a single issue -  the statutory regulation of the private security 
industry. For during the 1960s, the private security institutions increasingly came to 
see statutory regulation as the most effective means by which to accomplish their 
pluralist agenda of capturing legitimacy from the state institutions. This is because 
regulation would serve to establish a concrete, official and widely recognisable 
connection between the private security companies and the state. And this would in
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turn facilitate the transfer of legitimacy from the state institutions to the private 
security industry, in the process enhancing industry’s status and position within the 
security sector. As we will see, the importance attached to the regulation issue by the 
private security institutions shows once again how their preferences were continually 
being shaped the structural influence of the image of the state. For the private 
security companies were willing to sacrifice a degree of market freedom in exchange 
for the ‘stateness’ which a significant proportion of the British population considered 
to be so essential for the legitimate provision of security within postwar Britain. 
Conversely, it was precisely because regulation would have the effect o f further 
legitimating the industry and allowing the private security companies to challenge the 
state’s dominance in the security sector that the Home Office and police, following 
their now firmly established monopoly agenda, sought to suppress the regulation 
issue. Over the course of the 1960s, then, the contest between those institutions 
advancing the pluralist and monopoly practices increasingly came to be defined by 
these opposing positions in the regulation debate.
In order to analyse these interrelated themes, this chapter will be divided into six 
parts, each representing a different aspect or phase of the negotiations. Section 4.2 
will begin by investigating why exactly the Home Office entered into the these 
negotiations in the first place and by exploring the unique departmental culture of this 
institution. It is important to understand these background factors because during the 
1960s the Home Office soon became the most powerful state institution within the 
negotiations and the chief proponent of the monopoly agenda. Section 4.3 will then 
examine the two issues upon which the Home Office focused at the beginning o f the 
1960s: mock police uniforms and regulation. Section 4.4 will analyse the Home 
Office’s subsequent attempts to set a strong monopoly agenda for the ensuing 
regulation debate. Interestingly, in exploring this agenda setting process we will 
come across the first instance of a third set of practices -  termed here the ‘reformist’ 
practices. To be sure, these practices play only a minor role in this phase of the 
negotiations. But, as we will see, they do become increasingly significant in later 
chapters. Next, Section 4.5 will explore the first face-to-face interactions, between the 
Home Office, police and the private security representatives. Of particular interest in 
this section is, firstly, the different ways in which the private security and state actors 
approached the issue of regulation and, secondly, how this important meeting resulted 
in the creation of the BSIA. Section 4.6 will examine the ‘rules of the game’ which
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characterised the interactions between the private security and state institutions at the 
close of the decade. It will, more specifically, show that although the pluralist 
practices of the private security institutions had by this juncture accumulated a 
significant amount of momentum, the allied monopoly practices of the Home Office 
and the police continued to ultimately dictate the terms of the negotiations. Finally, 
Section 4.7 will provide a few theoretically-informed conclusions about this second 
phase of the negotiations. It will, in particular, illustrate how the dialectical processes 
o f contestation and continuity which were revealed in the preceding empirical sections 
-  and which were articulated through the state-in-society concepts of image and 
practices -  serve to explain the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
4.2 The Home Office Culture
This section has two purposes. First, it will examine how and why the Home Office 
entered into the negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security functions in 
postwar Britain. This will in turn illustrate why the Home Office so quickly became 
the most powerful institution within these negotiations. Second, it will explore the 
strong departmental culture it added to the policy process. This will serve to explain 
why the Home Office was, from the outset, determined to channel its substantial 
resources towards the further promotion of the monopoly set of practices initially 
developed by the Metropolitan Police.
Aside from a brief intervention to outlaw the trade name ‘Security Corps’, the Home 
Office had remained firmly outside negotiations regarding the constitution of the 
security sector during the 1950s. During the early 1960s, however, the Home Office 
finally arrived into this policy arena. For at the one of the Central Conferences of 
Chief Constables in 1962 -  an assembly which came together biannually under Home 
Office chairmanship -  it was decided that a Working Party on Mock Uniforms and 
Vehicles should be established so as to facilitate discussion between Home Office 
officials and senior police officers about the private security industry.1 This was a 
significant decision because it marked the point at which the most powerful state actor 
within the security sector started to participate within the increasingly important
1 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This information was drawn from an 
internal communication dated 10lh March 1964.
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negotiations regarding the legitimate role of the public and private spheres in the 
provision of internal security.
Official records provide no clear indication of the exact reason why the Home 
Office became involved in these negotiations at this particular time. It is possible, 
however, to outline two contextual factors which could very possibly have influenced 
this decision. The first factor relates to the continual expansion of the private security 
industry. For instance, in 1960 Securicor was purchased by Kensington Palace Hotels 
Ltd, a move which in turn substantially increased the volume of financial investment
'y
pumped into the company’s operations. Furthermore, in the same year De La Rue 
International, the largest commercial banknote printer and paper manufacturer in the 
world, founded the private security company Security Express, which was to become 
another market leader within a decade. Indeed, against the background of these 
expansions Clayton argues that “[i]t was in 1960 that industrial security began to 
emerge as Big Business in its own right”.2 34 So while the attempts made by the private 
security companies to capture legitimacy from the central state institutions were 
meeting solid resistance, it appears the certain companies were nevertheless accruing 
an ever greater share of the security sector. It is very conceivable that the challenge 
that this expansion represented to the state-centric orientation of the security sector 
could have prompted the Home Office to engage more directly with the issues 
surrounding the industry.
The second factor relates to changes in the institutional arrangements between the 
Plome Office and the police forces during the early 1960s. In historical terms, the 
relationship between the Home Office and police had always been very close. In 
1829 the Metropolitan Police was established by the Home Secretary Robert Peel 
“ ...as quite literally a sub-department of the Flome Office”.5 And in 1919 ‘F 
Division’ of the Home Office was set up specifically to develop policy for and liase 
with the various police forces of England and Wales.6 Despite this closeness, 
however, the police forces were generally given a sizeable degree of independence
2 Underwood, Securicor, p.22.
3 Clayton, The Protectors, p.22.
4 Clayton, The Protectors, p.22.
5 Lord Allen of Abbeydale, ‘State Service: Reflections of a Bureaucrat’, in The Home Office: 
Perspectives on Policy and Administration, Bicentenary Lectures 1982 (London: Royal Institute of 
Public Administration, 1983), p.24.
6 Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History (Harlow: Longman, 2nd edition, 
1996), p.161.
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from the Home Office on the grounds that decentralised policing would serve to 
protect the liberty of the population by preventing the establishment of a single, all- 
powerful centralised police force.7 8 Indeed, it is against the background o f such 
constabulary independence that we should probably interpret the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police’s decision in 1959 to ‘keep the Home Office out’ of its 
negotiations with Securicor. Yet 1960 marked an important turning point in this 
institutional set-up because it signified the onset of what Clive Emsley terms “the 
steady march of centralisation”, in which the police forces were gradually brought 
more directly under the centralised control of the Home Office. For in that year the 
Royal Commission on Police was formed and subsequently recommended changes 
which served to increase the power of the Home Office over the police forces.9 To be 
sure, many of these changes were not formally implemented until the Police Act 
1964. Yet the beginnings of this process could certainly be viewed as another 
contextual factor causing the Home Office to follow the Metropolitan Police into the 
private security negotiations during the early 1960s. In the event, however, both of 
these factors probably served to influence the arrival of the Home Office into these 
negotiations. And if this was indeed the case, this suggests that the Home Office 
entered into this policy arena with a clear target -  the expanding private security 
industry -  and a great deal of institutional power and resources.
Furthermore, it is also important to explore in more detail the Home Office’s
departmental culture, since this provides a further insight into the way in which this
*
key institution approached issues relating to the private security industry. In doing 
this, it is crucial to recognise from the outset that the very existence of the Home 
Office has always been closely related to the propagation of the monopoly myth 
which serves to structure institutional interactions within the British security sector. 
This is because of the unique position of the Home Office within modern British 
history. For as the former Plome Secretary and Prime Minster James Callaghan 
commented, since its inception in 1782 the Home Office has had an “ ...unchanged 
basic function of preserving the civil peace that has continued to form the State’s
7 Emsley, The English Police, pp. 162-163.
8 Emsley, The English Police, p. 160.
9 Emsley, The English Police, pp. 172-175.
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spinal cord down to this very day”.10 It was and still is, in other words, one of the 
clearest manifestations of the institutional arrangements advanced by early modern 
philosophers such as Hobbes. Importantly, this historical context means that the 
monopoly myth has generally been deeply institutionalised within Home Office’s 
departmental culture. For example, in a recent interview conducted by Ian Loader, a 
retired Home Office civil servant makes the following observation:
There was, I think, a sort of under-dialogue common sense o f liberal 
values...Those are the sort of core, mostly shared ideas about the nature of 
justice that go back to Enlightenment thinking, fairly widely shared by the 
intelligent or the well informed, or the professionally involved. You can go 
back behind those to philosophical stuff from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and 
Kant.11 12
Furthermore, after conducting almost two hundred interviews with former and
currently employed civil servants, David Marsh, David Richards and Martin Smith
reached a similar conclusion: “In the last sixty years”, they discovered, “two values,
those of state intervention to ensure social order and libertarianism to defend
individual liberty, have been fundamental precepts around which the Home Office
culture has evolved”. From the outset, then, the departmental culture of the Home
Office has been permeated by a very literal and direct interpretation of the image of
the state as the sole legitimate provider of security functions. As we will see, upon
entering into the negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security functions in
0
postwar Britain the Home Office was thus immediately supportive of the monopoly 
practices developed by the Metropolitan Police over the preceding few years.
4.3 Uniforms and Regulation
This section will examine the undertakings of the first and only meeting o f the 
Working Party on Mock Uniforms and Vehicles, which took place in May 1963 and 
marked the formal entry of the Home Office into the private security policy arena. It 
was a meeting for state representatives only: it was chaired by Mr A. W. Glanville, a
10 James Callaghan, ‘Cumber and Variableness’, in The Home Office: Perspectives on Policy and 
Administration, Bicentenary Lectures 1982 (London: Royal Institute of Public Administration, 1983), 
P-9-
11 Loader, ‘Fall of the ‘Platonic Guardians” , p.563.
12 David Marsh, David Richards and Martin Smith, Changing Patterns o f  Governance in the United 
Kingdom: Reinventing Whitehall? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.71.
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Home Office civil servant from the police-orientated ‘F Division’, and was attended 
by six Chief Constables and one Chief Superintendent. And its explicit purpose was 
to construct a joint Home Office-police policy stance for negotiating with the private 
security industry.13 Significantly, it soon became apparent that the policy preferences 
expressed by these individuals essentially represented an expansion of the monopoly 
practices developed by the Metropolitan Police during the previous decade. For their 
common agenda was to explore the various ways in which the pluralist practices of 
the private security companies could be marginalized and controlled using the state’s 
apparatus. For analytical purposes, the expansion of this monopoly agenda can be 
broken down into four separate points of interest.
Perhaps rather unusually, the first point of interest concerns a topic which never 
actually surfaced within the Working Party discussions. For while the participants 
considered many different means by which to control the operations of the private 
security companies, they at no point contemplated the possibility o f using Section 2 of 
the Public Order Act 1936. The reason for this conspicuous omission can be perhaps 
be traced back to a Conference of District Chief Constables meeting which took place 
three years earlier in June 1960. During the course of once again assessing the 
applicability of this piece of legislation to the private security industry, the minutes of 
the meeting record the following outcome:
While it is not considered that formal objection can be taken to organisations of 
this kind on the grounds that they have ‘organised, trained and equipped their 
employees for the purpose of enabling them to be employed in usurping the 
functions of the police’, nevertheless it is considered that any extension of the 
fields of operation which would bring them into contact with members o f the 
public is undesirable and should be discouraged.14
This decision-making process was important because it revealed the powers available 
to the Home Office and police in the promotion of their monopoly practices against 
the pluralist practices of the private security industry. For while the Home Office and 
police could ‘discourage’ the expansion of the private security companies, for 
example by preventing the transfer of legitimacy to their operations, it was now 
finally clear that they could not invoke Section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 to
13 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This information was drawn from 
the minutes of the first meeting of the Working Party on Mock Uniforms and Vehicles, 20th May 1963.
14 TNA: PRO, MEPO 2/8739, Metropolitan Police, Office o f the Commissioner, Correspondence and 
Papers Concerning Securicor. These minutes are dated 20th June 1960.
92
completely eliminate them from the security sector. In other words, it was now 
accepted by these core state institutions that the legal status of the industry was 
guaranteed, for there is no indication that state officials ever again considered 
enforcing this legislation against the industry.
Although the Public Order Act 1936 was necessarily omitted from the Working 
Party’s agenda, the other repeatedly considered legislative control, Section 10 o f the 
Police Act 1919 which addresses the use of mock police uniforms, did assume a 
central position within this forum -  indeed, it even provided the Working Party with 
its name. The Working Party’s consideration of this legislation represents the second 
point of interest. As background, it is important to note that the Metropolitan Police 
had been concerned with this matter throughout the 1950s as they increasingly 
became aware that private security companies were issuing uniforms to their guards 
which closely resembled those uniforms worn by the public police. From the 
perspective of the private security companies, this represented one further strategy for 
capturing legitimacy from the state, since it served to rather superficially give the 
private security officers the air of ‘stateness’ considered to be so essential for the 
legitimate provision of security. This strategy, then, provides further indication that 
the private security companies were shaping their activities in accordance with the 
structural influence of the image of the state. From the Metropolitan Police’s 
perspective, this strategy served only to drain their own reserves of legitimacy by 
creating an association between their own activities and the operations o f these 
‘private armies’ -  hence their concern. This strategy therefore grated with their very 
literal interpretation of the image of the state. But while the Metropolitan Police made 
no attempt to enact this legislation during the 1950s, it appears that the entry of the 
Home Office into this policy area, with its superior administrative and political 
resources, prompted a more active standpoint to be adopted on this issue. For one of 
the explicit objectives of the Working Party was to modify Section 10 of the Police 
Act 1919 so that it could be more readily applied to the private security industry.15 
The successful modification of this legislation would in turn constitute an useful 
enhancement of the Home Office and Police’s ability to further realise their monopoly 
practices by stifling one dimension of the industry’s ever-widening strategy of 
siphoning-off legitimacy from the core state institutions.
15 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This information was drawn from 
the minutes of the first meeting of the Working Party on Mock Uniforms and Vehicles, 20th May 1963.
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Significantly, the timing of this decision could not have been better, for at that 
moment a new Police Bill was being drafted in Parliament in order to implement the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Police. As a result, the proposals of 
the Working Party were swiftly integrated into the drafting procedures through a 
House of Lords amendment and soon emerged as Section 52(2) of the Police Act 
1964, which read:
Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in 
circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a 
member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100.16
Again, then, the state institutions, now significantly strengthened by the presence of 
the Home Office, had successfully deployed their political and administrative 
resources to curtail the industry’s efforts at capturing legitimacy from the state, 
thereby further advancing their monopoly practices in the increasingly contested 
security sector.
The third point of interest is, in retrospect, by far the most significant issue arising 
from the Working Party meeting, although this was not considered to be the case at 
the time. For the minutes of the meeting show that the Working Party discussed the 
possibility of one further form of legislative control: the introduction of statutory 
regulation or licensing of the private security industry. An internal communication 
written by Glanville reveals that this particular matter was'debated in large part 
because the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police supported the implementation 
of such a system.17 However, the minutes of the meeting show that the Working 
Party clearly disagreed with the Commissioner’s assessment:
The Working Party were not in favour of registration or licensing of commercial 
security organisations, which would involve, or appear to involve some official 
guarantee of probity, if not efficiency and would lay the registration authority 
open to criticism for misdeeds of the firms.18
16 Police Act 1964 (ch.48) (London: HMSO).
17 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 16th September 1963.
18 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. These minutes are dated 20th May 
1963.
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This is an extremely important judgement, for the members of the Working Party 
seemed to recognise that the consequences of statutory licensing would indeed be 
completely different to those of Section 10 of the Police Act 1919 or Section 2 o f the 
Public Order Act 1936. The implementation of these latter pieces o f legislation, for 
instance, would simply allow the state to curtail and undermine the activities o f the 
private security industry from a distance within the context o f a very impersonal, 
straightforward command and control relationship. They would therefore serve to 
enhance the ability of the Home Office and police to realise their monopoly practices. 
The implementation of statutory regulation, however, could potentially serve to bring 
the state institutions and the industry closer together in a very public and official- 
looking relationship, which could in turn have the unintended effect o f transferring a 
considerable degree of legitimacy from the state institutions to the regulated private 
security companies. It would, in other words, serve to considerably strengthen the 
pluralist practices of the private security institutions and correspondingly weaken the 
monopoly practices of the Home Office and police -  the very antithesis of the 
Working Party’s objectives.
This specific interpretation of the possible consequences of statutory regulation is 
central to the remainder of the negotiations and therefore deserves closer scrutiny. 
Statutory regulation would require the Home Office to set explicit standards for* the 
industry, establish some kind of institutional apparatus with which to vet the private 
security employees or companies, and then issue some kind of state-approved license 
to those private security employees or companies who meet these criteria. While such 
a system would undoubtedly allow the state to control the industry more effectively 
through the setting of strict vetting standards, it would also lay down an explicit 
linkage between the private security companies and the state institutions within the 
security sector. It would, in other words, communicate to the British population that 
private security companies now represented a realistic alternative to the public police. 
So rather than curtailing their expansion, a system of statutory licensing could 
effectively serve to legitimate the operations of the private security companies. This 
point was succinctly reiterated by Glanville when a few months later he wrote in an 
internal communication on this matter to the Deputy Under-Secretary o f State in 
charge of ‘F Division’ that “ ...the words ‘approved by the Home Secretary’ would
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provide the companies with a valuable piece of propaganda”.19 20 It was because 
statutory regulation represented such an effective institutional device for transferring 
legitimacy from the state to the private security industry that it became, in a short 
period of time, the central issue around which subsequent negotiations over the 
legitimacy to undertake security functions revolved.
The fourth and final point of interest emerging from these discussions relates to the 
Working Party’s decision to initiate a more structured dialogue with representatives 
from the private security industry. The initial rationale behind this proposed dialogue 
was to discuss the enforcement of future restrictions upon the use o f mock police 
uniforms. However, given the speed with which this recommendation reached the 
statute books, this rationale soon became obsolete. Yet an internal communication 
written by Glanville following the successful passage of the Police Act 1964 reveals 
that it was still considered worthwhile by the Home Office and police officials to set 
in motion a more structured dialogue with the private security industry. This is 
interesting because it demonstrates that despite the additional powers provided by the 
mock police uniform legislation, the Home Office and police were still sufficiently 
concerned about the activities of the private security companies to enter into formal 
discussions with them. And when compared with Securicor’s many failed attempts to 
initiate such formal discussions with the Metropolitan Police during the 1950s, "this 
decision could certainly be viewed in a positive light from the perspective of the 
private security industry, for it would provide them with a more concrete platform
t
from which to further consolidate their pluralist practices. However, as the next 
section will demonstrate, the Home Office made sure that this platform would not 
represent a level playing field, but would instead be significantly tilted towards the 
further advancement of their monopoly practices.
4.4 The Working Party on Private Security Organisations
The Working Party on Private Security Organisations was a crucial milestone in the 
negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security functions in postwar Britain 
because it constituted the first occasion when the Home Office and police officials
19 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 8th November 1963.
20 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 14th August 1964.
96
held face-to-face negotiations with representatives from the private security industry. 
This section will explore the Home Office’s extensive preparations for this important 
meeting (the actual face-to-face negotiations will be examined in the next section), 
which involved reconciling two difficult problems. The first problem was that the 
very process of meeting with the private security representatives would inevitably 
entail conferring some degree of legitimacy upon their operations. And in line with 
their monopoly practices, the Home Office and police were accordingly concerned 
with minimising any such transfer of legitimacy. The second and more significant 
problem addressed by the Home Office was to ensure that the issue o f statutory 
regulation was eliminated from the meeting’s agenda. For regulation had the potential 
to be an extremely explosive issue in the context o f these negotiations, as the previous 
section made clear. It is interesting to note that this increasingly became an internal 
problem, for some high-ranking Home Office and police officials were actually highly 
supportive of such regulation. And as we will see, this support in turn represented the 
genesis of a third set of practices, termed here the ‘reformist’ practices. For a period 
of time, then, the preparations for the Working Party came to be increasingly 
dominated by the attempts of those Home Office officials promoting the monopoly 
practices to marginalize these nascent pro-regulation reformist practices. This was 
because, from the monopoly perspective, those officials advancing the reformist 
practices were dangerously close to facilitating and empowering the pluralist practices 
of the private security companies by supporting the introduction of statutory 
regulation. Ultimately, the monopoly agenda prevailed in this internal fracture, but 
not before a third battle line was drawn in these ongoing negotiations (though it 
should be noted that the reformist practices did not gather any real momentum until 
the 1970s, as the next chapter will demonstrate). In short, then, the Home Office’s 
preparations were designed to promote the monopoly practices against the now long­
standing challenge of the pluralist practices, together with the new challenge o f the 
reformist practices, for this was seen to be the most effective way of protecting the 
state’s valuable reserves of legitimacy.
In autumn 1964 the Home Office began laying the foundations for the Working 
Party on Private Security Organisations. The specific rationale for holding this 
meeting was neatly articulated by Glanville in the following internal communication:
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Perhaps the main justification for it would be that the development and
multiplication of these organisations is a matter of public concern in which the
Home Office is bound to be implicated and perhaps we should put ourselves in
the position of being able to say that we have had discussions with their 
• 21representatives.
By putting themselves in this more proactive position, in other words, the Home 
Office and police would be better placed to control the course of any future 
interactions with the industry. This would in turn put these state institutions in the 
optimal position for continuing to assert their monopoly practices in the face o f the 
pluralist practices of the private security industry. Another internal communication 
written by Graham-Harrison illustrates how the Home Office and police actually 
intended to fashion the specific institutional arrangements for this new forum -  they 
wanted to “ ...induce them [the private security companies] to form a central body, 
with which the police, and when appropriate the Home Office, could discuss any 
problems that may arise”.21 2 Significantly, this ‘central body’ would eventually 
emerge in the form of the British Security Industry Authority, the creation of which 
we will examine in detail in the next section.
It is important to recognise, however, that while on the surface this objective might 
appear to have been relatively straightforward, from the Home Office’s perspective it 
also created two important problems. The first was related to the fact that it would be 
very difficult to hold such a meeting without unintentionally conferring some degree 
of official approval -  or legitimacy -  upon the private security-companies. Glanville 
wrote in September 1964, for instance, that
.. .there is the danger that, merely by taking the initiative in arranging a meeting, 
we shall in practice have committed ourselves to developing increasingly close 
relationships with the organisations...Some measure of official recognition, 
guidance and help seems implicit in the invitation to join in talks.23
21 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 22nd September 1964.
22 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 14th April 1965. Although this document is dated seven months after Glanville’s it seems to be 
referring back to discussions which took place in the previous year, which brings the idea o f a ‘central 
body’ in line with the chronology presented here.
23 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This quote is taken from a ‘Draft 
Memorandum for the Working Party on Mock Police Uniforms and Vehicles’. This particular 
document marks the point at which this initial Working Party was being dissolved and reconstituted in 
the form of the Working Party on Private Security Organisations.
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Any such meeting therefore represented an opportunity for the private security 
companies to further advance their pluralist practices by capturing legitimacy from the 
Home Office and police. Indeed, Glanville accordingly presumed (rightly as it turned 
out) that the industry representatives would not pass up this opportunity to actively 
develop closer connections with the state by, for example, “...seek[ing] more positive 
support for the international security e x h i b i t i o n s . w h i c h  was a something they had 
attempted to do both in 1961 and 1963, though with no success.24 25 Glanville was not 
merely anxious that the industry representatives would try to manipulate the meeting 
towards the realisation of their pluralist practices, however, but also that during the 
course of these negotiations the Home Office and police might actually be required to 
concede some ground to such demands so as to realise their own long-term monopoly 
agenda of concentrating the lobbying power of the industry into a single, manageable 
central body. He accordingly advised members of the Working Party that they might 
have to participate in future international security exhibitions and similar events, 
writing that “ ...in the context of attempting to-persuade representatives of the 
organisations to cooperate with the police service and with the Home Office it might 
be difficult to withhold some degree of cooperation in these activities”. This trade­
off was, of course, problematic because the conferral of any such ‘official recognition, 
guidance and help’ -  that is, legitimacy -  upon the industry directly conflicted with 
the Home Office and police’s monopoly practices. It conflicted, in other words, with 
the Home Office and police’s very literal interpretation of the image of the state in 
which public institutions were viewed as being the only legitimate security providers 
in postwar Britain.
The way in which this particular problem was approached is interesting for two 
reasons. First, it demonstrates that senior Home Office officials appeared to clearly 
comprehend the nature of the pluralist practices being advanced by the private 
security industry. For they certainly seemed to anticipate the industry’s need to forge 
some kind of official connection with the state so as to capture legitimacy for their 
operations. They understood, in other words, how the image of the state -  that is, the 
majority of the British population’s normative expectations about how security ought 
to be provided -  served to structure the operations of security providers within the
24 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This is an excerpt from a letter sent 
by Glanville to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police on 141' August 1964.
25 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. See the ‘Draft Memorandum for the 
Working Party on Mock Police Uniforms and Vehicles’, dated September 1964.
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postwar security sector. Second, these preparations also illustrate that it was 
becoming increasingly inevitable that the Home Office and police would have to 
accommodate elements of these pluralist practices so as to ensure that the private 
security companies would comply with their own monopoly practices. Crucially, 
then, this signifies that for the first time a relationship of power dependence might 
start to develop between these institutions. For the Home Office officials were now 
prepared to confer a limited degree of legitimacy upon the industry in exchange for 
the industry representatives’ compliance in establishing a central body. This 
elucidates, then, how the constitution of the security sector was in reality moving ever 
further away from the institutional arrangements envisaged in the monopoly myth and 
was becoming an increasingly contested domain characterised by the conflicting 
demands of two contrasting sets of practices.
Significantly, however, Glanville’s difficulties did not end here, for he encountered 
a second major problem with regard to the proposed Working Party meeting. This 
related to the fact that the meeting provided a forum for the further emergence of the 
statutory regulation issue. Glanville had already predicted that the private security 
representatives would “ ...see some advantage in registration and the adoption o f strict 
codes of conduct...” in order to establish an official connection with the state and, by 
extension, capture a degree of legitimacy.26 And he accordingly embarked upon a 
strategy of ensuring that the most important Home Office and police representatives 
thus understood the dangers that statutory regulation posed to the successful pursuit of
0
the monopoly agenda. In undertaking this strategy, however, he soon came across 
some notable resistance. To begin with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police 
was in favour of statutory licensing on the grounds that it would provide a more 
formal legal mechanism through which to control the industry’s operations. In an 
internal communication written during autumn 1964, for instance, he noted that the 
Commissioner’s ongoing preference for statutory licensing was “evidently a thorny 
problem”.27
As will become increasingly evident, the Commissioner’s standpoint on regulation 
actually marked the emergence of a third set of practices within the negotiations over 
legitimacy to undertake security functions within postwar Britain, termed here the
26 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This is an excerpt from a letter sent 
by Glanville to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police on 14th August 1964.
27 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 22nd September 1964.
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‘reformist’ practices. It is therefore important to introduce the nature o f these 
practices. Like those advancing the monopoly practices, advocates of the reformist 
practices interpreted the image of the state in relatively straightforward maimer to 
mean that state institutions such as the police ought to be the only providers of 
security functions in postwar Britain. Unlike those promoting the monopoly agenda, 
however, the reformists also recognised that in its pure, idealised form the monopoly 
formula represented an unachievable ideal. As a consequence, they pragmatically 
accepted the reality of private security provision in the postwar security sector. Yet 
this was not a passive acceptance, for as far as possible the reformists sought to bring 
these private security companies in line with the monopolistic ideal o f security 
provision as a universal, state-provided public good, even though a direct fit was 
unachievable. And, crucially, they aimed to accomplish this by enforcing these 
‘public good’ standards upon the industry using state mechanisms such as statutory 
regulation. To be sure, they acknowledged that this strategy might serve to indirectly 
re-legitimate the operations of the private security companies, but in the name of 
maximising public safety this was generally regarded as an acceptable unintended 
consequence. These reformist practices can therefore be situated somewhere in 
between the monopoly and pluralist practices. For like the monopoly practices they 
shared a very state-centred approach to security problems, though it was much more 
pragmatically executed. And like the pluralists, they supported a system of statutory 
regulation, though they viewed this as a means of reforming the industry, not as a 
method of enhancing the legitimacy of the industry. We can see from depiction of the 
reformist practices, however, that in the context of the regulation debate, the 
reformists and pluralists represented an incongruous alliance on the pro-regulation 
side. And it was this which caused so much concern to those Home Office and police 
officials promoting their avowedly anti-regulation monopoly practices.
Indeed, the challenge represented by these reformist practices became far more 
pronounced a few months later when the Home Secretary Frank Soskice developed 
both a sudden interest in private security and an according reformist preference for 
statutory regulation. In January 1965, for instance, Soskice asked Home Office 
officials for information and advice on “ ...Securicor and other private protection 
organisations...” and loosely contextualised this request by saying that “ . ..[qjuestions
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have been asked and I should know more than I do”. He was immediately provided 
with a succinct Home Office briefing note, the final line of which read “ ...our present 
view is that there is no immediate case for regulation”. This concluding sentence 
was clearly intended to bring Soskice in line with the Home Office and police’s 
dominant monopoly practices. But Soskice was not satisfied by this argument and 
responded thusly:
There is a feeling that services of this sort should only be undertaken by the 
police, and anything like ‘vigilantes’, or (although happily we are miles from 
this) private armies would excite extreme public resentment. But should 
anything occur like a fight between these organisations and gangsters there 
would be immediate disquiet. Has the time not come when if they are to
30operate they must be strictly publicly controlled?
Soskice’s strategy for dealing with these private security companies was thus to 
implement a system of ‘strict public controls’ along the lines of statutory regulation. 
Soskice was not particular concerned, it seems, that such a system would have the 
paradoxical effect of enhancing the industry’s status by transferring legitimacy to their 
operations. He instead wanted to formally acknowledge their existence and bring 
their operations within the orbit of the state. Soskice’s position in the regulation 
debate thus represented a clear example of the nascent reformist practices. From the 
perspective of the majority of the Home Office officials, most of whom adhered 
closely to the monopoly interpretation of regulation, Soskicejs policy stance thus 
constituted an alarming internal institutional fracture with potentially serious 
consequences. For it was clear that these monopoly-orientated officials did not want 
to enter into future talks with private security representatives when the issue of 
statutory regulation was on the negotiating table, since this would serve only to 
bolster the industry’s pluralist agenda.
In order to reinforce the anti-statutory monopoly regulation agenda, then, the next 
briefing note sent to the Home Secretary in April 1965 was more detailed and more 
persuasively pitched:
28 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home 
dated 1st January 1965.
29 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home 
January 1965.
30 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home 
dated 16th January 1965.
Office, Private Police General. 
Office, Private Police General. 
Office, Private Police General.
This internal communication is 
This briefing note is dated 13th 
This internal communication is
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The legend ‘Registered by the Secretary of State’, which would no doubt be 
used by firms in their publicity, might be taken by the public as carrying some 
guarantee, particularly in view of the nature of the services provided by these 
firms, and it might be suggested that the Secretary of State had some 
responsibility for making good any loss that might be incurred though 
inefficiency or negligence, or through mere failure to safeguard valuable
31property effectively.
This effectively represented a restatement of the policy arguments developed during 
the Working Party on Mock Uniforms and Vehicles, but personalised so as to 
persuade the Home Secretary of their importance. The Home Secretary remained 
unswayed, however, communicating back to the Home Office that in his opinion 
private security companies “ ...should in some way be put under police supervision, or 
license, or perhaps be embodied into some kind of auxiliary police organisation”. 
Soskice was therefore remaining firm in his reformist position. It is significant to 
note, furthermore, that records indicate that the Home Secretary was at this same 
moment being lobbied by Raphael Tuck MP into bringing private detective agencies 
under statutory control, which no doubt strengthened Soskice’s preference for 
licensing the private security companies. The reformist practices were therefore 
supported not merely by certain breakaway individuals within the Working Party, but 
also by other state elites within Parliament -  indeed, in the subsequent decade the 
House o f Commons was to become the main conduit for the divisive reformist lobby, 
as the next chapter will demonstrate.
In a final bid to rescue the Home Office and police’s anti-statutory regulation 
monopoly agenda, Mr. Graham-Harrison, Deputy Under-Secretary o f State and the 
most senior Home Office official directly involved the preparations for the Working 
Party, arranged a meeting in May 1965 with Soskice. Significantly, an internal 
communication sent by Graham-Harrison to Glanville a couple o f days later reveals 
that this meeting represented a victory for the Home Office and police’s monopoly 
practices: “After some discussion S. of S. [Soskice]...said that in his view the 
objections to introducing any system of registration were in the present circumstances 312
31 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This briefing note is dated 15lh April 
1965.
32 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 26th April 1965.
33 TNA: PRO, HO 287/627, Minster’s Case, Private Police General. See the letter from Tuck to 
Soskice dated 30lh March 1965.
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conclusive”.34 This meeting therefore appeared to consolidate for the time being the 
Home Office and police’s anti-regulation agenda and prevent any serious internal 
fragmentation along the monopoly-reformist fault line. Moreover, any lingering 
doubts over Soskice’s commitment to this monopoly agenda were allayed when in 
December 1965 he was replaced as Home Secretary by Roy Jenkins, who did not 
appear to take any direct interest in the regulation issue. So at the end of 1965 the 
agenda for the Working Party on Private Security Organisations was for now set: 
Home Office and police representatives were to initiate a dialogue with the private 
security companies so as to encourage them to form a central body with which state 
institutions could discuss (or more precisely control) matters relating to the industry; 
and, at the same time, the Home Office and police representatives would also attempt 
to minimise official contact with the industry and keep the issue o f statutory 
regulation firmly away from the negotiating table so as to avoid conferring any 
unnecessary legitimacy upon their activities.
The playing field for the first face-to-face meeting between the private security and 
state representatives was now in theory tilted in favour of the Home Office and 
police’s monopoly practices. This agenda was only achieved, however, after much 
internal contestation between the contrasting monopoly and reformist practices inside 
the Home Office and police alliance, which shows how the negotiations were now 
taking on much more complex proportions. For the fault lines were no longer simply 
set down between private security and state institutions, but were now also internal to4
the state. This illustrates even more clearly the extent to which the constitution of the 
security sector was moving away from the blueprints o f the monopoly myth, for the 
state institutions were no longer characterised by a total commitment to the 
advancement of monopoly practices against the pluralist practices o f the private 
security industry.
4.5 The BSIA, Regulation and Manipulation
This section will analyse the actual undertakings of the Working Party on Private 
Security Organisations, which represented the first instance that Home Office, police 
and private security representatives had been assembled together within a formal
34 TNA: PRO, HO 287/626, Home Office, Private Police General. This internal communication is 
dated 12lh May 1965.
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institutional setting. It will illustrate that, for the most part, this meeting progressed in 
line with the Home Office and police’s hard fought preparations which were designed 
to advance their monopoly practices. For as they intended the meeting resulted in the 
establishment of the BSIA as a central body through which the Home Office and 
police could consult with the industry. Furthermore, the issue of regulation, though 
briefly discussed, was on the whole successfully marginalized and no internal 
fragmentation along the monopoly-reformist fracture line occurred. As the Home 
Office predicted, however, the private security companies did succeed in exploiting 
and manipulating the terms of the meeting in order to communicate to the British 
population that a more official connection was being established between the industry 
and the state institutions. The private security institutions, in other words, did manage 
to capture some legitimacy from the meeting, in turn advancing to some extent the 
progress of their pluralist practices.
The first meeting took place in October 1965. Importantly, the opening session of 
this meeting was attended by state representatives only -  that is, Graham-Harrison and 
Glanville of the Home Office, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and four 
Chief Police Constables. To begin with, these state officials agreed that all meetings 
with industry representatives should be given no publicity whatsoever so as to avoid 
arousing any “unnecessary apprehensions”.35 The Home Office and police were thus 
still clearly anxious about the repercussions of associating themselves with these 
‘private armies’, for any such associations could serve to either enhance the 
legitimacy of the industry or undermine their own status.
After this opening session the state officials met separately with representatives 
from the manned guarding and cash-carrying side of the industry and then with 
representatives from the hardware side of the industry. It is important to note that 
these two sides of the industry have always had very different functions, for the 
guarding and cash-carrying side has generally been involved in the active and 
coercive policing of everyday citizens in a manner similar to the public police, 
whereas the hardware side has mostly been concerned with far more passive and 
technical security solutions relating to alarms and locks. Moreover, the fact that the 
state officials consulted with these two sides separately is significant because it shows
35 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security'Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. This information is taken from the minutes of the 
meeting held on 18lb October 1965.
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that they were viewed in different lights. The most critical difference seemed to be 
that while the guarding and cash-carrying side of the industry was attempting to 
operate in a domain which had traditionally been claimed as the exclusive preserve of 
the modern state, the hardware side was operating in a domain which had never come 
within the remit of the modern state. As a consequence, the Home Office and police 
have generally seemed to be far less concerned with the hardware side of the industry 
(other than with the annoyance of false alarms taking up police time), since it has 
posed no threat to their professional remit and has not served to undermine the idea of 
security provision as a state-centred, universal public good. But as we have seen, the 
Home Office and police have been greatly troubled by the guarding and cash-carrying 
side of the industry since, from the monopoly perspective at least, it challenges the 
integrity of the core state function of providing security as a public good. It is 
important to note, then, that throughout the remainder of this investigation we will 
focus exclusively upon the state’s negotiations with the manned guarding and cash­
carrying side of the industry (and the contract as opposed to in-house element o f this 
side).
In selecting representatives from the manned guarding and cash-carrying sub­
sectors with which to initiate a formal dialogue, the Home Office and police officials 
chose to meet with two directors from each of the three largest private security 
companies -  that is, Securicor, Security Express and Factoryguards (which was 
formerly Plant Protection Ltd and was to become Group 4 three years later). The 
resulting discussions closely followed the course anticipated by the Home Office 
officials in their extensive preparations for this Working Party. To begin with, the 
minutes of the meeting show that both the state and private security representatives 
agreed that it would be mutually beneficial for the private security companies to 
establish a central body which could be used to communicate with the industry in 
future consultations.36 It is significant to note at this juncture that something 
approximating the envisaged central body did in fact already exist, for in 1958 the 
International Professional Security Association (IPSA) was founded with the aim of 
promoting professionalism within the private security industry.37 There are two 
possible explanations, however, why the state officials decided not to utilise this body
36 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. These minutes are dated 18th October 1965.
37 George and button, Private Security, p.42.
106
in future consultations. First, IPSA was created specifically to represent small and 
medium sized private security companies, so the large companies with which the
■ID
Home Office and police were concerned were not members of this organisation.
Second, and probably more importantly, it was evident that the Home Office and
police wanted to influence the terms on which this central body was to be established
so as to ensure that this institution would conform as far as possible with the their
monopoly practices. And this was far more easily accomplished by encouraging the
construction of a new organisation as opposed to reshaping the existing terms of an
already established one. Indeed, David Cowden, who began working for Securicor in
1969 and eventually became Chairman of the BSIA, interpreted the Home Office’s
decision-making process in precisely these terms: “The BSIA was set up as an
organisation that would from time to time allow the government to have a dialogue, if
only to defend the government's position of it ever got attacked on the whole thing”.38 9
This observation would be confirmed at numerous points over the next few years.
Either way, the decision to create a central body certainly served to fulfil the first
objective of the Home Office and police’s monopoly agenda.
The Home Office and police’s other objective of steering the discussions firmly
away from the issue of statutory regulation was similarly accomplished, though less
smoothly. For as predicted, the industry representatives did indeed lobby in favour of
such a system, as the minutes of the meeting reflect: “The representatives o f the
security organisations said that...it would seem desirable for the Home Office to
0
undertake a system of licensing to prevent unsatisfactory firms from setting up in 
business”.40 The ostensible logic behind this request was that the industry’s poorly 
regarded status within the security sector was in part due to the existence of the 
increasingly large number of ‘cowboy’ operators, whose ‘unsatisfactory’ operations 
served to damage the reputation of the industry as a whole. Thus by eliminating this 
cowboy element through statutory regulation, the overall status o f the industry would 
be enhanced. To be sure, this process was certainly an important consideration and 
was reiterated at numerous points over the next few decades (and there was the 
additional bonus that the newly regulated companies might be able to pick up the 
contracts which would be left behind by the now eliminated cowboy companies).
38 George and Button, Private Security, p.42.
39 Interview with David Cowden, conducted on 19lh November 2007.
40 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes ofMeetings 1965-1967. These minutes are dated 18lh October 1965.
107
However, the fact that Securicor, Security Express and Group 4 would also receive a 
state-endorsed license, which they could utilise to portray themselves as state- 
deputised security operatives functioning with much greater degree of legitimacy, was 
also clearly a substantial motivation for lobbying in favour o f regulation. This 
scenario, then, shows once again how the preferences of the private security 
companies were continually being shaped by the image of the state. These companies 
were not attempting to expand their operations purely through conventional market 
mechanisms, but were instead willing to sacrifice a degree of their market freedom in 
order to capture the quality of ‘stateness’ which was considered by a significant 
proportion of the British population to be so essential for the legitimate provision of 
security in postwar Britain. Statutory regulation was thus becoming the primary 
means through which the private security companies could further their pluralist 
practices.
Given the centrality of this argument to this investigation, it is important at this
juncture to once again question the credibility of this scenario. For given that these
companies were still expanding successfully, why were they so determined to enter
into this trade-off? Indeed, by the mid-1960s, Securicor had almost 90 branches in
the United Kingdom, employed over 6,000 uniformed guards and ran a fleet of
approximately 600 armoured vehicles; Security Express employed 1,200 guards'and
ran a fleet of over 250 armoured vehicles; and Factoryguards also employed 1,200
guards but ran a slightly smaller fleet of 50 armoured vehicles.41 These statistics
*
show that the private security companies had expanded substantially over the past 
twenty years. Yet despite this growth, these companies were still facing serious 
cultural constraints within the postwar security sector. For the average British citizen 
thought that security provision ought to be provided by the state, not the market. 
These attitudes are in part captured by the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, 
which discovered that 80 percent of the respondents considered the British police to 
be the “best in the world” and that 83 percent felt a “great respect” for the police.42 
And this positive standpoint towards the police, it seems, translated into an equally 
strong distrust of private security provision. This can be clearly identified in the 
following comments given by a security industry public relations officer in the mid- 
1960s:
41 Clayton, The Protectors, p.23.
42 Loader and Mulcahy, Policing and the Condition o f  England, p.4.
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People who say there is no such thing as bad publicity have never handled a 
security company’s account. One theft with built-in news value can cancel 
years of solid successes. One stupid incident involving a security guard can 
revive all the old canards about strong-armed men and private armies.4
This quotes illustrates to great effect how the image of the state was still serving to 
constrain the activities of the private security companies. It appears that the very 
existence of these companies grated against the way in which the average British 
citizen considered that security ought to be provided. This therefore demonstrates 
why there was indeed sufficient motivation for the private security representatives to 
lobby in favour of a system of statutory regulation -  they clearly still needed to 
capture legitimacy from the state in order to continually expand their operations 
within the unique cultural context of the postwar security sector. It was still 
necessary, in other words, for the private security companies to pursue their now long­
standing pluralist practices.
Returning now to the Working Party meeting: in accordance with their pre-arranged 
monopoly agenda the Home Office and police officials immediately neutralised the 
industry’s request for statutory regulation and steered the course of the discussion 
back towards their pre-prepared objectives:
The chairman [Graham-Harrison] said that it was unlikely that the Home 
Secretary would be willing to promote licensing legislation, but that it should be 
possible to achieve high standards in small firms as well as* large by establishing 
a professional association with its own code of conduct, membership o f which 
would be a guarantee of status and a guide to the public.43 4
This is therefore a clear example of the monopoly practices of the Home Office and 
police countering the pluralist practices of the private security companies. It is 
interesting, however, that while the state officials were acutely aware of the logic 
behind the industry’s pluralist agenda, so too were the industry representatives 
cognisant of the state’s monopoly agenda. Reflecting back on these discussions, for 
instance, Jorgen Philip-Sorensen, who was one of the Factoryguards representatives 
attending this meeting, commented that: “They [the Home Office and police] also felt
43 Clayton, The Protectors, p. 12.
44 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. These minutes are dated 18lh October 1965.
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that licensing would give us an imaginary form of authority so we could act and 
behave like policemen. A pseudo-police force. They were suspicious: you’re a 
private army”.45 This is the important sub-text which was not always clearly betrayed 
in the official minutes of the meeting.
This sub-text aside, however, it is important to recognise that during these formal 
discussions the Home Office and police officials appeared to enforce their monopoly 
practices with apparent success. For in line with Home Office’s carefully constructed 
agenda, the private security representatives were now charged with the responsibility 
of constructing a central representative body for consulting with the state and, at the 
same time, the idea of statutory regulation had been completely sidelined. This was 
nothing more than the industry representatives expected, however. As Jorgen Philip- 
Sorensen comments: “We knew we wouldn’t get statutory regulation straight away. 
So we started with self-regulation to show that we could do it. That made it easier to 
get to the next step: statutory regulation”.46 It seems that the private security 
companies were quite prepared to concede ground to these monopoly practices in the 
short term, in the hope that in years to come they would be better placed to impose 
their pro-regulation pluralist agenda. Indeed, the simple fact that as a consequence of 
this meeting they now had a solid institutional base upon which to further consolidate 
their agency and promote these pluralist practices could be seen as a victory o f sorts, 
especially when compared with their completely marginalized status a decade or so 
earlier
Outside of the formal Working Party meeting, however, it is also interesting to note 
that these companies were quick to capitalise upon this new institutional set-up by 
communicating to the British public that some kind of alliance was indeed emerging 
between the industry and the state. It soon transpired, in other words, that Glanville’s 
early concerns about initiating a formal dialogue with the private security companies 
turned out to be very well founded. Over the next few months, representatives from 
these private security companies began to actively publicise their new relationship 
with the state institutions. For instance, an article in the Daily Telegraph during 
November 1965 reported upon a speech made by Mr. Cooper-Key -  one o f the 
Security Express representatives -  as follows: “A National Association of commercial 
security organisations to join in a ‘united front’ with the Home Office, police and
45 Interview with Jorgen Philip-Sorensen, conduced on 17th December 2007.
46 Interview with Jorgen Philip-Sorensen, conducted on 17th December 2007.
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insurance companies in the fight against crime was called for yesterday”.47 And in 
what seems to be a clear reference to the Working Party discussions, a representative 
of Factoryguards supplied the following comment to a Daily Express reporter: “I 
would like to see some sort of licensing system for security companies under the 
Home Office”.48 This demonstrates that while the private security companies were 
forced to concede ground to the Home Office and police’s monopoly practices during 
the Working Party discussions, they were nevertheless able to use the fact that these 
discussions had taken place at all to contribute towards their pluralist strategy of 
developing public linkages between themselves and the state institutions so as to 
capture state legitimacy, even if these linkages were far short of the more solid 
institutional connections which would have been constructed through a system of 
statutory regulation.
Moreover, even when they were ostensibly complying with the Home Office and 
police’s agenda these companies were still seeking to maximise all the benefits they 
could possibly derive from this new institutional relationship. In April 1966, for 
example, delegates from eight large private security companies came together in order 
to lay the foundations for the central body which was to represent the industry from 
then onwards. The minutes of this meeting indicate that there was a clear consensus 
among the delegates in favour of establishing this body, which was to be named the 
British Security Industry Association, reporting that: “It was finally resolved that the 
formation of the new Association should be proceeded with, all firms present 
agreeing”.49 Rather than conveying this news to the Home Office and police, 
however, a representative from Chubb Group informed Glanville at the Home Office 
that “ .. .the whole thing may fly apart by centrifugal forces”. And to prevent this from 
happening, the Chubb Group representative suggested that:
It would be most helpful if Mr. Dunham [Managing Director of Chubb Group] 
could be seen to be received from someone in authority in the Home 
Office...would it be possible for Mr. Dunham to be invited to the Home Office 
to give some report of the progress being made, some modest publicity being 
given to this event? If this could be done it would greatly strengthen Mr.
47 Daily Telegraph, ‘Anti-Crime National Front Call’, 18lh November 1965.
48 Daily Express, ‘Those Other Men in Blue’, 22nd March 1966.
49 British Security Industry Association (BSIA), Council Meeting Minutes, l sl April 1966 (BS1A 
Archives).
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Dunham’s position and improve the chances of the Association being brought 
into operation.50
This therefore constitutes yet another instance of the industry attempting to develop 
official and publicly recognisable connections with the core state institutions so as to 
capture a degree of their legitimacy. Like the newspaper publicity, this did not 
necessarily contribute directly to their primary strategy of bringing about statutory 
regulation, but it nevertheless represented another attempt to advance their pluralist 
practices more broadly defined. Significantly, in their eagerness to facilitate the 
successful creation of the BSIA, the Home Office officials conceded to this request 
and arranged for Dunham to meet with Sir Charles Cunningham, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State, and the most senior civil servant within the Home Office. 
This scenario thus demonstrates that the private security industry had clearly now 
entered into a genuine relationship of power dependence with the Home Office and 
police. The companies were prepared to cooperate with the Working Party’s 
objectives, but only if they could siphon off some of the state’s legitimacy in return. 
They were, in other words, starting to exercise some genuine agency within the 
security sector negotiations, thereby enabling them to promote their pluralist practices 
and challenge the monopoly practices of the Home Office and police.
This section has illustrated, then, that while the Home Office and police were 
managing to steer the debate surrounding the core issue of statutory regulation in line 
with their monopoly practices, the private security companies were nevertheless 
exercising an increasing degree of agency on the periphery of the negotiations. They 
were able, in other words, to promote their pluralist practices by capturing small 
amounts of legitimacy in a number of less direct ways. At this stage, the security 
sector was therefore increasingly characterised by conflict between two opposing sets 
of practices, as the state-in-society approach would indeed suggest. Yet, as we will 
now see, this was not an unstoppable, uni-directional trend. For the extent to which 
these companies could continue to advance their pluralist practices over the next few 
years was severely limited by the Home Office and police during the course o f the
0 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. This information is contained in an internal 
communication dated 13"' May 1966 and sent by Glanville to the Home Secretary, and carbon copied 
to Graham-Harrison.
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subsequent Working Party meetings, when the more stringent ‘rules o f the game’ for 
these negotiations were gradually set down by these state institutions.
4.6 The Rules of the Game
This section will examine the ‘rules of the game’ which increasingly came to 
characterise the negotiations between the private security and state institutions during 
the late 1960s.51 It will show that these rules were implemented by the Home Office 
and the police in order to reinforce their monopoly practices against the growing 
power of the private security industry’s pluralist practices. Although it will also be 
emphasised that because these rules were nevertheless premised on formal, face-to- 
face interactions with private security representatives they also served to consolidate 
the agency of the private security institutions.
During the next Working Party meeting, which took place in August 1967, the 
Home Office and police representatives again conducted the opening session in the 
absence of the private security representatives so as to set down a clear monopoly 
agenda. The minutes of the meeting show that “ ...the Working Party did not like the 
idea of state or police registration -  mainly because such registration would inevitably 
imply that the operations and standards of work of a particular firm had official 
blessing”.52 The Home Office and police were thus as troubled as ever by the idea of 
conferring any ‘official blessing’ -  or legitimacy -  upon the operations of the private 
security companies. Furthermore, this quote also illustrates that the Working Party 
was no longer plagued by any divisions along the monopoly-reformist fracture lines, 
for the idea of regulation was firmly rejected. All said, then, the opening session was 
characterised by a firm commitment to the monopoly practices which had once again 
come to dominate the Home Office and police. With this in mind, the officials then 
met with the private security representatives. The minutes indicate that this session 
was very short and notable for only two reasons.
First, it was agreed that the BSIA would now function as the main institutional body 
through which the Home Office and police would from now on engage with the
51 The useful term ‘rules of the game’ has been taken from: Martin Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy: 
Slate Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States (Kernel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993), p.61.
52 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. This information is taken from the amended section of 
the Working Party minutes dated 17'1’ October 1967.
113
industry, thereby consolidating the formal institutional arrangements between these 
public and private agencies.53 This represented, then, one of the central ‘rules of the 
game’ which would define the negotiations in years to come: communication between 
the industry and the state would take place only through this institutional channel -  
there would, in other words, be no more impromptu meetings with the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State. Second, it was decided that no further publicity should be 
given to the Working Party discussions.54 Taking into account the differing agendas 
of these institutions, it was presumably the Home Office and police representatives 
who instigated this latter policy. And, working on this presumption, it seems 
reasonable to surmise that this stipulation was probably a reaction to the media 
coverage of the first Working Party meeting which was generated by the private 
security companies. This can therefore be interpreted as another core ‘rule o f the 
game’ for future negotiations: no more publicity. So while the Home Office and 
police were willing to provide the industry with some official publicity in the context 
of setting up the BSIA, once this core objective had been accomplished this resource 
was no longer to be exchanged.
The rule-making did not end here, however, because following this joint
consultation the state representatives then held another brief meeting among
themselves when, significantly, it was further decided that “[t]he consultations...
would generally be of a technical nature and would not alter the status o f the private
security firms in any way”. This decision was intended to allay “ ...anxieties in the
*
police service about the possibility of the private security firms developing into 
private police forces and encroaching upon the functions of the service”.55 The Home 
Office and police were therefore using their elevated position in their institutional 
relationship with the private security companies to lay down yet another very 
important ‘rule of the game’: that discussions would be confined to technical matters 
only. This would in turn serve to limit even further the extent to which the private 
security companies could advance their pluralist practices, which were based upon the
53 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. This information is taken from the non-amended 
section of the Working Party minutes dated 18th August 1967.
54 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. This information is also taken from the non-amended 
section of the Working Party minutes dated 18th August 1967.
55 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes of Meetings 1965-1967. This information is taken from the amended section of 
the Working Party minutes dated 17th October 1967.
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development of broad and ambitious connections between the industry and the state, 
particularly through the auspices of the Working Party.
This institutional environment then became even more unfavourable to the private 
security companies during the course of the next Working Party meeting. To begin 
with, the Home Office and police did not begin preparations for the next meeting until 
September 1969, and in the intervening two-year period records suggest that no 
consultations occurred between these public and private institutions. Clearly, this 
lack of engagement suited the Home Office and police to the detriment of the private 
security industry. For the while the Home Office and police’s monopoly practices 
were strengthened by a lack of association between the two sets o f institutions, the 
industry’s pluralist practices were almost entirely dependent upon it. Then, in finally 
preparing for the next meeting, the Home Office sent a letter to the Secretary of the 
BSIA informing him that subsequent Working Party discussions would focus upon 
issues relating to the hardware section of the industry only.56 This decision 
represented a significant blow to the BSIA, for the resulting dialogue would 
essentially bypass its membership, which was primarily comprised o f guarding and 
cash-carrying companies. While no explanation was given by the Home Office and 
police for this decision, it seems reasonable to speculate that by orientating the 
discussions towards the uncontroversial hardware side of the industry they were 
minimising the possibility of transferring any legitimacy to the far more controversial 
manned guarding and cash-carrying side.
*
All of the ‘rules of the game’ instituted by the Home Office and police in the late 
1960s were thus essentially designed to consolidate their monopoly practices in the 
face of the increasingly powerful pluralist practices of the private security industry. 
For they were all created to either prevent or minimise the potential transfer of 
legitimacy from the state institutions to the private security institutions. Moreover, 
the Home Office and police were both willing and able to enforce these new rules. 
This was clearly demonstrated during the next Working Party meeting, which took 
place in October 1969, when the BSIA representatives attempted to contravene these 
recently established stipulations. For instance, the minutes of the meeting show that 
Mr. Dunham -  Managing Director of Chubb Group and BSIA representative -  
initiated the following discussion:
56 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes 1969. This letter is dated 3rd September 1969.
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To be effective the BSIA should be able to demonstrate that membership 
brought benefits. They wanted, Mr. Dunham said, something more than 
friendship from the Home Office; they wanted their sponsorship. They hoped 
that the police would accept that membership of the BSIA guaranteed high 
standards of technical competence and integrity and would recommend the 
members of BSIA to those who sought their advice of security.57
Here, then, Dunham was attempting to enhance and publicise the linkages between 
the state institutions and the private security companies -  a strategy which clearly ran 
contrary to two of the rules instituted by the Home Office: first, that the Working 
Party was not to be utilised as a vehicle for influencing the status of the industry; and 
second, that no public communications could result from the Working Party 
discussions. Significantly, the minutes show that the Chairman -  now Mr. Trevelyan 
of the Home Office -  immediately enforced these rules with his response:
The Chairman said that the Home Office had already given support to the BSIA 
and, indeed, had been involved to some extent in the setting up of the 
Association. Their confidence in the BSIA had been demonstrated by their 
suggestion that the BSIA supervise the industry. Note would be taken of what 
had been said.58
This response can be construed as a polite but firm refusal of Dunham’s requests. 
Through the enforcement of these rules, furthermore, the institutional pattern for the 
remainder of the Working Party discussions was set. Records show, for instance, that 
the remaining three Working Party meetings were dominated by technical issues 
surrounding the hardware section of the private security industry, as the rules 
stipulated.59 Moreover, the last regular Working Party meeting took place in October 
1972, after which point the formal dialogue between Home Office, police and private 
security representatives seemingly ground to a temporary halt.
The initial success which the private security companies had experienced through 
their new, formalised institutional relationship with the central state institutions was
57 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes 1969. These minutes are dated 28th October 1969.
58 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes 1969. This information is taken from the minute of the Working Party meeting 
dated 28"' October 1969.
59 TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security 
Organisations, Minutes 1970; TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private Police and Security Organisations, 
Working Party on Security Organisations, Minutes 1970-1971; TNA: PRO, HO 287/1477, Private 
Police and Security Organisations, Working Party on Security Organisations, Minutes 1971-1972.
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therefore steadily diminishing as the Home Office and police increasingly imposed 
their monopoly practices upon the negotiations. For these rules o f the game in effect 
served to create a localised policy network in which the monopoly practices of the 
Home Office and police were privileged over the pluralist practices o f the private 
security institutions. Yet, when taken as a whole, the 1960s were nevertheless 
characterised by a pronounced intensification in the degree of contestation between, 
on one side, the combined pluralist practices of the private security companies and the 
BSIA and, on the other, the monopoly practices o f the Home Office and police. This 
is especially the case when the highly networked position of the BSIA is compared 
with the relatively ostracised position of Securicor at the close of the 1950s. So while 
the industry was not necessarily able to capture much legitimacy from the Home 
Office and police by 1969, their new levels of interconnectedness certainly meant that 
they much more strategically placed to do so in the future.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that, in certain respects, the security sector at the close of 
the 1960s quite closely resembled the security sector at the end of the 1950s. For it 
was still primarily characterised by a political contest between the pluralist and 
monopoly sets of practices. And the purpose of each of these practices was still to 
bring about a different ensemble of institutional arrangements within the security 
sector. Those institutions advancing the pluralist practices, Tor instance, still wanted 
to develop a pluralised system of security provision, in which both public and private 
security providers were able to legitimately function alongside one another within the 
security sector. Whereas those institutions advancing the monopoly practices still 
wanted to defend and maintain a monopolistic system of security provision, in which 
only public security providers were able to legitimately function within the security 
sector.
There were two main differences by the end of the 1960s, however. The first 
difference was that this contest was now taking place on a much grander scale. For 
while in the 1950s the pluralist practices were being advanced by Securicor alone, a 
decade later they had been adopted by all the major private security companies, 
together with their new trade association, the BSIA. Similarly, while in the 1950s the 
monopoly practices were being advanced solely by the Metropolitan Police, a decade
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later they had been considerably reinforced by the support of the Home Office and 
other high-ranking police officials -  the brief reformist breakaway notwithstanding. 
The second difference was that although the monopoly practices of the Home Office 
and police were still controlling the negotiations, the pluralist practices o f the private 
security institutions had clearly accumulated power and momentum over the course of 
the 1960s. So by the end of the decade these institutions were consequently in a 
better position to pursue their pluralist strategy of capturing legitimacy from the state. 
The political contest between these two sets of practices was, in other words, less one­
sided than before. As the state-in-society approach would suggest, the political 
domain supposedly at the very heart of the state was therefore increasingly being 
characterised by a political contest between contrasting sets of state and society 
practices.
This chapter has also elucidated, however, that strong currents of continuity were
nevertheless still running through these negotiations. For the structural influence of
the image of the state was clearly still serving to shape and mould the both the
pluralist and monopoly practices of the private security and state institutions
respectively. So despite the growing prominence of the private security industry, it
seems that a sizeable section of the British population were unmoving in their
normative expectation that the state ought to be the only legitimate provider of
security functions -  that is, their attachment to the monopoly myth appeared to be
unwavering. This in turn meant that the image of the state was necessarily reflected*
in each set of practices, for it could not be ignored without these security providers 
encountering cultural resistance. In the case of the Home Office and police, the 
structural influence of image of the state continued to provide an empowering context 
for their monopoly practices -  that is, in their attempts to defend a state-monopolised 
security sector they remained the direct bearers and perpetuators of the monopoly 
myth. In the case of the private security companies, on the other hand, the structural 
influence of the image of the state was still more of a constraint. For they were forced 
to continue with their complicated endeavours to capture legitimacy from the state in 
order to structure their operations as far as possible with these normative expectations 
about how security ought to be provided. With this in mind, then, it is important to 
recognise that even as the private security companies were becoming increasingly 
powerful within the postwar security sector, they were using this power not to 
function as purebred market actors but rather to capture an ever greater degree of
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legitimacy from the state. As the state-in-society approach would suggest, then, the 
structural influence of the image of the state was still causing a strong current of 
continuity to course through these divergent state and society practices. For once 
again, whatever the outcome of these negotiations, central components of the image 
of the state would to some extent be reproduced.
It is important to re-emphasise, then, that it is this dialectical process o f continuity 
and change, articulated here using the state-in-society concepts of image and practice, 
which ultimately serves to elucidate the complex political processes relating to the re­
legitimation private security in postwar Britain. For on one side, it was the fluid 
nature of state and society practices within the security sector over the course of the 
1960s which demonstrates how the various private security institutions managed to 
successfully advance their pluralist agenda in the face o f ongoing state opposition. 
On the other, it was the strong current of continuity created by the structural influence 
of the image of the state which explains why these private security institutions used 
this agency not to function as market actors within the security sector but rather to 
capture legitimacy from the state. It is the dialectical interplay between these two 
processes, furthermore, which enables us to understand the re-legitimation o f private 
security in postwar Britain. Interestingly, in the next chapter we will see these 
patterns of political contestation and continuity complicated by the emergence of a 
much more powerful set of reformist practices, thereby adding a clear third dimension 
to these previously bifurcated negotiations. As we will see, this development had the
0
largely unintended effect of both augmenting the bargaining position of the private 
security industry and, by extension, further advancing the cause of the re-legitimation 
of private security in postwar Britain.
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BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
5Parliamentary Pressure (1969-1979)
5.1 Introduction
By the end of the 1960s, the negotiations regarding the constitution of the security 
sector within postwar Britain had been transferred into a far more formal political 
network. While this new set of institutional relations certainly had the effect of 
concretising the agency of the private security companies, the ‘rules of the game’ 
which served to structure these interactions were nevertheless weighted decisively in 
favour of the monopoly practices of the Home Office and police. This was perhaps 
most clearly evidenced by the way in which the issue of statutory regulation, which 
was viewed by the Home Office and police with great trepidation, and by the private 
security companies with a corresponding degree of optimism, was eliminated from the 
policy network’s agenda. However, this chapter will show how these ‘rules of the 
game’ were transformed over the subsequent decade and the balance o f power was 
accordingly shifted gradually further towards the pluralist practices o f the private 
security institutions. The primary factor which served to instigate this transformation 
was the entrance of numerous parliamentary actors into policy arena. For, crucially, 
these actors were collectively responsible for giving further shape and substance to 
the nascent reformist practices which, as we have already inferred, served to rather 
paradoxically complement the pluralist practices of the private security companies 
with regard to the central issue of statutory regulation.
The reformist practices were briefly introduced in the previous chapter, primarily in 
relation to the ultimately inconsequential interventions of the Home Secretary Frank 
Soskice. Given the centrality of these practices to the present chapter, however, it is 
worth restating their core characteristics. In many respects the reformist practices 
have much in common with the monopoly practices. For both are premised on a 
direct interpretation of the image of the state. The key difference between them, 
however, is that the reformists are far more pragmatic in their application o f this 
interpretation. For rather than seeking to marginalise the private security industry 
because it contradicts the image of the state, they instead reluctantly accept its 
existence. Yet, critically, this is not a passive acceptance. This is because as far as
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possible they want to use statutory regulation to actively bring the operations of the 
private security companies in line with the ideas of ‘good’ security provision extolled 
in the image of the state -  that is, they want to see all security provision, whether 
delivered through public or private institutions, to take the form of a universal and 
accountable public good. So while they accept that the industry contradicts the image 
of the state, they want to use regulation to reshape the industry towards this same 
image, thereby reducing the scale of the initial contradiction and, by extension, 
increasing public safety.
The reformist support for statutory regulation has rather paradoxical unintended 
consequences, however, since it also serves to complement the pluralist practices of 
the private security industry. For such as regulatory system would, of course, 
establish the official public-private institutional connections which could potentially 
serve to transfer legitimacy from the state institutions to the industry. To the extent 
that both the pluralists and reformists want to bring about a system of statutory 
regulation, then, they form a political alliance. As we have already seen, during the 
1960s a series of carefully orchestrated political manoeuvres by the Home Office and 
police managed to prevent any such alliance developing, for these institutions judged 
that it would have the effect of undermining their anti-regulation, monopoly agenda. 
This chapter will show, however, that the Home Office and police could not suppress 
the formation of this alliance indefinitely. For over the course o f the 1970s, the 
reformist practices of the parliamentary actors and pluralist practices o f the private 
security institutions combined to give the issue of statutory regulation far more 
political weight than in the past. And this alliance, of course, served to further 
increase the possibilities for the re-legitimation of private security.
This chapter will map out this phase of the negotiations in six parts. Section 5.2 
will first provide some important background • information about the nature of 
parliament as a political actor within postwar Britain. It will, in particular, elucidate 
its constitutional powers and contextualise its relations with other state actors such as 
the central government departments. Section 5.3 will then examine Parliament’s 
historical interest in private security provision, which traditionally revolved around 
the twinned issues of privacy and private investigators. Next, Section 5.4 will 
investigate the reformist practices of the Committee on Privacy, which during the 
early 1970s came into direct conflict with the monopoly practices of the Home Office 
and police with regard to the question of statutory regulation of the private security
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industry. Section 5.5 will then examine the series of private members’ bills 
introduced into the House of Commons during the mid and late 1970s, which were all 
designed to bring about a system of statutory regulation. This section will also 
illustrate how the parliamentary actors and the private security institutions were 
increasingly forming a reformist-pluralist alliance at this time so as to publicise the 
issue of regulation. Section 5.6 will analyse the 1979 Green Paper which the Home 
Office published in an attempt to reassert their monopoly practices in the face of 
growing pressure from the now wide variety of public and private institutions 
promoting the reformist and the pluralist practices. Finally, Section 5.7 will provide a 
few theoretically-informed conclusions about this third phase of the negotiations. It 
will, more specifically, illustrate how the dialectical processes of contestation and 
continuity which were revealed in the preceding empirical sections -  and which were 
expressed through the state-in-society concepts of image and practices -  again serve 
to explain the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
5.2 Parliament and Political Influence
This section will outline the political influence of parliamentary actors. It will 
illustrate that parliamentary actors -  which in this thesis includes parliamentary 
committees and individual MPs -  have a series of political powers available to them 
in order to pursue their preferences. Furthermore, when applied in the right context 
these powers can serve to significantly change the shape of the political landscape. 
The negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security functions, as we will see, 
represented such a context, thereby enabling these parliamentary actors to make a 
substantial impact upon this policy area.
The position of Parliament within the British political system has been hotly 
debated over the past three decades. The long-standing notion of ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty’, which was advanced in the traditional Westminster model of British 
government, placed Parliament right at the centre of the political system, with the 
constitutional capability to override political parties, government departments and 
societal pressures. From this perspective, it was the core of the elitist, unitary and 
centralised British state. Over the past few years, however, the recently emergent 
governance paradigm has openly challenged this interpretation of parliamentary 
power. Martin Smith, for instance, views this traditional reading of ‘parliamentary
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sovereignty’ as nothing more than a “constitutional myth”, which only had real 
analytical purchase during a limited period of the mid-nineteenth century.1 2 Instead of 
viewing the British political system as being centralised around Parliament, then, the 
governance theorists instead focus upon the widely dispersed and conflict-laden 
patterns of power among political parties, central government departments, non-state 
pressure groups and supranational institutions in the policy-making process, and in 
turn allocate Parliament only a relatively limited role in this much more broadly 
defined political system. This is a very important analysis, for it illustrates that while 
Parliament is a key political actor, its ability to influence political events is largely 
dependent upon the extent to which it can forge alliances with other actors. As we 
will see, it was the alliance between the reformist practices of the parliamentary actors 
and the pluralist practices of the private security companies which actually made a 
real difference to the security sector negotiations in the long run.
Yet as a corrective to the governance paradigm, some analysts have accordingly 
warned us not to over-marginalise Parliament -  especially the House of Commons -  
within the contemporary British political system, arguing that while it is one among 
many actors it nevertheless occupies a rather special position. For David Judge, 
Parliament remains crucial because it is the only institution which acts as a “ ...two- 
way conduit between ‘political nation’ and the executive”. And in performing this 
function, Parliament assumes the unique role of linking together the ‘governing’ and 
‘governed’ sections of society in something approximating a consensual andê
representative relationship. It serves to legitimate, in other words, the potentially 
volatile relationship between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ in British society. Judge is 
quick to acknowledge that in reality Parliament is indeed often bypassed and 
marginalised within the policy-making process as the governance theorists assert. 
But, he continues, any such marginalisation is necessarily limited because all the 
governing agencies involved need at the very least to maintain the impression that 
Parliament is still legitimating the policy-making process for the resulting policy 
outcomes to be widely accepted. In this way, then, Parliament always tends to 
structure the policy-making process to some degree. Or, as Judge puts it:-
1 Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain (Basingstoke: Paigrave Macmillan, 1999), p.219.
2 David Judge, The Parliamentary Slate (London: Sage, 1993), p.2.
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...the central state cannot be examined in Britain without reference to the 
structural and organising precepts of parliamentary government itself. This is 
not to argue that central state institutions act consistently in accordance with 
these precepts, merely that there is a widespread belief, within and beyond the 
executive, that they should?
So when examining the impact of parliamentary actors upon the security sector 
negotiations, it is important to keep in mind that while they are most powerful when 
operating in an alliance, they do nevertheless have the ability to make more of an 
autonomous impact upon the policy process than many other actors do. Indeed, as we 
will see in this chapter, this can be witnessed during the early 1970s when the 
reformist practices of parliamentary actors started to autonomously challenge the 
monopoly practices of Home Office and police with regard to the central issue of 
statutory regulation.
In depicting parliament as a political actor, it is also necessary to explore in greater 
detail the exact institutional mechanisms through which parliamentary actors are able 
to influence the policy-making process and the political contexts in which these 
mechanisms have the greatest impact. Philip Norton summarises the policy-making 
powers of Parliament as follows:
Parliament’s involvement in the initiating stage may be classified as 
sporadic...The principle means by which policies may be brought on to the 
policy-making agenda are several. On the floor of each House they comprise 
questions, motions, and the second reading of private members’ bills. Away 
from the floor, there are two unofficial routes, those of party committees and 
all-party groups, and one official route, that of select committees. There is also 
the opportunity to table early day motions.3 4
During the private security negotiations from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, a 
variety of parliamentary actors employed most of these mechanisms in order to 
influence the direction of the statutory regulation policy agenda. But in the specific 
era examined within this chapter the main mechanisms utilised were, in the 1970- 
1974 period, a rather heterogeneous parliamentary committee, and in the 1974-1979 
period a series of private members’ bills.
Norton further reminds us, however, that the impact of these parliamentary 
mechanisms is also dependent upon context. He argues, for instance, that “[t]he
3 Judge, The Parliamentary Stale, p. 133 [italics in original].
4 Philip Norton, Does Parliament Matter? (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp.56-57.
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occasions when these means are likely to prove most effective are when there is no 
existing policy in the area or when the issue is a contentious but non-party one, with 
the government preferring to adopt an ostensible hands-off approach”.5 Significantly, 
the statutory regulation policy area during the early 1970s did indeed satisfy many of 
these criteria. To begin with, while there was a clear Home Office and police policy 
stance on regulation, there was no existing legislation serving to formally define the 
boundaries of debate. In addition, in the early 1970s the issue was not yet party- 
politicised, which meant that parliamentary actors from both benches were open- 
minded with regard to this issue. Furthermore, through careful planning the Home 
Office had certainly managed to maintain a ‘hands-off approach in the sense that it 
wanted to actively dissociate itself from the private security companies wherever 
possible so as to avoid raising the profile of the industry. As these contextual factors 
suggest, and as subsequent sections will demonstrate, when parliamentary actors 
became involved within this policy area they did have a substantial impact upon the 
debate. With these points in mind, then, we must now begin to examine the historical 
involvement of parliamentary actors in this policy area, which initially revolved 
around the twinned issues of privacy and private investigators.
5.3 Parliament, Privacy and Private Security
This'section will examine Parliament’s historical interest in issues concerning the 
private security industry, which was initially focused primarily upon the broader 
matter of privacy and its relation to the activities of private investigators. It will 
show, more specifically, that by the time parliamentary actors started to intervene in 
the security sector negotiations, they were already characterised by a nascent 
reformist agenda. It will also demonstrate that in the context of the regulation debate 
these reformist practices served to complement the pluralist practices of the private 
security institutions and conflict with monopoly practices of the Home Office and 
police.
The parliamentary lobby in favour of statutory regulation did not gain any real 
momentum until 1969, yet the foundations for this lobby were established in 1961 
when Lord Mancroft introduced his Right of Privacy Bill. Although the Bill itself 
was very broadly pitched, intending “ ...to give to every individual such further
5 Norton, Does Parliament Mailer?, p.57.
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protection against the invasion of his privacy as may be desirable for the maintenance 
of human dignity”,6 during the Bill’s second reading it became clear that its remit 
included, among other things, the licensing of private investigators.7 8 The Bill did not 
progress beyond its second reading, yet it did generate a great deal of sympathy within 
the Lords and seemingly ignited a general parliamentary interest in the twinned issues 
of the protection of privacy and the statutory regulation of private investigators. This 
therefore represented the genesis of the reformist practices of the parliamentary actors 
which gathered momentum in subsequent years, especially during the 1970s. As a 
related aside, it is important to note at this juncture that while the activities of private 
investigators have not yet been analysed in this thesis, they do constitute one -
o
admittedly rather small -  section of the private security industry. Furthermore, like
the contract manned guarding side of the industry, private investigators have sought to
operate in a domain over which the modern state has historically claimed a monopoly.
As such, the activities of private investigators have similarly been characterised by the
constraining structural influence of image of the state, the struggle for legitimacy and
the corresponding desire for statutory regulation. As will become clear, then, they
have been important propagators of the pluralist set of practices.
Six years later, in February 1967, these twinned issues made their first appearance
in the House of Commons when Alexander Lyon MP (Labour) introduced his Right
of Privacy Bill under the ten minute rule. This Bill was an explicit attempt to
continue Lord Mancroft’s earlier efforts to generate a wider parliamentary interest in
*
the protection of privacy. Lyon did not, however, manage to secure a second reading 
and his lobbying efforts accordingly disappeared.9 Then, two years after this, in April 
1969, Tony Gardner MP (Conservative) introduced his Private Investigators Bill into 
the House of Commons, again under the ten minute rule. Strikingly, this Bill 
represented the first endeavour to regulate the activities of private investigators 
directly. Gardner was concerned that there was no regulatory body to ensure that 
professional standards were maintained within this sub-sector -  “ ...there is no one 
available to keep an eye on the ‘private eye’”10 -  and thus proposed to a institute a 
system whereby private investigators would be required to obtain a certificate from a
6 HL Bill (1960-61) [35],
7 HL Deb (1960-61), vol.229, col.607.
8 George and Button, Private Security, pp.90-92.
9 HC Deb (1966-67), vol.740, col.1566.
10 HC Deb (1968-69), vol.782 , col. 1444
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county court judge stating that they were a “fit and proper person” before they could 
legally undertake their operations.11 This Bill therefore represented the further 
development of Parliament’s inclination towards a reformist agenda.
While on the surface, Gardner’s Bill seemed to conform with the growing 
parliamentary pressure surrounding this issue in a straightforward manner, the 
background to his Bill is very revealing. For in an article published in the private 
investigator trade press a few months later, Peter Heims, Vice-President of the 
Association of British Investigators (the largest trade association in this sub-sector), 
claimed that “ ...I was responsible for the original draft upon which Anthony Gardner 
based his Bill”. 12 If this claim is taken to be genuine, it reveals a number of 
interesting things about this part of the negotiations. It first indicates that the 
activities of the private investigators, like those of the larger private security 
companies, were clearly being structured by the image of the state -  that is, they were 
being constrained by the majority of the British population’s normative expectations 
about how security (or investigative services in this case) ought to be provided. 
Indeed, Peter Heims accordingly commented in the trade press at the time that 
“ ...many of the public regard us as being in a rather dubious business”.13 A sizeable 
proportion of the public, other words, considered that the state ought to undertake 
these functions, not commercial organisations. Against this backdrop, then, we can 
conjecture that Heims’s draft bill represented an attempt to capture legitimacy from 
the state institutions though a system of statutory regulation in order to portray private 
investigators as state-deputised security actors and in turn placate the public’s poor 
regard for private investigator services to some degree. And with this rather loose 
interpretation of the image of the state, the private investigators can be regarded as 
clear purveyors of the pluralist set of practices.
Furthermore, it seems that this pluralist strategy was being facilitated by the 
reformist tendencies of the parliamentary actors. For Gardner’s Bill was effectively 
serving to enhance the pluralist practices of the private investigators. To be sure, this 
alliance was clearly not based upon a sharing of political ends, since Gardner’s 
rationale was to control and reform the industry in order to protect the public, whereas 
the private investigators’ rationale was to confer a greater degree of legitimacy upon
"HC Bill (1968-69) [146].
12 The Private Investigator, ‘Invasion of Privacy’, August 1970.
13 The Police Review, ‘To Elevate the Profession of the Investigator’, 5 May 1972.
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their operations and in turn increase their competitiveness. And this is precisely why 
the reformist practices and pluralist practice are seen here as being different from one 
another. Yet because both of these sets of practices shared a commonality in the 
means to these different ends -  statutory regulation -  they entered into an alliance. 
Indeed, the fact that there was no opposition to Gardner’s Bill in the House of 
Commons and that it was accordingly scheduled for a second reading two months 
later illustrates the strength of this alliance. In the event, however, this particular 
permutation of the emergent reformist-pluralist alliance did not impact greatly upon 
the security sector negotiations because an extended parliamentary debate over the 
Divorce Reform Bill meant that there was not sufficient time to carry out this second 
reading, and the Bill disappeared.
But while Gardner’s Bill prematurely faded away, the broader issue certainly did 
not -  indeed, it soon became far more prominent. For in November 1969, Brian 
Walden MP (Labour) introduced his Right of Privacy Bill into the House of 
Commons, which was to have a far greater impact than its predecessors. Though 
more broadly pitched than Gardner’s Bill, it still retained an explicit focus on 
curtailing and reforming the activities of private investigators.14 And the House of 
Commons again remained sympathetic to the cause, rewarding Walden’s Bill with a 
second reading two months later. This second reading, in January 1970, proved to be 
highly successful. For after an extremely supportive debate James Callaghan, the 
Home Secretary, declared that the various issues relating to protection of privacy 
certainly required more attention and that the government would accordingly establish 
a Committee on Privacy to conduct a more technical investigation into these 
matters.15 With this promise, Walden withdrew his Bill.
It is also significant to note that in the final contribution to the second reading 
debate, Niall MacDermot MP (Labour) commented that: “The outstanding feature of 
the debate has been that not one hon. Member has suggested that there is no need for 
legislation”.16 This illustrates the overwhelming degree of parliamentary support for a 
system of statutory regulation to control and reform the private investigator sub-sector 
of the private security industry -  it shows, in other words, a strong commitment in the 
House of Commons towards the reformist practices. It also provides an indication of
14 HC Bill (1969-70) [25].
15 HC Deb (1969-70), vol.794, coI.939-941.
16 HC Deb (1969-70), vol.794, col.956.
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the impending split between Parliament and the Home Office over this issue. For 
while the House of Commons was inclined towards the pro-regulation reformist set of 
practices, the Home Office was firmly in favour of the anti-regulation monopoly set 
of practices. The fault lines initially set down by Soskice four years earlier were 
therefore re-opening, signalling a new phase of internalised state contestation within 
the security sector negotiations. Furthermore, this section has also revealed the 
beginnings of a new reformist-pluralist alliance with reference to the issue of statutory 
regulation. And, crucially, this alliance would also come to have great ramifications 
for the industry’s attempts to capture legitimacy from the state institutions, as the next 
section will start to elucidate.
5.4 The Committee on Privacy Versus the Home Office
This section will examine the undertakings of the Committee on Privacy between 
1970 and 1973, with a particular emphasis on the way in which the Committee’s 
reformist practices increasingly came into conflict with the monopoly practice o f the 
Home Office and police and served to complement the pluralist practices o f the 
private security institutions. For in their support of statutory regulation, these 
reformist practices had the unintended (but accepted) consequence o f contributing 
towards the re-legitimation of private security. In terms of the resulting changes in 
the shape of the security sector negotiations, this section will demonstrate that while 
the Home Office did eventually managed to impose its anti-regulation agenda upon 
the proceedings, the influence of the parliamentary actors was beginning to shift the 
balance of power towards a pro-regulation agenda.
The Committee itself was rather eclectic in its composition, including members of 
the three main parties drawn from both the House of Lords and House of Commons, 
together with a number of lawyers and trade union representatives, and was chaired 
by Kenneth Younger, a former Labour MP and at that time Chairman o f the Howard 
League for Penal Reform, Chairman of the Advisory Council on the Penal System, 
and Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.17 The Committee began 
its enquiries in early 1970 by taking evidence from a range of relevant agencies, both 
state and non-state. Of particular interest here is the evidence presented by the private 
investigators on one side and the Home Office and police on the other. For this
17 The Private Investigator, ‘Invasion o f Privacy’, August 1970,
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illustrates how the different sets of practices were impacting upon one another -  the 
long-term outcome of which was crucial in the re-legitimation o f private security in 
postwar Britain.
In line with the previously established pluralist practices of the private security 
industry, the private investigators were extremely supportive of statutory regulation. 
Early in the enquiry, in May 1970, Graham-Harrison of the Home Office drew upon 
his experiences in the Working Party on Private Security Organisation to inform the 
Committee Chairman of this position: “Many of the more reputable firms are said to 
desire the creation of a professional code and a system of licensing”.18 And the 
evidence subsequently submitted by the private investigators to the Committee 
certainly confirmed this suspicion. Finlay’s Bureau of Investigation, for instance, sent 
a letter to the Committee in September 1970 concluding that:
...we would therefore strongly support that the Committee looks carefully into, 
and thereafter recommends, that some form of practising certificate be 
introduced for reputable Private Investigators, which could be renewed annually 
by a Judge in Chambers of a County Court.19 20
In a similar manner, the ABI, which at the time had 483 members and was judged by 
the Committee to “have the best claim to represent reputable private detectives”, 
wrote in their submission that:
The Association of British Investigators believes that proper recognition of a 
professional body observing a strict code of conduct would be in the best public 
interest and the Association would therefore support suitable legislation which 
would restrict the activity of lawful intrusion to suitable persons.21
These submissions thus provide further evidence that this small section of the private 
security industry, like the large contract manned guarding companies, was actively 
attempting to bring about a system of statutory regulation. It was willing to relinquish
18 TNA: PRO, HO 264/57, Committee on Privacy Circulate Papers, PRI (70) 1-20.
19 TNA: PRO, HO 264/69, Committee on Privacy, Circulated Papers, PRI (71) 13-20. .This letter is 
dated 4th September 1970.
20 TNA: PRO, HO 264/69, Committee on Privacy, Circulated Papers, PRI (71) 13-20. This quote was 
drawn from an internal communication written by the Committee Secretary on 11th February 1971.
21 TNA: PRO, HO 264/69, Committee on Privacy, Circulated Papers, PRI (71) 13-20. Although this 
submission was not dated, it must have been sent to the Committee between 31s1 December 1970 and 
11,h February 1971. This is because the Association of British Investigators was not officially 
incorporated until the first date and the Committee Secretary had received the submission by the 
second date.
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a degree of control over its operations in exchange for an official linkage with the 
state, which would then potentially facilitate the transfer of the key resource of 
legitimacy from these state institutions to the industry, and would in turn serve to 
enhance its competitiveness within the security sector. It was shaping its preferences, 
in other words, in accordance with a loose interpretation image o f the state in which 
both public and private institutions could populate the security sector so long as they 
somehow conformed to the majority of the British population’s normative 
expectations about how security ought to be legitimately provided. The private 
investigators were, in other words, actively pursuing a pluralist agenda.
Also in line with their previously established monopoly practices, the Home Office 
and police were resolutely opposed to statutory regulation in their submissions to the 
Committee. In April 1971, for example, the General Secretary of ACPO sent a letter 
to the Committee asserting that: “The Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis 
was firmly opposed to registration of Private Detective Agencies in that such persons 
would be given an enhanced status...” . And in July 1971 the Home Office 
submitted the following memorandum to the Committee regarding the statutory 
licensing of private investigators:
...the impression which would be given by any system would be that those 
admitted had passed stringent tests and could be employed without fear that 
they would themselves prove dishonest or employ reprehensible methods. 
Because of the false impression it would give, the idea of ‘licensed private 
detectives’ is unattractive.2 3
Both of these submissions represented attempts to reiterate and reinforce the long- 
established policy stance of the Home Office and the police towards the notion of 
introducing a system of statutory licensing into the private security sector. Their 
concern was that such a system would potentially serve to ‘enhance the status’ of 
security providers within this sector by conferring upon them a degree o f the state’s 
legitimacy. And such a transfer of legitimacy would, in their eyes, facilitate the 
expansion of the industry into a domain which they viewed as being the sole remit of 
the modern state. This was, in other words, a standard application of the monopoly
22 TNA: PRO, HO 264/76, Committee on Privacy, Circulated Papers, PR1 (71) 41-50. This letter is 
dated 20,h April 1971.
23 TNA: PRO, HO 411/7, Committee on Privacy, Memoranda of Evidence, Home Office Oral 
Evidence. This memorandum is dated 15"' July 1971.
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set o f practices. In effect, then, both the private investigators and the Home Office 
and police were attempting to sway the Committee on Privacy towards their 
respective interpretations of statutory regulation.
Significantly, during the process of evaluating these submissions the Committee 
was more sympathetic to the pluralist practices of the private investigators than the 
monopoly practices of the Home Office and police. For instance, the various 
members o f the Committee assembled for a weekend in July 1971 with the objective 
of evaluating the submissions they had received so far. Although the Committee 
members certainly recognised and gave careful consideration to the Home Office and 
police’s objections towards statutory regulation, they were not convinced by the 
overriding importance of the monopoly rationale, as the minutes o f the meeting 
illustrate:
The Chairman, summing up the discussion, said that they were in general 
satisfied that the activities of private detectives constituted a sufficiently special 
threat to privacy to call for a licensing system of some kind. The aim of this 
should be to inhibit the likelihood of their undesirable activities, not to give 
them a stamp of approval.24
The Chairman’s summation gives a clear insight into the logic o f the reformist 
practices -  the state ought to be firmly in charge o f the security sector, so it should 
implement a system of statutory regulation not to enhance the legitimacy of the 
industry but rather to control the operations of the private security companies. The 
Committee on Privacy was thus more disposed towards the pro-regulation pluralist 
preferences, not because these actors shared the same ends but because they shared 
the same means to their different ends. This in turn caused a fracture to emerge 
within the state along the reformist-monopoly fault line. And, as we will see, this 
fragmentation was to increase over subsequent months.
In this July meeting the Committee was only supposed to reach provisional 
recommendations with regard to the statutory regulation of private investigators, for 
they had still not yet received oral evidence from arguably the most important 
representative of all -  Sir Philip Allen, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Office. However, the provisionality of their recommendations would be called
24 TNA: PRO, HO 411/7, Committee on Privacy, Memoranda of Evidence, Home Office Oral 
Evidence. These minutes are dated 16lh July 1971 -  18lh July 1971.
133
into question following this high profile interview. During this interview, which took 
place at the Home Office in October 1971, Allen was flanked by two Deputy Under­
secretaries of State, Mr Graham-Harrison and Mr Waddell, and together they once 
again advanced a solid defence of the Home Office’s long-standing monopoly 
practices. Allen explained, for instance, that “[t]he main danger in licensing private 
detectives was, as the Home Office memorandum had pointed out, that the public 
might be misled into thinking that they had some special competence or powers”.25 
He also suggested that in addressing the difficult question o f how to control the 
operations of these private investigators “[pjossibly an ad hoc body was the only 
answer”.26 This line of reasoning thus directly reproduced the previously established 
Home Office strategy for tackling the larger contract manned guarding companies -  
that is, in order to avoid conferring any legitimacy upon their operations they should 
be institutionalised within a non-statutory set of relations designed specifically to 
minimise official linkages between these public and private institutions. Indeed, this 
strategy was unsurprising given that Waddell considered that the issues surfacing in 
regard to the private investigators and the larger private security companies were 
really “ .. .not all that different”.27
Given that by 1971 this Home Office evidence was based upon twenty years of 
experience in dealing with private security provision and was delivered by the 
department’s most senior civil servant in his own surroundings, one might have 
expected it to represent a rather persuasive submission to the Committee’s enquiries. 
This was not the case, however. A series of internal communications written by the 
Committee Secretary at the beginning of 1972 reveal that the chapter o f the 
Committee’s report which discussed the statutory regulation o f private investigators 
had actually been written before Allen’s oral evidence was received.28 Moreover, the 
Secretary added that:
I have now revised the draft, both to take account of Sir Philip Allen’s evidence
and of further consultations I have had on points arising therefrom, but not so as
25 TNA: PRO, HO 411/7, Committee on Privacy, Memoranda of Evidence, Home Office Oral 
Evidence. This quote is taken from the minutes of the meeting dated 21sl October 1971.
26 TNA: PRO, HO 411/7, Committee on Privacy, Memoranda of Evidence, Home Office Oral 
Evidence. This quote is taken from the minutes of the meeting dated 21st October 1971.
27 TNA: PRO, HO 411/7, Committee on Privacy, Memoranda of Evidence, Home Office Oral 
Evidence. This quote is taken from the minutes of the meeting dated 21st October 1971.
28 TNA: PRO, HO 264/83, Committee on Privacy, Circulated Papers (71) 98-114. This internal 
communication is dated 14lh January 1972.
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to depart in any way from the Committee’s general intention reached at their 
meeting at the Berystede Hotel in July.29 30
It seems, then, that the Home Office’s additional submissions were never going to 
alter the previously established reformist practices of the Committee. As the previous 
episodes in the House of Commons suggested, such as the readings of Gardner’s and 
Walden’s private members’ bills, parliamentary actors were generally persuaded by 
the reformist position and their minds would not be changed by the monopoly 
practices of the Home Office. Furthermore, the fact that these reformist practices 
were complemented by the pluralist practices of the private investigators with regard 
to statutory regulation no doubt strengthened the Committee’s resolve.
The official Report of the Committee on Privacy, which was published a few 
months later in July 1972, accordingly recommended that a Central Licensing 
Authority be set up and given the task of administering licenses to those private
O A
investigators who satisfied the criteria of a “fit and proper person”. This was 
precisely the system which the Home Office feared, since it could potentially have the 
effect of conferring legitimacy upon the operations of the private investigators. This 
recommendation is also very enlightening because it illustrates the extent to which the 
Committee was willing to pursue its pro-regulation reformist agenda in the face of 
substantial Home Office and police opposition. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that this recommendation largely reproduced the content of Gardner’s 1969 Bill, 
which was allegedly based upon the work of Peter Heims, Vice-President of the ABI. 
This in turn demonstrates the way in which the reformist-pluralist alliance was 
capable of challenging the monopoly practices of the Home Office. Moreover, when 
the Report was discussed in Parliament one year later, in July 1973, the growing 
fragmentation between reformist practices of the parliamentary actors and the 
monopoly practices of the Home Office was reproduced upon one of Britain’s most 
public stages.
In this parliamentary debate, Robert Carr, the Home Secretary, did actually agree to 
some extent with the motivations behind the Committee’s proposals to license private 
investigators -  that is, controlling and regulating their activities -  thereby illustrating 
again that the Home Office and the parliamentary actors were not entirely
29 TNA: PRO, HO 264/83, Committee on Privacy, Circulated Papers (71) 98-114. This internal 
communication is dated 14lh January 1972.
30 Report o f  the Committee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012 (London: HMSO, 1972), pp. 135-140.
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counterposed on principle, for they both wanted to control what happened to the 
industry. But returning to the long-standing Home Office monopoly agenda, Carr 
also added that he was also extremely concerned that statutory regulation would 
effectively amount to a “license to pry”.31 Expanding upon this theme he went on to 
reason that: “The public might also be misled...into believing that the fact that a 
person possesses a license implies some special status, competence or power”.32 In 
other words, then, Carr was arguing that rather than controlling their activities, such a 
system would have the opposite effect and serve to confer legitimacy upon their 
operations, in the process giving the private investigators more power than ever. For 
these reasons he rejected this recommendation. But given the overwhelming 
parliamentary pressure in favour of statutory regulation it was apparent that Carr 
could not simply dismiss this recommendation outright. So despite his powerful 
position, the Home Secretary was compelled to cede some ground by outlining an 
alternative solution:
We have therefore been considering whether there is an alternative method 
which would achieve the committee’s objectives without the drawbacks, and we 
believe that it means starting the other way round. A person would be 
disqualified from acting as a private detective if he had been convicted o f an 
offence involving dishonesty, violence or intrusion into privacy or if  he had 
been given a custodial sentence... We believe that in this way we should remove 
from practice those persons who are not found proper to act as detectives 
without giving anyone a positive license which might misleadingly create the 
impression that a person was positively certified as being suitable or was 
specifically empowered to make an inquiry.33
This alternative solution did seem to offer a compromise between the parliamentary 
actors’ demands for some kind of formal control over private investigators and the 
Home Office’s desire to minimise the potential for conferring an unnecessary degree 
of legitimacy upon this particular sub-sector of the private security industry. Yet this 
solution did not satisfy the parliamentary lobby, which throughout the remainder of 
the debate continued to question the Home Office’s rationale and persevered with its 
reformist practices by calling for statutory regulation. The Home Secretary did not 
concede any further ground, however, and the parliamentary lobby was merely left 
with the promise of a government White Paper to be published on these matters later
31 HC Deb (1972-73), vol.859, col.1966.
32 HC Deb (1972-73), vol.859, col.1966.
33 HC Deb (1972-73), vol.859, cols. 1966-1967.
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in the year.34 Significantly, no such White Paper was ever published, which suggests 
that the Home Office was not actually genuinely trying to compromise with these 
parliamentary actors but was instead acting insincerely and attempting to undermine 
their reformist agenda. But despite this rather authoritarian imposition of the Home 
Office’s monopoly practices, the parliamentary lobby certainly did not disappear. 
Indeed, in subsequent years it widened its focus by encompassing the entire private 
security industry in its pro-regulation reformist agenda, in the process establishing a 
much stronger alliance with the pluralist practices of the private security industry, as 
the next section will demonstrate.
Before moving on to this next period of parliamentary lobbying, it is important to
note that by the end o f 1973 the security sector negotiations were beginning to change
shape. While the Home Office and police were still successfully enforcing their
monopoly practices, their conflicts with the reformist practices of the parliamentary
actors over the issue of statutory regulation certainly served to weaken their overall
position. Furthermore, this significant rupture in the state also had the effect of
enhancing the pluralist practices of the private security companies, for they now had a
clear outlet for their pro-regulation agenda through the state. This section has
illustrated, then, that the security sector negotiations were now characterised by a
contest between three sets of practices which increasingly blurred the traditional
public-private divide. This shows once again, then, how the reality of the security
sector was moving ever further away from the monopoly myth in which a unified and
0
coherent state is seen to exercise complete dominance over the security sector.
5.5 Private Members’ Bills
This section will demonstrate how ongoing parliamentary intervention during the 
second half of the 1970s, much of it through the medium of private members’ bills, 
continued to shift the balance of the security sector negotiations towards a pro­
regulation agenda. Importantly, this shift was not achieved by parliamentary actors 
lobbying alone within Westminster, however, but rather in partnership with a variety 
of private security institutions. This in turn had the effect of generating a more 
substantial reformist-pluralist alliance which increasingly worked against the 
monopoly practices of the Home Office and police. And, of course, as this alliance
34 HC Deb (1972-73), vol.859, col. 1956.
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rallied around the cause of statutory regulation, the possibilities of the private security 
industry formally capturing legitimacy from the state increased accordingly. In order 
to understand how this alliance developed, it is first necessary to examine the 
circumstances of the larger private security companies during the early 1970s.
At this time, the private security industry in Britain was expanding at a respectable 
rate. In 1970, the industry was worth a sizeable £70 million and employed 40,000 
men, the majority of whom (25,000) were engaged in guarding, patrolling and cash- 
in-transit.35 And measured in terms of sales volume -  as opposed to number of 
companies -  90 percent of the industry was represented by the BSIA.36 378 Yet the 
industry still suffered from extremely bad press. It was at the time “popular 
mythology” that the industry lacked responsibility -  that is, there was widespread 
cultural antipathy towards the industry -  and this in turn limited the opportunities for 
expansion which were available to the private security companies. The industry 
thus still wanted to bring about a system of statutory regulation so as to capture a 
greater degree of the legitimacy from the state and enhance its attractiveness in the 
eyes of the average British citizen. Its preferences, in other words, continued to be 
shaped by the image of the state. But while in the early 1970s, the Committee on 
Privacy presented the private investigator sub-sector of the industry with an excellent 
opportunity to pursue these pluralist practices, the larger private security companies 
were not so strategically positioned at this time.
The BSIA, reflecting the preferences of its members, still wanted to lobby in favour 
of statutory regulation, but was still locked into the rules of the game set down by the 
Home Office and police. For instance, a BSIA memorandum sent to the Cambridge 
Institute of Criminology’s Cropwood Round-Table Conference on private security in 
July 1972 asserted that: “The B.S.I.A. supports legislation which would enable the 
security companies to be licensed but the present attitude of the Home Office is that a 
case has not yet been made out”. Indeed, during the open debate at this high-profile 
conference, the attending Home Office representative reiterated this anti-regulation ' 
‘attitude’ against a hostile audience of pro-regulation academics and private security
35 Randall and Hamilton, ‘The Security Industry of the United Kingdom’, p.67.
36 Randall and Hamilton, ‘The Security Industry of the United Kingdom’, p.68.
37 Randall and Hamilton, ‘The Security Industry of the United Kingdom’, p.68.
38 BSIA, ‘Memorandum’, Appendix A, in The Security Industry in the United Kingdom: Papers 
Presented to the Cropwood Round-Table Conference July 1972, eds. Paul Wiles and F. H. McClintock 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Institute of Criminology, 1972), p. 105.
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representatives.39 The censure of a few academics and industry representatives was 
certainly not sufficient to change the Home Office’s monopoly practices, however. In 
effect, then, after many years of struggle, the private security companies were now at 
the negotiating table, but were being silenced.
This subordinated position was even more clearly reflected in the BSIA Council 
Meeting minutes at this time:
Mr. Dunham asserted that BSIA had fallen back, as it is not known nor 
mentioned by press, radio or television...they should do something to promote 
the Association and by so doing improve the stature of the security 
industry...The Chairman agreeing with this view said that BSIA carried little no 
weight in various circles and members must act to make the Association 
known.40
It is important to re-emphasise that the marginalised status of the BSIA was precisely 
what the Home Office officials had in mind when they established the Working Party. 
They wanted all the political activity of the private security industry concentrated into 
a single body which they could then manipulate and manage. This was not a full- 
proof plan, however. For some private security companies subsequently started to 
distance themselves from the BSIA and operate outside of the formal policy network 
so as to take advantage of the new opportunities presented by the Committee on 
Privacy’s reformist attack on the monopoly practices of the Home Office and police. 
In order to examine this new movement, we must focus in particular on the 
strategising of Group 4 and Norman Fowler MP (Conservative).
Group 4 Chairman Jorgen Philip-Sorensen was one of the strongest proponents of 
implementing statutory regulation within the private security industry -  a perspective 
which was influenced by his previous experiences in the Swedish private security 
industry, which has a long history of regulation and accordingly enjoys very high 
levels of legitimacy.41 It is no coincidence to discover therefore that in July 1973 
Norman Fowler, who at that time was both a Member of Parliament and serving on 
the Group 4 board of directors,42 introduced into the House of Commons the Security
39 The Security Industry in the United Kingdom: Papers Presented to the Cropwood Round-Table 
Conference July 1972, eds. Paul Wiles and F. H. McClintock (Cambridge: University o f Cambridge 
Institute of Criminology, 1972), p.76.
40 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 27lh June 1972 (BSIA Archives).
41 Interview with Jorgen Philip-Sorensen, conducted 17lh December 2007.
42 Draper, Private Police, p. 142.
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Industry Licensing Bill under the ten minute rule.43 Importantly, this was the first Bill 
which directly reflected the interests of companies such as Group 4 by linking 
together the idea of statutory regulation specifically with the private security 
companies. The timing of this Bill, too, was highly significant, since it was 
introduced just one week before the parliamentary debate on the Committee on 
Privacy’s recommendations was scheduled, and was therefore deployed to have 
maximum impact upon this pro-regulation lobby.
In presenting the Bill to Parliament, Fowler’s introductory speech, as one would 
expect from someone with vested interests in Group 4, was highly supportive of the 
industry:
We must all learn to take crime prevention more seriously. If that is the case the 
private security industry will have an increasingly important part to play. This 
part should be encouraged and the intention of the Bill is to encourage good 
security firms and to ensure high standards.44
Fowler’s support of the industry was also supplemented by a Conservative Party 
pamphlet published in that same year in which he wrote that:
Private security is much criticised in Britain but much of this criticism is ill- 
founded. The best private security in Britain is very good and the aim of policy 
should be to encourage this...Licensing would show clearly that the government 
recognised the contribution that private security could make and at the same 
time encourage even more firms and individuals to make use o f  their services.45
Significantly, then, this represents the first instance of a state representative actively 
promoting a pluralist agenda, thereby pulling these practices across the public-private 
divide. Fowler therefore clearly represented a crucial component of Group 4’s own 
pluralist practices (although it should be noted that the existence o f the Conservative 
Party pamphlet also suggests that Fowler was acting not purely on behalf of Group 4’s 
management, but also from a personal ideological conviction in the virtues of free 
market provision -  a conviction which would be displayed more clearly in years to 
come when serving in successive Thatcher governments).
43 HC Bill (1972-73) [175],
44 HC Deb (1972-73) Vol. 859, col.537.
45 Norman Fowler, The Cost o f  Crime (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1973), p. 20.
140
But despite the significance of this Bill within the context of the security sector 
negotiations, it did not receive a second reading in Parliament. Statutory regulation of 
the private security industry was not yet a high profile issue capable of generating 
widespread interest. Nevertheless, due to the propitious timing of its introduction, 
this rejection did not represent the conclusion of the Bill’s life in Parliament. For 
during the parliamentary debate on the Committee of Privacy’s findings nine days 
later, Fowler made two contributions to the long discussion on the Committee’s 
recommendations in order both to draw attention to his Security Industry Licensing 
Bill and to argue that private security companies should be regulated alongside private 
investigators.46 With these arguments, then, he was once again promoting the 
pluralist practices of Group 4 more particularly and the private security industry more 
generally. As we have already seen, the Home Office rejected all suggestions of 
regulation at the end of this debate. Yet the fact that Fowler, and by extension Group 
4, had not let this opportunity pass without forging an extremely public connection 
between themselves and this issue represented a very important step towards the shift 
in the balance of power within the security sector negotiations.
After the Committee on Privacy’s and then Fowler’s parliamentary interventions
there followed short period of only very gradual movement within both Parliament
and the BSIA. In the first instance, the vestiges of the Committee’s regulation project
were kept alive over the next few months in the form of two unsuccessful Private
Detectives (Control) Bills, both of which were introduced as ordinary presentations by#
Michael Fidler MP (Conservative) and were supported by Norman Fowler.47 But 
these achieved little publicity and it was becoming increasingly obvious that the 
Home Office was neither intending to produce the promised White Paper on private 
detective disqualification, nor were they going to engage with the issue o f statutory 
regulation more generally. The Home Office were still avowedly pursuing their 
monopoly practices by refusing to bring about any situation in which legitimacy could 
be transferred from the state to the private security industry.
Furthermore, perhaps galvanised by the activism of Group 4, the BSIA were now 
slowing re-addressing the issue of statutory regulation. During a Council Meeting in 
January 1974, for instance, they approached the matter cautiously. With a clear 
ongoing appreciation o f the rules of the game set down by the Home Office years
46 HC Deb (1972-73), Vol. 859, cols.1967 and 2029-2030.
47 HC Bill (1973-74) [32]; HC Bill (1973-74) [77],
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before, the participants first “ ...considered that the Home Office was unlikely to 
initiate this subject unless stimulated by the Association stating a case in favour of 
licensing”. The task of constructing such a case was accordingly delegated to the 
BSIA Policy and Public Relations Committee. Just over a year later, in April 1975, 
the Council Meeting minutes show that while participants agreed that a case certainly 
could be made in favour of licensing the transport and guard patrol sections -  that is, 
the main operations of Securicor, Group 4 and Security Express -  they did not seem 
to have a substantive strategy for pursuing these pluralist practices.48 9 The BSIA, it 
appears, still considered itself to be limited by the rules established by the Home 
Office. Yet, in this period of general inertia, a new period of state fragmentation 
along the monopoly-reformist fault line caused by another parliamentary actor was 
once again to enhance the possibilities of the private security industry capturing 
legitimacy from the state through a system of statutory regulation.
In February 1974, Bruce George entered the House of Commons as a new Labour 
MP and soon afterwards started to take a strong interest in reforming the private 
security industry. For like many parliamentary actors before him he immediately 
seemed to be inclined towards the reformist position -  that is, he wanted to increase 
training standards and professionalism within the industry through statutory 
regulation. In 1976, George accordingly started preparations for his long pro­
regulation parliamentary campaign -  which would take the form of numerous private
members’ bills, participation in select committee enquiries and a handful of long
*
parliamentary speeches -  to reform the private security companies through statutory 
regulation. To begin with, George attempted to recruit allies from the BSIA, for as 
we have seen parliamentary actors are strongest when allied with other political 
actors. The BSIA were supportive but still cautious, as the minutes of a June 1976 
Council Meeting reflect:
He [Mr Smith of the Policy and Public Relations Committee] reported on a 
query from Mr. Bruce George regarding licensing to which he had replied, on 
behalf of the B.S.I.A., that the Association would support licensing but were of 
the impressions that parliamentary time, to give consideration to this subject, 
would not be made available in the foreseeable future.50
48 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 17lh January 1974 (BSIA Archives).
49 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 15lh April 1975 (BSIA Archives).
50 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 15th June 1976 (BSIA Archives).
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This caution was almost certainly related once again to the restrictive rules o f the 
game set down by the Home Office, for during the subsequent Council Meeting the 
Director-General, John Wheeler, explained that George’s campaign would probably 
suffer from “...lack of support by the Home Office and Police”.51 The BSIA were, it 
seems, still highly sensitised to the monopoly practices of the Home Office and thus 
remained relatively inert on the issue, for now at least. But while the BSIA were 
unable to advance George’s campaign, Group 4 were. For this company, which had 
previously eschewed the Home Office’s rules of the game in their partnership with 
Norman Fowler, once again dismissed the implicit proscriptions of this central state 
institution and immediately became staunch supporters of the campaign, as George 
recently explained: “Group 4 were constantly supporting me on regulation...Helping 
me with the bills, arguing the case”.52 From Group 4’s perspective, then, this alliance 
with George would contribute towards their pluralist strategy of capturing legitimacy 
from the state through a system of statutory regulation. This therefore represented 
another example of the reformist-pluralist alliance, but this time involving one of the 
largest private security companies, as opposed to a section of the comparatively small 
private investigator sub-sector. As one might expect, then, this permutation o f the 
alliance was to prove far more influential in years to come.
With Group 4’s assistance, George introduced two private members’ bills into the 
House of Commons during 1977, each of which sought to regulate the private security 
industry through the establishment of a statutory licensing scheme governed by a 
central body. The first bill, entitled Registration of Private Security Firms,53 was 
presented to the House of Commons in February under the ten-minute rule and was 
significant not just for its content, but also for the supporters and detractors it listed. 
According to George, the Bill’s supporters included MPs from both benches of the 
Commons, a number of academics, the Police Federation, the BSIA, the ABI, both 
large and small companies within the industry, and the journal Top Security.54 Apart 
from the Police Federation, whose position in this list seems rather inexplicable given 
the police’s long-standing policy stance on this issue, these supporters elucidate once 
again the development of a rather incongruous alliance between reformists and 
pluralists from both public and private institutions. To reiterate, the ultimate
51 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 27th January 1977 (BSIA Archives).
52 Interview with Bruce George, conducted on 30th October 2007.
53 HC Bill (1976-77) [62],
54 HC Deb (1976-77), Vol.925, col. 1251.
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objectives of these various institutions were not always the same. For, generally 
speaking, while the industry institutions wanted to capture a greater degree of 
legitimacy from the licensing system, the parliamentary actors and institutions wanted 
to reform the industry through the same means. But despite these contrasting 
motivations their preferences actually complemented each other.
The main detractor listed by George, however, was the Home Office. Indeed, he 
noted in his introductory speech that:
It is paradoxical that normally in these circumstances the Government say to an 
industry that they want to establish rules for it and the industry wants to stay 
free. In this case it is the industry itself that is crying out for Government 
intervention and regulation, while the Home Office is resisting the idea.55
This scenario could indeed be considered paradoxical when compared with an 
ordinary industry. But private security is not particularly ordinary. The provision of 
security has a unique historical lineage, for no other social function has been so 
closely connected with the modern state -  a connection which was crystallised in 
early enlightenment political thought and has been translated into both theory and 
practice for much of the last three hundred years. This is why state security provision 
has become so constitutive of the idealised image of the state which structures the 
security sector. And it is precisely because the monopoly practices o f the Home 
Office were founded upon a very literal and direct interpretation of this image of the
0
state -  in other words, it was precisely because they were the defenders o f the 
monopoly myth -  that they sought to undermine any institutions which challenged 
this image, as private security companies clearly did. Once this is recognised, the 
Home Office’s rejection of George’s Bill was not paradoxical but rather perfectly 
understandable. And, crucially, because of this rejection the Bill was not awarded a 
second reading. Moreover, George’s second bill, which was introduced as an 
ordinary presentation a couple of months later, and essentially represented a more 
detailed version of the first, met the same fate.56
Yet although on the surface the failure of these bills seemed to constitute another 
successful episode in the Home Office and police’s ongoing strategy of suppressing 
the industry’s attempts to capture any of the state’s legitimacy, a closer examination
55 HC Deb (1976-77), Vol.925, col. 1251.
56 HC Bill (1976-77) [114],
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reveals that this was not necessarily the case. For although George’s Bills made no 
inroads within Parliament, they did seem to publicly ignite a broader debate around 
the issue of statutory regulation. Indeed, private members’ bills often have this 
important indirect impact upon political issues. For as David Marsh and Melvyn
57Read note, “ ...even unsuccessful private members’ bills often have significance”. 
Significantly, this burgeoning interest in the regulation of the private security industry 
was perhaps nowhere more starkly evident than in the changing fortunes of the BSIA 
towards the end of the 1970s. The level of optimism which characterised the BSIA 
Council Meeting in January 1978, for instance, contrasted markedly with the 
pessimistic tone o f the Council Meetings conducted at the beginning of the decade. 
The minutes o f this meeting, for example, take note of
...the increasing interest being shown in the Association as evidenced by the 
numerous enquiries for information on the BSIA, the interviews sought by 
journalists from a wide range of news media and the fact that the Association is 
being cited as the voice of the security industry in such journals as ‘Business 
News’ and ‘Which?’.57 8
Furthermore, the BSIA annual luncheon guest list for 1978 included among others; 
the Permanent Under-Secretary of the State for the Home Office; the Commissioner, 
Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police; and a 
high-ranking official from H.M. Inspectorate o f Constabularies.59 This enhanced 
profile, especially the publicity generated by these high-ranking luncheon guests, 
demonstrates that the BSIA were now able to substantially redefine their role within 
the security sector negotiations. Far from being locked into a restrictive agenda, it 
seems that the BSIA were now actively engaging in the regulation debate and 
promoting the pluralist agenda. Furthermore, this pro-active stance appeared to have 
a knock-on effect in the industry more generally. For in the 1978 Annual Report, the 
Director-General wrote that: “Applications continue to be received, especially from 
companies engaged in the provision of guards and patrols under contract. This is no 
doubt encouraged by the continuing consideration of the question of licensing...”.60
57 David Marsh and Melvyn Read, Private Members ’ Bills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p .l.
58 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 24"' January 1978 (BSIA Archives).
59 BSIA, Council Meeting Minutes, 24"' January 1978 (BSIA Archives).
60 BSIA, Reports and Accounts, 31s' December 1978 (BSIA Archives).
145
And this, of course, had the effect of further enhancing the BSIA’s ability to advance 
the pluralist cause against the monopoly practices of the Home Office and police.
By the end of 1978, the rather incongruous but nevertheless effective reformist- 
pluralist pro-regulation alliance was thus clearly changing the nature o f the security 
sector negotiations. To begin with, it seems that the profile o f the industry and its 
relationship with the state was certainly being raised as a result o f this alliance -  as 
evidenced in the luncheon guest-list -  which in turn had the effect o f conferring a 
small degree of legitimacy upon the industry (or at least the BSIA). Furthermore, the 
continuing success of the alliance also appeared to represent one further step toward 
the realisation of the industry’s main pluralist objective -  that is, capturing a much 
greater degree of legitimacy from the state through a system of statutory regulation. 
With these developments, then, the reformist-pluralist alliance between the private 
security institutions and the parliamentary actors seemed to represent a mounting 
challenge against the monopoly practices of the Home Office and police. And in 
tandem with these conflicting sets of practices, the reality o f the security sector 
appeared to be moving ever further away from the institutional arrangements 
envisaged in the monopoly myth. In reaction to these trends, then, it is unsurprising 
to find that the Home Office -  who were at this time still the primary bearers and 
propagators of these monopolistic institutional arrangements -  were once again 
compelled to stamp out the issue of regulation, which they attempted to do through 
the medium of a departmental Green paper, as we will now see. ,
5.6 The Green Paper
This section will examine the 1979 Green Paper entitled The Private Security 
Industry: A Discussion Paper, which was published by the Home Office in a direct 
attempt to defend their anti-regulation monopoly practices against the challenges of 
the growing pro-regulation reformist-pluralist alliance. It will show that although the 
Home Office once again managed to successfully uphold their anti-regulation 
monopoly agenda, their ability to do this in the face of the reformist-pluralist alliance 
was becoming increasingly compromised. This in turn enhanced the probability of 
the private security companies capturing legitimacy through a system of statutory 
regulation.
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Unlike a decade earlier, the Home Office could no longer bury the regulation issue 
within a highly structured policy network characterised by strict rules o f the game, for 
the combined efforts of parliamentary lobbying and industry strategising had now 
successfully projected the issue into the public sphere. As a result, the Home Office 
was in turn forced to employ an equally public medium to smother the issue, which 
came in the form of a Green Paper published in February 1979. The Green Paper 
purported to advance a balanced assessment of the cases both for and against 
regulating the private security industry. Indeed, the Home Office authors asserted 
from the outset, rather incredulously given the nature of the Home Office’s previous 
engagement with the issue, that “[t]he Government have not yet formed a view on the 
balance of these arguments”.61 Yet upon reading the Green Paper it soon becomes 
clear that its intention was not to provide a balanced assessment of the regulation 
debate but rather to systematically undermine the arguments in favour o f regulation 
and thereby reassert the Home Office’s monopoly practices within this policy area. 
Indeed, this lack of objectivity was duly noted by Stenning and Shearing in their 
analysis of the document at the time:
...it is evident to even the most casual observer that the Discussion Paper is a_ 
tentative governmental response to some quite specific pressures for the 
introduction of some form of regulatory legislation...there is often as much, if 
not more, comment to be made on what the Paper did not talk about (and why it 
did not talk about it), as on what the Paper did talk about.62
0
And, perhaps understandably, George reflects back upon the skewed orientation of the 
Green Paper in slightly more emotive terms, commenting that “I managed to wring 
out o f Merlyn Rees [the Home Secretary]...a Green Paper in 79 and it was a hatchet 
job on me, deliberately. Just to destroy the concept of regulation”.63 Given its 
centrality to the advancement of the Home Office’s anti-regulation monopoly 
practices, then, the Green Paper represented an important moment in the private 
security negotiations. The remainder of this section will map out the main arguments 
within the paper.
61 Home Office, The Private Security Industry: A Discussion Paper (London: HMSO, 1979), p. 1.
62 Philip Stenning and Clifford Shearing, ‘Private Security and Private Justice’, British Journal o f  Law 
and Society 6(2) ( 1979), p.262.
63 Interview with Bruce George, conducted on 30th October 2007.
147
In order to put forward their anti-regulation position, the Home Office authors
advanced two main arguments. First, they set down a rather abstract and normative
rationale for rejecting the notion of statutory regulation. This began with the basic
proposition that: “ ...the responsibility for maintaining law and order rest in this
country with the police”,64 and that “[n]o one may usurp the role o f the police”.65
This constituted a restatement of the Home Office’s very literal interpretation o f the
image of the state in which only state institutions are seen to be endowed with the
requisite legitimacy to undertake security functions. With this image in mind, they
then asserted that rather than actively undertaking police-like security functions,
private security guards must therefore merely be functioning as a supplement to the
self-defence activities undertaken by many ‘ordinary citizens’ within their own
private property. As in the image of the state from which they were drawing, then,
this assertion depicted a clear and impenetrable boundary between the public and
private spheres. And given this boundary, the authors subsequently contended that
private security guards, unlike the public police, were therefore endowed with no
“special powers” over and above the ordinary citizen. As a consequence, they
concluded, there was no need to use statutory regulation so as to safeguard the
ordinary citizen from the private security companies.66 The Home Office authors
were essentially asserting, then, that the monopoly myth was in fact a reality. As
Stenning and Shearing noted at the time, this was a highly unsatisfactory argument
because it was patently clear that private security guards did indeed have special
0
powers over and above the ordinary citizen, for they controlled access to and 
behaviour within both public and private spaces while wearing military-style 
uniforms.67 Contrary to the image of the state, there was therefore a clear blurring of 
the boundary between the public and private spheres. The monopoly myth was 
certainly not a reality. The Home Office authors did not, however, allow this 
complication to interfere with the advancement of their monopoly agenda.
Second, however, the Home Office authors were nevertheless compelled to move 
away from their normative logic and provide a more practical response to George’s 
private members’ bills, since these constituted the major platform upon which the pro­
64 Home Office, Discussion Paper, p.10.
65 Home Office, Discussion Paper, p. 12 .
66 Home Office, Discussion Paper, pp.8-9.
67 Stenning and Shearing, ‘Private Security and Private Justice’, p.263.
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regulation lobby was at the time building its momentum. In a now familiar manner, 
then, the Home Office authors sought to undermine the licensing rationale:
First, any form of licensing or statutory control could give the appearance of 
state approval to particular activities and by increasing an apparent distinction 
between approved security personnel and other citizens lead people mistakenly 
to believe that such personnel had some legal authority or power which they did 
not in fact have.68
This anti-regulation argument was founded upon the long-standing concern that 
licensing would serve to confer an unwanted degree of legitimacy upon the industry. 
To be sure, in order to demonstrate that they were still considering the cases for and 
against this argument the Home Office authors linked it with the Committee on 
Privacy’s report of seven years earlier. In a rather disingenuous manner they claimed, 
for instance, that the pro-regulation recommendations of this report “remain under 
consideration”.69 70 Yet it soon becomes clear that the prospect of such regulation ever 
being implemented was remote when they added that:
A particular disadvantage of formal controls over private detectives (which the 
Younger Committee recognised) is that the possession by a private investigator 
of a license, or other form of authority, might give the false impression of his
. 1C\having special powers or status in the eyes of the public.
The legitimacy rationale was therefore being deployed by the Home Office authors 
not just to neutralise George’s broadly pitched private members’ bills, but also their 
historical antecedents. This therefore represented an all-out attack on the reformist 
practices of parliamentary actors over the past few years and, by extension, an indirect 
attack on the pluralist practices of the their private security industry allies.
Crucially, these arguments did indeed succeed in temporarily reasserting the Home 
Office’s monopoly practices within this policy area -  although this was probably 
more related to the fact that the Green Paper was supported by the powerful triptych 
of the government, the Florae Office civil servants and the police rather than the 
cohesion of the document itself. It is thus possible to conclude that in 1979 the Home 
Office was still able to successfully realise its monopoly practices in the face of the
68 Home Office, Discussion Paper, pp. 12-13.
69 Home Office, Discussion Paper, p. 16.
70 Home Office, Discussion Paper, p. 17.
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reformist-pluralist alliance, for it had once again stamped out the issue of statutory 
regulation. However, the ability of the Home Office to stifle this issue was by this 
time becoming increasingly compromised, for three important reasons. First, the idea 
of regulating the private security industry was now far more public than ever before. 
While in the past the regulation issue was for the most part contained by the Home 
Office and police within a relatively small circle of departmental actors and industry 
representatives, it was now clearly set out within the Green Paper -  an openly public 
document. And although the Green Paper was intentionally written in order to steer 
the reader towards the case against statutory regulation, the case in favour was 
certainly not discredited. The idea of statutory regulation of the private security 
industry was now, in other words, a widely accessible reference point. This in turn 
served to benefit the reformists and pluralists who, for different reasons, wanted to 
publicly build the case in favour of implementing statutory regulation.
Second, in addition to the idea of statutory regulation escaping its formerly narrow 
institutional confines, the entire shape of the security sector negotiations had now 
changed. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Home Office had managed to prevent the 
state fracturing along the monopoly-reformist fault line with regard to the issue of 
statutory regulation. By the end of the 1970s, however, this fracture was now firmly 
established, with a number of parliamentary actors on the reformist side and the Home 
Office and police on the monopoly side. Importantly, this fracture in turn provided a 
window of opportunity for the private security institutions to unite their pluralist 
practices with the reformist practices of the parliamentary actors and against the 
monopoly practices of the Home Office in order to advance the cause o f statutory 
regulation. Through this alliance, then, the private security institutions had broken 
free of the rules of the game set down by the Home Office a decade earlier and now 
had a variety of concrete institutional channels through which to pursue their pluralist 
practices. And as the ability of the private security companies to pursue their pluralist 
practices increased, so did the possibility of the industry capturing greater degrees of 
legitimacy from the state.
Finally, the Green Paper was published not only at a time when the localised context 
of the security sector policy network was changing, but during a period o f broader 
political-economic transformation. For just three months after the Green Paper was 
released, the first Thatcher government assumed power and began implementing its 
far-reaching neoliberal project. The new emphasis upon market-centred as opposed to
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state-centred solutions to political-economic problems served to redistribute resources 
within security sector negotiations even more in favour of the pluralist practices of the 
private security industry, as the next chapter will illustrate.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that during the course of the 1970s, the security sector 
became increasingly characterised by a political contest between three different sets of 
state and society practices. Once again, the purpose of each of these sets o f practices 
was to bring about a particular ensemble of institutional arrangements within the 
security sector. Now, however, the exact nature of these different institutional 
arrangements completely revolved around contrasting ideas about the role of statutory 
regulation. Those private security institutions advancing the pluralist set o f practices, 
for instance, still wanted to create a pluralised system of security provision, in which 
both public and private security providers were able to successfully and legitimately 
function alongside one another within the security sector. But over the course o f the 
1970s, their primary strategy for accomplishing this was increasingly to lobby for 
statutory regulation, since they judged this to represent the most effective institutional 
mechanism through which to capture legitimacy from the state institutions. Those 
parliamentary institutions and actors promoting the reformist set o f practices wanted 
to establish a state-centred political system, in which the operations o f the private 
security industry were permitted to exist so long as they could be controlled through 
state auspices. And, significantly, their main strategy for achieving this control was 
the introduction of statutory regulation. In their joint support for statutory regulation, 
then, the reformists and pluralists formed a natural alliance, even though their ultimate 
political ends differed markedly. Finally, those central state institutions advancing the 
monopoly set of practices still wanted to defend and maintain a state-monopolised 
security system, in which only public security providers were able to legitimately 
function within the security sector. Their primary strategy for doing this was to 
prevent the transfer of any legitimacy from the state to the private security industry by 
opposing statutory regulation -  they were therefore the natural political opponents of 
the pluralists and reformists.
As this chapter has illustrated, with the entrance of the reformist practices o f the 
parliamentary actors into the negotiations, and the development o f their political
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alliance with the pluralist practices of the private security institutions, the balance of 
power started to swing away from the monopoly practices of the Home Office and 
police. This meant that the private security companies seemed to be moving ever 
closer towards their objective of formally capturing legitimacy from the state via a 
system of statutory regulation. Despite this shift in the balance o f power, however, 
for the time being these central state institutions nevertheless managed to retain the 
upper-hand in these increasingly fragmented negotiations by preventing any such 
transfer of legitimacy. Yet to the extent that the degree of conflict between these 
three sets of contrasting practices further intensified over the course o f the 1970s, it 
can be observed that the security sector came to be defined more and more by clear 
processes of contestation and change. As the state-in-society approach would suggest, 
the political domain which was supposedly at the impenetrable heart o f the modern 
state was therefore still strongly characterised by a complex and evolving political 
contest between divergent sets of state and society practices.
However, this chapter has also illustrated that despite these pronounced processes of 
contestation and change, the security sector during the 1970s was still characterised 
by prominent currents of continuity. For the structural influence o f the image of the 
state continued to run through the negotiations. So despite the increasingly contested 
reality of the security sector, a sizeable proportion British population still believed 
that this sector ought to be monopolised by the modern state -  that is, they still 
believed in the monopoly myth. And this, of course, meant that the image o f the state 
was in some way reflected in each set of practices, for this image could not be ignored 
without these public and private security providers encountering significant cultural 
resistance. As one would expect, the structural influence of the image o f the state was 
most directly reflected in the monopoly practices of the Home Office and police, who 
remained the direct bearers and perpetuators of the monopoly myth. The structural 
influence of the image of the state was quite obvious, too, in the reformist practices of 
the parliamentary actors and institutions, for they ultimately wanted to bring about a 
hierarchical, state-controlled security sector, even though they did pragmatically 
accept the existence of a state-regulated private security industry at the foot of this 
hierarchy. Finally, as before, the structural influence of the image of the state was 
evident in the pluralist practices of the private security industry, though in a less direct 
manner. For they were forced to continue with their ongoing efforts to somehow 
capture legitimacy from the state, which now primarily involved lobbying for a
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system of statutory regulation. Whatever the outcome of these negotiations, then, key 
elements of the image of the state would inevitably be reproduced. As the state-in- 
society approach would suggest, then, at the end of the 1970s the security sector was 
characterised not only by intense political contestation between different sets of state 
and society practices, but also by strong currents of continuity brought about by the 
structural influence of the image of the state.
It is important to emphasise once again, then, that it is this dialectical process of 
continuity and change, expressed here through the state-in-society concepts o f image 
and practice, which serves to elucidate the complex political processes relating to the 
re-legitimation private security in postwar Britain. For on one side, it was the ever- 
changing and fluid nature of state and society practices in the security sector during 
the 1970s which illustrates how the private security institutions managed to form an 
alliance with the parliamentary reformists in order to advance their pluralist practices 
against the monopoly agenda of the Home Office and police. On the other, it was the 
strong current of continuity created by the structural influence o f the image of the 
state which explains why these private security institutions used their increased 
bargaining power not to promote themselves as purebred market actors within the 
security sector but rather to capture greater degrees of legitimacy from the state 
through a system of statutory regulation. It is the dialectical interplay between these 
two processes, furthermore, which continues to explain the re-legitimation o f private 
security in postwar Britain. The next chapter will demonstrate how this dialectical 
process became even more complex during the 1980s and early 1990s as a 
transformation in the political-economic context of postwar Britain prompted the 
emergence of a fourth set of practices within the security sector negotiations -  termed 
here the ‘neoliberal’ set of practices. This development served to once again shift the 
balance of power within the negotiations, and in turn had extremely important 
consequences for the re-legitimation of private security within postwar Britain.
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BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
The Neoliberal Experiments (1979-1996)
6
6.1 Introduction
By the end of the 1970s, the negotiations over the legitimacy to provide security 
functions within the postwar security sector were characterised by three sets of 
practices divided into two factions: on one side were the monopoly practices o f the 
Home Office and police; on the other side was an incongruous but increasingly 
effective alliance between the pluralist practices o f the private security institutions and 
the reformist practices of the parliamentary actors. As we have seen, at the close of 
the 1970s the Home Office and police were just about controlling the terms o f the 
security sector negotiations. This chapter will demonstrate, however, that by 1996 a 
consensus had finally emerged in line with the preferences o f the pro-regulation 
reformist-pluralist alliance. But, significantly, this decisive transformation, which had 
far-reaching consequences for the re-legitimation of private security in postwar 
Britain, did not involve a straightforward shift in the balance of power between these 
two factions. This chapter will show that there were instead three complex catalysts 
for this change.
First, and perhaps most obvious, was the ever-growing influence of the alliance
4
between private security institutions and the parliamentary actors. However, the 
previously linear pro-regulation trajectory of this crucial alliance experienced some 
substantial ruptures during the 1980s which, rather paradoxically, served in the long 
run to make it even more powerful. For with the transformation in the political- 
economic context brought about by the emergence of neoliberalism, certain private 
security companies began to distance themselves from their long-term pluralist 
strategy of attempting to capture legitimacy from the state and instead experimented 
with the alternative strategy of operating as ordinary market actors. This in turn 
signified the emergence of a fourth set of practices, termed here the ‘neoliberal’ 
position. Interestingly, these neoliberal practices -  which, it should be noted, draw 
their name more from the libertarian than the authoritarian strand of the neoliberal
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political-economic project1 -  were based upon a disregard for the structural influence 
of the image of the state. In other words, they eschewed the majority of the British 
population’s state-centric expectations about how the security sector ought to be 
constituted and instead proceeded on the assumption that this sector functioned in 
accordance with ordinary market principles -  hence their efforts to operate as ordinary 
market actors. Freed now from the burden of capturing legitimacy from the state, 
then, the private security companies advocating this new neoliberal agenda rejected 
the notion of statutory regulation and accordingly advocated a system of market- 
friendly self-regulation. With regard to the crucial issue of regulation, these new 
neoliberal practices thus represented a striking contrast to the resolutely pro­
regulation pluralist set of practices. Significantly, this new strategy proved to be 
productive for a few years and in turn allowed many private security companies to 
rapidly expand their operations. Towards the end of the 1980s, however, these 
neoliberal practices encountered significant a degree of cultural resistance -  which 
was unsurprising given that they were eschewing the structural influence of the image 
of the state -  and their operations were accordingly undermined by a severe 
legitimacy crisis. This in turn served to bring the now strengthened industry back 
towards the pluralist set of practices and the corresponding alliance with .the 
parliamentary reformists. Moreover, during the 1990s this reunited reformist-pluralist 
alliance became the central catalyst in the development of the pro-regulation 
consensus. -
Second, the politicisation of law and order during the mid-1980s, especially in 
relation to the policing of the 1984-85 miners’ strikes, had an enormous impact on the 
previously solid monopoly alliance between the Home Office and police. For not 
only did it introduce tension into this relationship, but through some heavily 
contextualised political logic it also served to shift ÁCPO and the Police Federation 
away from their long-standing monopoly practices and towards the reformist position 
occupied by the parliamentary actors. This shift in practices, as one would expect, 
substantially strengthened the pro-regulation lobby. In addition, the politicisation of 
law and order served to dilute the image of the state which structured the security 
sector, in the process making it slightly easier for the private security institutions to
1 For an examination of the two contrasting strands of the neoliberal project, see: Andrew Gamble, The 
Free Economy and the Strong Stale: The Politics o f  Thatcherism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2"d edition, 
1994).
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reconcile their awkward status in the security sector with the British population’s 
prevailing normative expectations of how security ought to be provided.
Third, the depth and conviction of the Conservative Party’s neoliberal project 
during the 1980s had the effect of transforming the ‘world view’ o f the Home Office. 
For in a remarkable ideological turnaround, Home Office ministers and officials 
gradually moved away from their previously dominant monopoly practices and 
instead actively embraced the emergent neoliberal position. Curiously, this meant that 
the Home Office continued to oppose statutory regulation, but for a completely 
different rationale than was the case in the past -  regulation now represented an 
unwanted bureaucratic constraint upon the logic of the free market. So with the 
emergence of the pro-regulation consensus during the mid-1990s, it was not the 
monopoly practices but rather the new neoliberal practices of the Home Office which 
were defeated. As we will see, the abandonment of the monopoly practices by both 
the Home Office and police during the 1980s had important consequences for the re­
legitimation of private security.
In order to elucidate these complex themes, this chapter will be divided into five 
parts. Section 6.2 will examine the relationship between neoliberalism, the private 
security companies and the statutory regulation debate which, though replete with 
paradoxes and unintended consequences, resulted in the eventual strengthening o f the 
industry’s pro-regulation agenda and its reformist-pluralist alliance with the various 
parliamentary actors. Section 6.3 will then explore the politicisation of law and order 
during the 1980s and the corresponding conflicts between the Home Office and the 
police which resulted in the major police institutions re-aligning themselves with the 
pro-regulation alliance. Next, Section 6.4 will investigate the Home Office’s response 
to its increasingly isolated and untenable position in the regulation debate. It will 
focus in particular upon the period during late 1980s and early 1990s when the Home 
Office increasingly began to operate in line with a distinctly neoliberal set of 
practices. Section 6.5 will examine the Home Affairs Select Committee enquiry into 
the private security industry during 1994 and 1995. This high profile parliamentary 
forum, in a manner similar to the Committee on Privacy two decades previously, 
served to bring together in one political arena the many conflicting sets o f practices of 
the private security industry, the Home Office, the police, parliamentary actors and 
other interested parties. It is a measure of how far the security sector negotiations had 
transformed by this juncture that the pro-regulation recommendations put forward by
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the pluralists and reformists within this enquiry had such decisive repercussions for 
the regulation debate. For by the end of the Conservative Party’s period in 
government, the Home Office was eventually forced to relinquish its anti-regulation 
standpoint and the stage was set for the formal re-legitimation of the private security 
industry in postwar Britain through a system of statutory regulation. Finally, Section
6.6 will provide a few theoretically-informed conclusions about this fourth phase of 
the negotiations. It will, more specifically, illustrate how the dialectical processes of 
contestation and continuity which were revealed in the preceding empirical sections -  
and which were articulated using the state-in-society concepts of image and practices 
-  continue to explain the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
6.2 Neoliberalism and the Private Security Industry
This section will show that with the ascendance of neoliberal political-economic 
ideology and policy during the 1980s, the majority of the private security companies 
started to develop a new set of practices. They moved away from the pluralist set of 
practices which had defined their activities over the past three decades and began 
instead to lay the foundations for the neoliberal set of practices. These new practices 
were based upon the idea that private security companies could unproblematically 
function as ordinary market actors within the security sector without reference to the 
structural influence of the image of the state. As a consequence, they decided that 
they no longer needed to capture legitimacy from the state through a system of 
statutory regulation so as to conform with the majority of the British population’s 
normative expectations about how security ought to be delivered. This section will 
then demonstrate that for a limited period in the mid-1980s these new practices 
seemed to be benefiting the industry as the private security companies experienced 
significant organic economic growth. However, these companies soon encountered 
cultural resistance, as one might expect given that they were completely disregarding 
the structural influence of the image of the state. They accordingly entered into a 
legitimacy crisis and were in turn compelled to both return to their former pluralist 
practices of capturing legitimacy from the state and resurrect their corresponding pro­
regulation alliance with the parliamentary reformists. As we will see, however, on 
resuming these old linkages the private security companies were better resourced and
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more powerful than ever before and were thus more equipped to challenge the 
monopoly practices of the Home Office.
On 4th May 1979, the Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher entered into 
office, bringing with it a market-orientated -  or neoliberal -  approach to the political- 
economic problems of the day. But while the neoliberal agenda advanced by the 
Conservatives was eventually to impact substantially upon the security sector 
negotiations, the government’s initial policy stance towards the private security 
industry seemed to represent, on the surface at least, a direct continuation with the 
approach taken by the preceding Labour government. The Home Office, for instance, 
immediately started to institute through the BSIA an improved system of self­
regulation in line with the recommendations of the previous government’s 1979 
Green Paper.2 This process resulted in the establishment, on 28th May 1982, o f the 
National Inspectorate of Security Guard, Patrol and Transport Services, which was an 
industry-run institution designed to maintain standards among BSIA registered 
companies.3 This policy outcome thus seemed to indicate a clear continuation of the 
long-standing monopoly set of practices, for in steering the industry towards a system 
of self-regulation, the Home Office were in effect preventing the establishment o f any 
formal connections between the industry and the state which could serve to confer 
legitimacy upon the private security companies.
A number of private security companies certainly interpreted the Home Office’s 
manoeuvres in this way, seeing the encouragement of a self-regulatory regime as a 
further stage in the ongoing struggle over legitimacy. And these companies once 
again resigned themselves to the long-game, reluctantly conforming with these 
monopoly practices for the time being in the hope that at some point in the future they 
would eventually accrue enough power to pursue more successfully the case for 
statutory regulation and in turn impose their pluralist practices upon the postwar 
security sector. For instance, Jim Harrower, former Chief Executive at Group 4 and 
later Chairman of the BSIA, commented that during the 1980s “[w]e still had to push
2 HC 397-11 (1983-84) Second Report from the House o f  Commons Defence Committee: The Physical 
Security o f  Military Installations in the United Kingdom, (London: HMSO, 1984). p.246. This 
information is taken from oral evidence given by Mr Alistair Torrance, Inspector General o f the 
National Inspectorate of Security Guard, Patrol and Transport Services.
3 Alistair Torrance, ‘Annual Report by the Inspector General for the year ended 31 December 1983’, in 
HC 397-11 (1983-84) Second Report from the House o f Commons Defence Committee: The Physical 
Security o f  Military Installations in the United Kingdom, (London: HMSO, 1984), p.238.
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self-regulation and stand up and be counted. To get there [statutory regulation]”.4 
Thus from Group 4 ’s perspective, they would simply continue their negotiations with 
the Home Office over the key resource of legitimacy. This evidence suggests, then, 
that during the early 1980s the negotiations between the private security industry and 
the Home Office were structured along exactly the same lines as the preceding three 
decades.
This was not the case, however. For some of the other private security companies 
began to see the re-imposition of self-regulation not so much as a constraint upon 
their ongoing attempts to capture legitimacy from the state, but rather as a re­
packaged opportunity to circumvent the perennial problem of legitimacy. In order to 
properly understand the emergence of this alternative strategy, which resulted in the 
establishment of the neoliberal set of practices, we need to examine the specifics of 
the new neoliberal context in which these companies found themselves in slightly 
more detail. First, it is important to recognise that during the immediate postwar 
decades the British political landscape was broadly structured around a relatively 
coherent set of state-centric political and economic principles -  commonly known as 
the ‘postwar consensus’.5 Governments of the day accordingly tended to look for 
state-centred solutions to economic and welfare problems -  which partly explains the 
dominance of the state-centred monopoly practices of the Home Office and police 
dui'ing this era. This consensus started to fracture during the 1970s, however, as 
many media commentators and politicians began to criticise the British political 
system for being too ‘overloaded’ with state functions.6 According to these critics, 
Britain was becoming ungovernable. This political crisis in turn set the scene for the 
Conservatives to win the 1979 general election on the back of a neoliberal manifesto 
which proposed distinctly market-orientated solutions to these economic and welfare 
problems.7 The extent to which the postwar consensus has since given way to a new 
market-orientated neoliberal political landscape is hotly debated.8 Yet all tend to
4 Interview with Jim Harrower, conducted on 17lh July 2007.
5 For a historical analysis o f the development of this consensus, see: Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: 
British Politics and the Second World War (London, Pimlico, revised edition, 1994).
6 Anthony King, ‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’, Political Studies 23(2) (1975), pp. 
284-296.
7 Stuart Hall, ‘The Great Moving Right Show’, in The Politics o f  Thatcherism eds. Stuart Hall and 
Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp. 19-39; Colin Hay ‘Narrating Crisis: The 
Discursive Construction of the Winter of Discontent’, Sociology 30(2), pp.253-277.
8 Some emphasise the ‘abandonment of consensus’, see: Dennis Kavanagh, ‘Whatever Happened to 
Consensus Politics?’, Political Studies 33(1985), p.541. Others, however, highlight the need to
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agree that there was at least some kind of discernable market-orientated shift in 
political outlook across the British state-society sphere.
Faced with the increasingly market-orientated political-economic context of the 
early 1980s, then, certain private security companies decided that it might be possible 
to abandon their long-standing and often futile attempts to capture legitimacy from 
state institutions and instead experiment with the idea of operating as ordinary market 
actors within the security sector. Certain companies, in other words, experimented 
with the notion of disregarding the structural influence of the image of state by 
functioning outside of the British population’s prevailing normative expectations 
about how the security sector ought to be constituted. The immediate advantage of 
this alternative strategy was that it allowed these companies to disengage with their 
struggle for statutory regulation and instead actively welcome the Home Office’s 
policy of self-regulation, thereby aligning themselves for once with the most 
politically powerful institution in the security sector. Furthermore, if  these companies 
were going to operate as ordinary market actors then supporting self-regulation made 
perfect economic sense, for this mechanism served to minimise the number of 
bureaucratic constraints imposed upon the industry and accordingly maximised the 
ability of these companies to function in accordance with the logic of the unfettered 
market. Due no doubt to the way in which this neoliberal experiment seemed to 
streamline the industry’s position in British society and its relations with the Home 
Office, these neoliberal practices quickly increased in popularity during the early 
1980s until they soon became the dominant viewpoint within the BSIA. The 
prefacing comments penned by the BSIA Chairman, W. E. Randall, in the 1982 BSIA 
Annual Report are illuminating in this respect: “Our members are fully committed to 
the concept of self-regulation of the industry and the need to be accountable”.9 So for 
many private security companies, the neoliberal era represented an opportunity to 
distance themselves from the intractable problem of legitimacy and finally operate as 
ordinary market actors within the security sector.
These neoliberal practices were not, however, merely based upon naive wishful 
thinking, for the private security companies were at the same time being presented
disaggregate between the ideational and institutional dimensions of each individual policy area when 
assessing the extent of the neoliberal transformation, see: David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘The 
Implementation Gap: Explaining Policy Change and Continuity’, in Implementing Thatcherite Policies: 
Audit o f  an Era eds. David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (Buckingham: Open University, 1993), 
pp. 170-187.
9 BSIA, Reports and Accounts, 31s' December 1982 (BSIA Archives).
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with more possibilities for organic economic growth than ever before. These came 
from both state and non-state sources. On the state side, in an attempt to reduce the 
financial burden on the exchequer the Thatcher government became increasingly 
eager to contract out traditional state security functions to private security contractors. 
To take one important example, annual Ministry o f Defence expenditure on private 
security contracts increased ten-fold during the 1980s, from £461,000 in 1984-85 to 
£4,418,000 in 1989-90.10 These contracts did not cover what would later be termed 
‘inner core’ state security functions, since they generally involved only the routine 
guarding and patrolling of military sites and only nominal interaction with the public, 
but they nevertheless represented a significant economic breakthrough for the private 
security industry.11 12
On the non-state side, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn have commented upon two 
trends which had the effect of providing the private security industry with promising 
new opportunities for organic economic expansion during the 1980s. First, drawing 
upon Shearing and Stenning’s writings, they noted that the construction of shopping 
malls and other forms of ‘mass private property’ created some degree o f new demand 
for security services, and where this could not be satisfied by the police the private 
security industry was usually drafted in. Second, they observed that economic 
rationalisation and downsizing throughout the British economy meant that many jobs 
which had performed ‘secondary’ social control functions -  such as bus conductors, 
ticket inspectors and roundsmen -  were being phased out, in-the process creating a 
vacuum which was frequently being filled by ‘primary’ social control providers such 
as private security guards.13 So against the backdrop of these highly favourable 
trends, the neoliberal practices of the private security companies gathered momentum 
and the struggle for legitimacy within the security sector accordingly became far less 
urgent.
10 HC 171 (1989-90) Sixth Report from the House o f Commons Defence Committee: The Physical 
Security o f Military Installations in the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1990), p.ix.
11 HC 397-11 (1983-84) Second Report from the House o f Commons Defence Committee: The Physical 
Security o f Military Installations in the United Kingdom, (London: HMSO, 1984); HC 171 (1989-90) 
Sixth Report from the House o f Commons Defence Committee: The Physical Security o f  Military 
Installations in the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1990).
12 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, ‘Urban Change and Policing: Mass Private Property Re- 
Considered’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 1 (1999), p.238. They also noted, 
however, that this trend was much less prominent in Britain when compared with North America.
13 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, ‘The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current Trends in 
Policing Systems’, British Journal o f Criminology 42(1) (2002), pp.139-142.
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One important consequence of this experiment for the shape of the security sector 
negotiations was that it largely dissolved the reformist-pluralist alliance with the 
parliamentary actors. For while this alliance was extremely valuable to the private 
security companies in their efforts to capture legitimacy from the state institutions, 
within the context of the neoliberal experiment this lobby suddenly became an 
obstacle. This fracture was vividly demonstrated in 1984, when Bruce George 
conducted an enquiry into the Ministry of Defence private security contracts through 
the auspices of the House o f Commons Defence Committee. During this enquiry he 
interviewed Mr. A. Torrance, Inspector General of the BSIA’s newly established 
National Inspectorate, about the highly variable enforcement of standards within the 
self-regulated industry. This resulted in a revealing exchange in which Torrance 
questioned: “How can we legally enforce these standards on other [i.e. non-BSIA] 
companies either a) to apply for membership, or b) achieve our standards?” George 
replied: “You go down to the Home Office and say, ‘We support Bruce George’s bill 
to license the security industry’”. Torrance then responded: “...we are an 
organisation which is fairly recent and I think as we go along our professionalism will 
increase and the standards of the industry, that segment for which we are responsible, 
will also increase”.14 This clearly demonstrates the extent to which the BSIA Jiad 
now changed its position within the regulation debate, for while during the previous 
decade George’s private members’ bills represented key lobbying mechanisms 
through which the industry could potentially capture legitimacy from the state 
institutions, they were now merely viewed as inconvenient attempts to bring about 
unwanted bureaucratic controls. This is a clear example of the BSIA thinking like an 
ordinary market actor and shifting its agenda from the pluralist to the neoliberal set o f 
practices.
This said, there was certainly not a blanket conversion to these neoliberal practices 
among BSIA members. Group 4 and a number of other companies, for instance, 
continued to persevere with their pluralist practices and their corresponding struggle 
for legitimacy over the course of the 1980s. For example, Group 4 were highly 
supportive of George’s next (and again unsuccessful) Private Security Bill, which he 
introduced in June 1988, thereby keeping a small-scale version of the reformist-
14 HC 171 (1989-90) Sixth Report from the House o f  Commons Defence Committee: The Physical 
Security o f  Military Installations in the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1990), p.254.
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pluralist alliance alive.15 Some private security companies clearly continued to 
believe, in other words, that despite the transformation of the political landscape in 
Britain, the only way to operate effectively within the security sector was still to 
capture a degree of legitimacy from the core state institutions so as to function in 
accordance with the majority of the British population’s normative expectations about 
how the security ought to legitimately be provided. But as the 1980s progressed, 
these companies increasingly found themselves in the minority. For example, David 
Dickinson, former Managing Director of Group 4 and current BSIA Chief Executive, 
recently explained the situation in the following terms: “The Group 4 position had 
always been statutory regulation, but we didn’t make a lot of public pronouncements 
about it because we were good loyal BSIA members, and the BSIA position was 
‘we’re doing perfectly well thank you’”.16 The neoliberal experiment was soon to be 
undermined in terrible circumstances, however.
On 22 September 1989, a bomb planted by the Irish Republican Army was 
detonated at the Royal Marine barracks in Deal, instantly killing ten marines and 
seriously wounding another twenty-three (one of whom later died from his injuries). 
During the political fallout of this attack, it very quickly emerged that in January 1988 
the responsibility for guarding the barracks had been transferred from the Marines -to a 
relatively large private security company called Reliance Security Systems. This 
immediately initiated a highly public debate in both parliament and the press about 
the inadequacies of private security companies in performing their state-contracted 
guarding functions. The press were first to elaborate upon the connection between the 
bombing and the failure of private security companies. The next day The Independent 
vividly reported, for instance, that:
As the bodies of the dead -- aged in their twenties and mid-thirties -  were
dragged from the rubble, the privatisation of security was strongly criticized.
The job of patrolling the perimeter was taken from full-time Marines last year
and given to Reliance Security Systems, a private security company.17
A few days later the same paper then quoted the following from an' interview 
conducted with a former Marine at the barracks: “Some [private security] guards 
refused to patrol the graveyard because they believed it was haunted. One was
15 HC Deb (1987-88),vol. 135, col. 220’; Interview with Jim Harrower, conducted on 17th July 2007.
16 Interview with David Dickinson, conducted on 25lh October 2007.
17 The Independent, ‘Base Where Bomb Kills 10 was ‘Soft Target’ for IRA’, 23rd September 1989.
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1 Rfrightened of the dark”. From the media’s perspective, then, it was clear that any 
status or credibility gained by the industry over the past decade was to be quickly 
disregarded as they instead returned to their traditional standpoint o f mocking the 
industry. This situation brings to mind the comments of the public representative 
working in the industry during the late 1960s who said that because of the industry’s 
precarious status in British society a decade of good work can be completely 
undermined in one instance.
Furthermore, Members of Parliament were equally disparaging. In mid-October 
1989, Martin O’Neill MP (Labour), who was at the time Shadow Secretary for 
Defence, seemed to reflect the mood of many MPs with the following comments on 
the Deal bombing:
The presence of some private security firms at gates and on perimeter duty gives 
a clear sign to terrorists that part of the security is the responsibility of people 
who do not have access to arms, and who have only a minimum of training and 
often only the slimmest of commitments to the job ...I hope that we can ensure 
that no more of these cheapjack firms will be hired”.18 9
And the number of parliamentary questions concerning the government’s plans to 
regulate the industry in order to raise standards increased sharply, with no less than 
thirteen written answers being required of the government on this matter over the 
ensuing parliamentary session.20 This cultural resistance to the unregulated private 
security industry, in the form of both unforgiving official criticism and dismissive 
mocking by the media, had the significant effect of completely undermining the 
industry’s neoliberal practices. For it became increasingly clear that private security 
companies did not in fact have sufficient acceptance among a significant proportion of 
the British population to operate effectively within the security sector without the 
conferral of state legitimacy. So while the neoliberal context undoubtedly served to
18 The Independent, ‘Deal Barracks Bombing: Deal Private Security Team ‘Undermanned” , 28 
September 1989.
19 HC Deb (1988-89), vol. 158, cols. 173-174.
20 HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 163, written answers, col. 391; HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 164, written answers, 
col. 384; HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 165, written answers, cols. 869-870; HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 168, 
written answers, col.72; HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 168, written answers, col.86; HC Deb (1989-90), 
written answers, vol.168, col. 103; HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 169, written answers, col.756; HC Deb 
(1989-90), vol.170, written answers, col.372; HC Deb (1989-90), vol.171, written answers, col.99; HC 
Deb (1989-90), vol.173, written answers, col. 172; HC Deb (1989-90), vol.176, written answers, 
col.l 19 (10/07/90); HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 177, written answers, col.261; HC Deb (1989-90), vol. 177, 
written answers, col.471.
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cloud the legitimacy issue in the short-term, the Deal bombing revealed the long-term 
reality: in the eyes of the majority of the British population market-based security was 
no substitute for state security. The process by which many private security 
companies attempted to disregard the structural constraints of the image of the state 
was thus doomed to failure. This re-emphasises one o f the key propositions o f the 
state-in-society approach: while state and society practices are ever-changing and 
fluid and can deviate from the image of the state, they cannot deviate too far since this 
runs counter to the fundamental normative expectations about what the state ought to 
do. Any attempts to completely contravene the structural limitations of the image of 
the state will thus be undermined when they inevitably encounter cultural resistance.
Due no doubt to their long-standing familiarity with this legitimacy dilemma, many 
private security companies quickly returned to their former pluralist agenda of 
attempting to capture legitimacy from the state through a system of statutory 
regulation. For instance, a former executive of a large private security company 
recently described this policy shift among the high-ranking industry representatives as 
follows: “ ...when the Royal Marines Barracks at Deal was bombed...we took the 
opportunity to say ‘ok then we must have a move towards statutory regulation, is that 
agreed, yes it’s agreed’”. Similarly, David Cowden, who at the time was working 
for Securicor, summarised the exact same decision-making process in the following 
terms:
/
We’ve got to be coming from a fundamentally more sound background in
working with the general public. The Deal bombing actually sharpened up one
or two and switched their minds. John Wheeler [Chairman o f the BSIA’s
National Inspectorate and Conservative MP] overnight almost changed his 
22view.
Indeed, on the 6th November 1989 and 17th January 1990 John Wheeler introduced 
into Parliament his unsuccessful Security Industry Bills to bring about statutory 
regulation of the private security industry.21 3 To be sure, these Bills did not follow 
precisely the same regulation formula mapped out by Bruce George in his numerous 
private members’ bills, for they put forward the notion of giving the BSIA’s National
21 Interview with a former executive of a large private security company who wished to remain 
anonymous.
22 Interview with David Cowden, conducted on 19lh November 2007.
23 HC Deb (1988-89), vol.159, col.702; HC Deb (1989-90), vol.164, col.304.
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Inspectorate statutory backing,24 25thereby essentially advancing what George calls 
“statutory self-regulation”. This divergence over institutional arrangements aside, 
however, these bills did signify the reconnection of the pluralist practices o f the 
private security companies with their parliamentary allies.
Yet while on the surface it appears that the security sector negotiations had simply 
come full circle over the 1980s, with the industry and parliament again unified in a 
pro-regulation reformist-pluralist alliance against the Home Office and police’s 
dominant anti-regulation monopoly practices, there were now four crucial differences. 
First, after a decade of benefiting from government contracts, the growth o f mass 
private property and a shift towards ‘primary’ social control provision, the private 
security industry had grown significantly. For instance, the marketing consultancy 
Jordon and Sons estimated that the industry’s annual turnover increased from £476.4 
million in 1983 to £1,225.6 million in 1990.26 And this growth meant that the private 
security companies now had considerably more resources to draw upon in their 
attempts to influence the course of the security sector negotiations. Second, the failed 
neoliberal experiment served to strengthen the industry’s political bargaining position 
in another way. For the process of contracting out security services during the 1980s 
meant that the state was now dependent upon a few large private security companies 
to deliver a number of supposedly public goods. And once a departmental function 
such as this has been devolved to the private sector it is often very difficult for that 
department to find the necessary resources to reintegrate tha t function back into its 
portfolio. This intensified relationship of power dependence between the industry and 
the state, which in turn meant that the preferences of these companies could no longer 
be dismissed so easily by the core state institutions. Third, while the image of the 
state still served to structure institutional activities within the security sector, it had 
undoubtedly been diluted to some extent by the shift away from the state-centred 
postwar consensus and the emergence of neoliberal project. This in turn meant that 
the ideational constraints upon the industry were slightly less severe than was the case 
in previous years -  though they were still strong enough to compel the industry to 
continue with its strategy of capturing legitimacy from the state. Finally, by the late
24 HC Bill (1988-89) [214]; HC Bill (1989-90) [55],
25 Interview with Bruce George, conducted on 30,h October 2007.
26 Jordon and Sons, Britain's Security Industry (London, 1989); Jordon and Sons, Britain’s Security 
Industry (London, 1993) -  quoted in: Jones and Newburn ‘How Big is the Private Security Sector?, 
p.226. As Jones and Newburn note once again, however, it is difficult to assess the reliability o f these 
statistics. Nevertheless, even if taken as approximate, these statistics illustrate an unambiguous trend.
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1980s the police were no longer supporters of the anti-regulation monopoly practices 
and had joined with the reformist side of the pro-regulation reformist-pluralist alliance 
-  this major policy turnaround will be examined in the next section. Each of these 
four differences, then, served to augment the power of the pluralist practices o f the 
private security industry and in turn increased the possibility of the industry capturing 
legitimacy from the state over the subsequent few years.
6.3 The Police and the Politicisation of Law and Order
This section will demonstrate how during the 1980s the long-standing monopoly
alliance between the Home Office and police began to fracture as issues o f law and
order became increasingly politicised, especially in relation to the 1984-1985 miners’
strike. This episode of state fragmentation had two significant consequences. First, it
served to dilute the image of the state, which had already be partially undermined by
the ascendance of neoliberal political-economic ideology, in the process enabling the
private security industry to pursue more effectively its pluralist practices. Second, it
prompted the major police institutions to shift their political operations from a
monopoly to a reformist set of practices. This in turn substantially compromised the
ongoing viability of the monopoly set of practices within the postwar security sector,
thereby strengthening the bargaining power of the counterposed reformist-pluralist
partnership. And these two consequences, of course, increased the possibilities o f the
*
industry capturing legitimacy from the state through a system of statutory regulation.
Despite the eventual fracturing of the institutional relations between the Home 
Office and police, at the beginning of the 1980s their long-standing alliance was in 
fact never stronger. This was due to a particularly close relationship between the 
Conservatives and the police. In the foreword to the 1979 Conservative Manifesto, 
for instance, Margaret Thatcher wrote that her Party’s strategy for the future was 
founded “ ...above all on the liberty of the people under the law”.21 This classic 
liberal formulation captured the Party’s conviction at the time that while most services 
can and should be provided through the market with a minimum of state interference, 
they believed that the one indisputable state function was the maintenance of law and 27
27 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Foreword to the Conservative Manifesto 1979’ in British General Election 
Manifestos 1959-1987 ed. F. W. S. Craig (Dartmouth, Parliamentary Research Services, 3ld edition, 
1990), p.267 [italics added].
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order. As such, the Manifesto went on to assert that “Britain needs strong, efficient 
police forces with high morale. Improved pay will help Chief Constables to recruit up 
to necessary establishment levels”.28 This was a strong statement of support for the 
police. Furthermore, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the Conservatives 
delivered on this pledge over subsequent years. Between 1979 and 1988, for 
example, more than 12,000 additional police officers were recruited, police powers 
were increased through the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the Home 
Office provided support for more weaponry and training in public order policing.29 30
This government sponsorship, then, meant that the already close relationship between 
the police and the Home Office was even more concretised during the early 1980s. 
So despite the contradictory policy of contracting out what came to be known as 
‘outer core’ security functions at this time (as mentioned in the previous section), the 
Conservative’s focus upon law and order did enable the Home Office and police to 
continue to maintain their monopoly set of practices.
By the mid-1980s, however, the alliance between the Conservatives and the police 
began to disintegrate. The primary cause of this fracturing was the politicisation of 
law and order and the concomitant de-legitimation o f the police. In historical terms, 
the police’s popularity in British society had arguably peaked during the 1950s .and 
1960s when, as previous chapters have shown, the institution was ‘lionized’ by a 
significant proportion of the general public and was endowed with a sizeable amount 
of legitimacy within the security sector. This status was, furthermore, a critical factor 
in allowing the Home Office and police to advance such a literal interpretation of the 
image of the state in their monopoly practices, for it gave an important degree of 
concreteness to this agenda, thereby making it more viable. From the late 1960s 
onwards, however, the actions of the police were increasingly brought into question as 
police officers clashed with demonstrators and rioters in a number of public order
disputes and were, at the same time, bedevilled with a series of high profile corruption
»
"3 A
scandals.
This de-legitimation trend arguably reached its low point, however, during the 
handling of the 1984-1985 miners’ strikes. In response to these strikes, the police,
28 Conservative Party, ‘Conservative Manifesto 1979’ in British General Election Manifestos 1959- 
1987 ed. F. W. S. Craig (Dartmouth, Parliamentary Research Services, 3rd edition, 1990), p.275.
29 Philip Rawlings, ‘Creeping Privatisation? The Police, the Conservative Government and Policing in 
the late 1980s’, in Beyond Law and Order: Criminal Justice Policy and Politics into the 1990s eds. 
Robert Reiner and Malcolm Cross (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p.42.
30 Reiner, The Politics o f  the Police, pp.59-62.
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strongly backed by the Conservative Party, controversially deployed considerable 
physical force against many thousands of British miners in an effort to maintain 
public order. The confrontations are described in detail by Clive Emsley:
They [the pickets] found themselves confronted by policemen drawn from a 
dozen or so difference forces, but uniformly kitted out in riot overalls with 
helmets and visors, shields and long batons. Police tactics were also new. 
Lines o f men carrying long shields took the brunt of any missiles hurled at the 
police; the lines then parted to release either squads of men carrying small, 
round shields and batons, or mounted police -  the former, according to the new 
[ACPO Public Order Policing] Manual, were to ‘disperse and/or incapacitate’ 
demonstrators, the latter ‘to create fear’.31 32
This was a long way from the friendly policy of policing by consent which 
characterised public security provision during the 1950s. Far from resonating with 
the public’s desire for a stable social order, these police actions were widely seen to 
be both excessive and militaristic and also invoked the deeply ingrained British fears 
about the emergence of a nationalised police force and an authoritarian British state. 
These criticisms in turn brought into question the legitimacy of the police within the 
security sector. The scale of this legitimacy crisis was captured neatly by Robert 
Reiner when he commented that: “Altogether the trauma of the miners’ strike' for 
policing has been rightly compared to the impact of Vietnam on the US military”. 
This significant moment in British policing history had two important consequences 
for the security sector negotiations.
First, it served to refashion to some extent the image of the state. In order to 
understand how this happened it is necessary to re-emphasise once again that the 
image has never been detached from reality. The relationship between the image of 
the state on one side and state and society practices on the other is a dialectical one. 
So when a certain set of practices deviate radically from the image of the state, then 
the image itself is transformed to some extent as expectations about what the state 
ought to do change. It is contended here that this is precisely what happened during 
the miners’ strikes. By policing so far outside of the majority of the British public’s 
normative expectations about how security ought to be provided, the actions of the 
public police during the 1980s served to decrease the degree of state legitimacy within
31 Clive Emsley, The English Police, p. 184.
32 Clive Emsley, The English Police, pp. 184-185.
33 Reiner, The Politics o f  the Police, p.68.
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the security sector. And this had notable consequences for the pluralist practices of 
the private security companies because as public faith in the public police decreased, 
so the cultural context of the security sector -  or the image of the state -  became less 
hostile to private security provision. To be sure, this certainly does not mean that 
there was an automatic shift of legitimacy from the public police to the private 
security companies, for legitimacy is not a zero-sum resource. It is an intangible 
quality which has to be toiled for over time. But it did nevertheless create a more 
favourable cultural context in which the private security companies could enhance 
their legitimacy.
This contextual transformation should not be overstated, however. For while the 
police certainly lost some of their legitimacy during the mid-1980s, they still retained 
a sizeable degree of cultural capital. Indeed, Krista Jansson shows that although 
public support for the police fell during this period, according to the British Crime 
Survey the proportion of people who considered the police to be doing a ‘fairly good’ 
or ‘good’ job stayed above the 80 percent mark between 1982 and 1988.34 35 And, 
furthermore, Reiner, remarked at the beginning of the 1990s that: “Such studies as the 
recent British social attitudes survey show that the police institution and leadership 
remains the most trusted pillar of the state”. So although the image o f the state 
within the security sector had been diluted in a manner favourable to the private 
security companies, it is important to repeat that it had not transformed to the extent 
that the industry no longer had to concern itself with questions o f legitimacy, as the 
Deal bombing so effectively demonstrated.
Second, the politicisation of law and order served to indirectly lay the foundations 
for the severance of the long-standing monopoly alliance between the Home Office 
and police in their negotiations with the private security industry. For during the 
aftermath of the miners’ strike both the Police Federation and ACPO consciously 
sought to distance themselves from their highly politicised relationship with the 
Conservatives in an effort to steer the police force back towards the safe ground of 
non-political ‘constabulary independence’.36 And this distancing gave these police 
institutions space in which to reassess their policy stance regarding the industry. 
Crucially, it was within the context of this new-found political space that ACPO
34 Krista Jansson, British Crime Survey -  Measuring Crime for 25 Years (London: Home Office, 2007),
p.21.
35 Reiner, ‘Chief Constables in England and Wales’, pp.62-63.
36 Reiner, The Politics o f  the Police, p.73.
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produced a pro-regulation report in March 1988 entitled A Review o f  the Private 
Security Industry. In order to generate data for this report, a questionnaire 
investigating criminality within the private security industry was sent to all police 
forces within Britain. The report not only uncovered a substantial amount of 
criminality within the industry, but in addition “all but two [of the 49 territorial police 
forces] expressed the view that either statutory licensing, or legislation to establish 
compulsory ‘self regulation, was essential to progress”.37 38 Against the backdrop of 
this overwhelmingly pro-regulation response, the report accordingly mapped out an 
official ACPO policy position in favour of statutory regulation. ACPO was now, in 
other words, a firm advocate of the reformist set of practices -  that is, it wanted to 
control and reform the industry. It must also be acknowledged, however, that this 
new reformist position was not only adopted at the Chief Constable level, for three 
months later the Police Federation were openly listed by Bruce George as supporters 
of his pro-regulation 1988 Private Security Bill. The police rupture with the Home 
Office over the issue of statutory regulation was therefore significant, for both o f the 
major police institutions had now eschewed their long-standing monopoly agenda in 
favour of the reformist set o f practices.
By the middle of 1988, then, the politicisation of law and order in Britain, combined 
with the ascendance of neoliberalism, had impacted greatly upon the security sector 
negotiations. For not only had the image of the state been diluted to some extent by 
neoliberal project and the authoritarian government-police response to the 1984-1985 
miners’ strikes, but the major police institutions had abandoned their anti-regulation 
monopoly alliance with the Home Office and had openly sided with the pro-regulation 
reformist lobby. Furthermore, when these events are considered alongside the Deal 
bombing in 1989 and the concomitant shift within the industry back towards the 
reformist-pluralist alliance, the pro-regulation lobby was by the end of the decade 
substantial, including the police institutions, a growing number of parliamentary 
actors and the majority of the private security industry. It must once again be noted, 
though, that the more specific preferences which were expressed within this lobby 
were by no means harmonious. For while the police and the parliamentary actors 
wanted to use regulation to control the industry’s operations, the private security
37 Association of Chief Police Officers, A Review o f the Private Security Industry (North Wales Police, 
1988), p.4.
38 HC Deb (1987-88), vol.135, col. 220.
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companies were seeking to employ regulation to capture much needed legitimacy 
from the state institutions. Yet these divergent preferences came together in a rather 
incongruous but nevertheless mutually beneficial manner. This was because they had 
a common enemy: the monopoly and now neoliberal practices which, from very 
different vantage points, propounded a strong anti-regulation agenda. Significantly, it 
was under the weight of this growing pro-regulation reformist-pluralist lobby that the 
Home Office’s anti-regulation standpoint started to capitulate. As the next section 
will demonstrate, however, this Home Office capitulation was not from the monopoly 
position, but rather the neoliberal one.
6.4 The Transformation of the Home Office World View
This section will show how during the late 1980s and early 1990s the Home Office 
continued to defend its anti-regulation policy stance against the increasingly powerful 
pro-regulation lobby, which now comprised the reformist practices of both the police 
and parliamentary actors, together with the pluralist practices o f the private security 
institutions. It will demonstrate, however, that this defence was no longer asserted 
from a monopoly perspective but rather a neoliberal one. This significant 
transformation in the Home Office world view had considerable ramifications for the 
way in which the different sets of practices played out within regulation debate. For it 
increasingly gave the upper hand to the pro-regulation reformist-pluralist alliance and 
in turn brought the industry one step close to formally capturing legitimacy from the 
state through a system of statutory regulation.
For most of the 1980s, the Home Office steered clear of direct interventions in the 
security sector negotiations. This was perfectly understandable given that, on the 
surface at least, the various political processes within the sector seemed to be 
structured in line with the Home Office’s long-standing monopoly practices. For 
instance, its alliance with the police institutions was stable, the industry was actively 
pursuing self-regulation, and the reformist parliamentary actors, whose influence was 
largely dependent upon the now defunct reformist-pluralist alliance, were accordingly 
relegated to a peripheral existence. To be sure, this version of the policy network was 
certainly not as tightly locked into the Home Office’s monopoly agenda as it was 
during the 1960s -  the emergence of the parliamentary-industry reformist-pluralist 
alliance during the 1970s had certainly ensured that -  but so long as this set of
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political relationships did not stray too far from the 1979 settlement, then the Home 
Office had little motivation to interfere. As we have seen, however, by the end of the 
1980s nothing had remained constant. Not only had the majority o f the private 
security industry, via a pronounced neoliberal detour, realigned itself with the pro­
regulation parliamentary lobby, in the process reinstating the reformist-pluralist 
alliance, but ACPO and the Police Federation had now very publicly joined the 
reformist side of this powerful partnership. And, moreover, this formidable pro­
regulation lobby was, towards the end o f the 1980s, beginning to apply considerable 
pressure upon the Home Office to rethink its anti-regulation policy stance. These 
transformations in the constitution of the policy network in turn forced the Home 
Office to formally readdress the regulation issue.
Upon doing this, however, it soon transpired that the Home Office, too, had changed 
significantly over the preceding decade, for the world view o f many Home Office 
officials and ministers had, perhaps rather inevitably, been significantly influenced by 
a decade of Conservative neoliberalism. Many Home Office officials and ministers 
were no longer characterised by the ‘platonic guardianship’ of the 1950s and 1960s, in 
which they took very seriously the responsibility of very directly reproducing the 
image of the state through their monopoly practices -  that is, they were no longer .the 
direct bearers and perpetuators of the monopoly myth. Instead, they were now 
advocates of the neoliberal set of practices. Similar to the neoliberal practices of the 
private security companies, the neoliberal practices of the Home Office were 
predicated upon a disregard for the structural influence of the image o f the state 
within the security sector. The security sector was instead viewed like any other, 
unproblematically populated by a mixture of public and private providers. 
Furthermore, against the backdrop of widespread neoliberal reforms, the Home Office 
decreed that this ordinary sector, like any other, can and should be streamlined by 
increasing the influence of free-market principles upon these public and private 
providers. As a consequence, the Home Office continued to advance a strict anti­
regulation policy stance, not on the basis of preventing the transfer o f legitimacy to 
the industry (for this was now considered to be irrelevant), but because this would 
minimise the bureaucratic constraints on the security sector and accordingly maximise 
the influence of the free market. As we will see, again in a manner similar to the 
neoliberal practices of the industry, the neoliberal practices o f the Home Office 
proved to be untenable and lasted only a few years.
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In order to impose their neoliberal practices on the regulation debate, then, the 
Home Office set up a Working Party in 1989 -  the department’s first focused analysis 
of the industry since the 1979 Green Paper. Once again, the investigations undertaken 
by the Working Party did not represent a balanced and open-minded assessment of the 
cases for and against statutory regulation. From the outset, for instance, its objective 
was limited to a consideration of the “ ...ways in which self-regulation might be 
improved”,39 and nothing more. The possibility o f implementing statutory regulation 
was simply not on the agenda. The resulting Working Party report, entitled The 
Private Security Industry Background Paper, thus quickly reached the inevitable 
conclusion that any problems within the industry should be resolved by instituting a 
new ‘Manned Services Inspectorate’ to replace the existing National Inspectorate, 
which would in turn supposedly bring about a more sophisticated and inclusive 
system of industry self-regulation.40 While on first appearances this recommendation 
actually seems to reproduce the analysis of 1979 Green Paper -  that is, self-regulation 
minimises official connections between the industry and the state and accordingly 
limits the transfer of legitimacy to the industry -  a closer examination in fact reveals 
that the report marked the emergence of a brand new rationale for justifying this old 
conclusion. It signified the start of a formal shift from the monopoly to the neoliberal 
set of practices.
The .core argument of the report is captured in the following assertion: “The 
government starts from a position of favouring deregulation in as many spheres of 
economic activity as possible in the interests of maximising competition and 
consumer choice”.41 This offers a completely different explanation for supporting 
self-regulation. For rather than drawing upon monopolistic, state-centric notions of 
legitimacy in the security sector, it is instead founded upon the distinctly neoliberal 
notion that, wherever possible, the state should not interfere with the private sector 
and firms should accordingly operate in line with the logic of the unfettered market. 
The most important consequence of this new rationale was that the private security 
industry was no longer viewed by the Home Office as an enemy of the state and the 
public good. For without the image of the state to highlight the irregularity of the 
industry, it was viewed as an ordinary private sector actor functioning in accordance
39 HC Deb (1988-89), voi.149, col. 597.
40 Home Office, The Private Security Industry Background Paper (Unpublished, 1991), p.9.
41 Home Office, The Private Security Industry Background Paper, p.8.
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with conventional market principles. This position was most clearly illustrated by the 
Home Office’s interpretation of the crime statistics advanced in the 1988 ACPO 
report (to which it was in large part responding):
Assuming the manned guarding sector of the security industry employs 100,000 
personnel, the rate of offending revealed by the most recent ACPO review (336 
per 100,000) compares with a rate of offending of 8,234 per 100,000 o f the 
general male population aged 17-50. On this basis, the level o f offending by 
private security personnel would not justify the introduction o f an inevitably 
expensive and bureaucratic licensing system.42
In comparing the industry’s personnel to the general male population, the Home 
Office was implying that there was nothing ‘special’ about the activities o f the private 
security guards. They were just ordinary people doing ordinary jobs. This could be 
considered a very problematic framework of comparison because it ignored the fact 
that private security guards do occupy an unusually powerful position within British 
society. Indeed, in recognition of this many pluralist and reformist commentators 
subsequently observed that the correct framework of comparison should be the 
corresponding level of offending among police officers, for these are the only other 
individuals engaged in full-time, pro-active security occupations. But this criticism 
was lost on the new neoliberal ‘world view’ of the Home Office.
This. emerging neoliberal policy position was further formalised in December 1993 
when the Home Office undertook a review of the functions of the police in order to 
ascertain whether state resources could be deployed more efficiently within the 
security sector. The result was the precedent setting 1995 report entitled Review o f  
Police Core and Ancillary Tasks. This report separated security functions into three 
categories: ‘inner core’, ‘outer core’ and ‘ancillary’.43 While ‘inner core’ concerned 
those functions which should be provided exclusively by the police, and ‘ancillary’ 
related to those menial activities which required no state intervention whatsoever, 
most interestingly, the middle category of ‘outer core’ made reference to a number of 
hybrid public-private security functions. These were defined as “ ...services [which] 
should be managed by the police service, but the method of delivery can be flexible, 
involving officers, specials, civilians or contracting o u t44 And the list of functions
42 Home Office, The Private Security Industry Background Paper, p.8.
43 Home Office, Review o f Police Core and Ancillaiy Tasks (London: HMSO, 1995).
44 Home Office, Review o f Police Core and Ancillary Tasks, p. 11 [italics added].
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judged to be suitable for contracting out to private security companies included the 
policing of public events, court security, prisoner and immigration escorts and the 
protection of abnormal loads.45 To be sure, this definition does introduce the notion 
of police management, but no mention is made of formal statutory regulation. In 
effect, then, police management simply seemed to entail choosing which services to 
contract out, nothing more. This document therefore represented the culmination of 
the Home Office’s neoliberal conversion. For this department was now arguing that, 
in an effort relieve the financial burden on the Exchequer, certain security functions, 
which were in the past viewed as the exclusive preserve of the state, were now to be 
actively contracted out to the private security companies. As an informal practice, 
this process had of course been underway for over a decade, beginning when the 
private security companies started to receive contracts from the Ministry of Defence 
and other central government departments in the early 1980s. But, crucially, it was 
now concretised in a formal policy document, which meant that the Home Office’s 
neoliberal practices were in turn pushed into the centre of the security sector 
negotiations.
Like the neoliberal practices of the private security companies, however, the 
neoliberal practices of the Home Office did not fare well. Indeed, taken together both 
of these neoliberal experiments appear to demonstrate that any attempt to eschew the 
structural influence of the image of the state -  that is, any attempt to disregard the 
majority of the British population’s state-centric normative expectations about how 
security ought to be legitimately provided -  was to prove unsustainable. The clearest 
manifestation of this cultural resistance in this instance was the way in which the pro­
regulation reformist-pluralist alliance -  which now included the private security 
industry, the major police institutions and the parliamentary actors -  continued to 
lobby against the Home Office’s neoliberal practices during the early to mid 1990s. 
When Michael Stern MP (Conservative) introduced his Private Security (Licensing) 
Bill in May 1994, for instance, he was able to remark that “ ...regulation, licensing 
and inspection for private security firms...appears to have the support of not only 
large sections of the police...but the full support of the British security industry”.46 
The Home Office could not continue to advance these anti-regulation neoliberal 
practices against such unified opposition. As a consequence, the pressure for change
45 Home Office, Review o f Police Core and Ancillary Tasks, pp. 15-21.
46 HC Deb (1993-94) vol.243, col. 159.
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within the security sector negotiations began to reach the critical moment in which 
something had to give -  the anti-regulation position was simply untenable. And, as 
the next section will illustrate, this moment eventually arrived in the summer of 1994, 
when the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee responded to this pressure by 
announcing its intention to conduct an enquiry into the regulation o f the private 
security industry.
6.5 The Home Affairs Committee and the Pro-Regulation Consensus
This section will show that the Home Affairs Committee’s 1994-95 enquiry into the 
regulation of the private security industry can be viewed as the one o f the key 
moments in the re-legitimation of the private security industry in postwar Britain. 
Like the Committee on Privacy enquiry twenty years previous, it became a forum in 
which all core members of the security sector negotiations -  the private security 
industry institutions, Home Office, major police institutions and parliamentary actors 
-  were able to simultaneously advance their contrasting sets o f practices. Unlike the 
Committee on Privacy, however, the political resources, rules of the game and broader 
political-economic context were not so loaded towards the preferences of the Home 
Office that its outcome was essentially pre-determined. For the various social, 
political and economic forces which had caused the gradual fracturing o f the security 
sector policy network over the past decade also served to ensure that the context in 
which the Home Affairs Committee conducted its enquiry resembled something 
approaching a level playing field. As a consequence, the majority opinion of the 
industry, police and parliamentary representatives during this enquiry set in motion 
the processes through which the Home Office was finally forced to capitulate to the 
pro-regulation reformist-pluralist alliance. This section will explore how the differing 
preferences advanced by these various pro-regulation actors within the Committee 
served to set down the terms of the resulting consensus.
In the months leading up to the Home Affairs Committee’s enquiry, the Home 
Office’s emerging neoliberal agenda was both a source of optimism and frustration 
for the private security industry. It was a source of optimism because in officially 
recognising and endorsing private security involvement within the British security 
sector, the Home Office was implicitly granting the industry a reasonable degree of 
legitimacy and was also providing it with a series of opportunities for organic
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economic growth. The Home Office’s neoliberal agenda was also a source of 
frustration, however, because in order to fully realise these new opportunities, and 
indeed to consolidate existing ones, the industry determined that it still needed to 
capture a much greater degree of legitimacy, not through implicit endorsements, but 
through formal and explicit statutory regulation -  something which the Home Office, 
through its neoliberal lens, could not comprehend. For this was the only way that the 
private security companies could meet the majority of the British population’s state­
centric normative expectations about how security ought to be legitimately provided. 
Indeed, the ongoing need for legitimacy was once again acutely highlighted to the 
industry with the infamous experiences o f Group 4’s early prison escort contracts. As 
Sally Weale reflected in The Guardian:
In the early 90s, poking fun at Group 4 became a national pastime after they 
managed to lose seven prisoners within three weeks of taking on the first private 
prisoner escort service. Newspaper cartoonists and satirical shows like Have I 
Got News For You had a field day. Today Group 4 admits mistakes were made, 
but what the papers failed to point out, it says, was that police and prison 
services doing the same job were losing 12 prisoners a week.4
The fact that state institutions were performing the same security functions as-the 
private sector with less efficiency yet receiving virtually no criticism once again 
illustrated to the private security companies why they desperately needed to capture a 
greater degree of legitimacy from the state through statutory regulation. They needed 
to somehow situate their activities in line with the image of the state in order to be 
taken seriously within the security sector.
It was against this backdrop that the industry very persuasively communicated its 
pro-regulation pluralist agenda to the Home Affairs Committee. Group 4 ’s written 
submission, for instance, commented that: “ ...the perception of criminality within the 
industry (fed by media scare stories) ^  is now so well established that statutory 
regulation is now the only way to deal with the natural concerns expressed”.47 8 And 
Securicor’s written submission reinforced this point: “The combined effect of 
statutory registration/licensing and access to criminal records would particularly
47 The Guardian, ‘The Great Escape’, 15 November 1999 -  quoted in: Livingstone and Hart, ‘The 
Wrong Arm of the Law?’, p. 164.
48 Group 4 Securitas, ‘Memorandum’, in HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f the House o f  Commons 
Home Affairs Committee: The Private Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 153.
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enhance our public credibility...”.49 Furthermore, in providing oral evidence to the 
Committee, Jim Harrower, who was at the time a Chief Executive o f Group 4, 
explained more precisely why statutory regulation would improve relations with the 
public:
.. .the regulation of course would carry the identification card... and if there was 
enough publicity, which we would put into it, then the pensioners and people 
would know. If a guy comes forward with an ID card you can check it, you can 
see that it is a bona fide  ID card and you can move ahead.50
This explanation was remarkably consistent with the preferences of the industry forty 
years earlier. The private security companies still wanted to establish an official 
linkage between themselves and the core state institutions so as to capture a greater 
degree o f the legitimacy within the security sector. For this would in turn enable them 
structure their operations in line with people’s normative expectations about how 
security ought to be delivered and thus consolidate their status within British society. 
The industry was still, in other words, advancing a loose interpretation of the image of 
the state in its pluralist practices. It is also important to note that while forty years ago 
the industry’s demands were almost universally dismissed, they were now being 
supported by the growing number of state institutions promoting the reformist set of 
practices.
On the whole, the reformist practices of the police institutions generally conflicted
with the neoliberal practices of the Home Office with regard to the issue of regulation.
For while they conceded that private security provision did serve to relieve the ever-
increasing demands on police resources, they rejected the idea that private security
companies could formally enter into the security sector without some kind o f statutory
regulation to control standards and accountability. This position was clearly mapped
out in ACPO’s written submission to the Committee:
*
Arising out of the recent reforms of the police service and the growing demands 
and financial restrictions placed upon it, new opportunities have arisen for non- 
statutory bodies to enter the field of what has hitherto been seen solely as the 
remit of the police. As the private security industry moves to fill this void so it
49 Securicor Security Services, ‘Memorandum, in HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f  the House o f  
Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 150.
50 HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p.5.
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has attempted to provide a service traditionally seen as the responsibility o f the 
police, but without the moral, ethical or legal constraints which apply to the 
police. It is ACPO’s contention that the provision of a function inextricably 
linked to that of the police, should be structured within a statutory framework 
that commands public confidence.51 52
This quote is a clear statement of the reformist agenda, for while ACPO were 
pragmatically accepting the existence of the private security companies, they were 
also asserting that their operations would have to be controlled and reformed so as to 
conform with the notions of universal and egalitarian security provision extolled in 
the image of the state. It is therefore important to re-emphasise here that the 
reformists, unlike the pluralists, were not aiming to explicitly re-legitimate the private 
security industry through a system of statutory regulation, but were instead primarily 
concerned with protecting the public.
The parliamentary actors also advanced a clear statement of their reformist practices 
within the Home Affairs Committee enquiry, in turn echoing many of the arguments 
put forward by ACPO. The main parliamentary representative was, again, Bruce 
George MP. In his submission of oral evidence to the Committee, he pragmatically 
recognised, like the police, that the industry was inevitably going to assume an 
increasingly important position within the British security sector: “The security 
industry has already made substantial strides into those areas hitherto sacrosanct for 
the police and will continue to make further inroads”. As a consequence o f this 
position, moreover, George advocated a system of statutory regulation, as set out in 
his numerous private members’ bills, so as to fashion “ ...an industry which functions 
effectively and responsibly”.53 It is interesting to observe here that compared to the 
other state actors, George’s line of reasoning had remained remarkably consistent, 
being largely unchanged since he introduced his first private members’ bill in 1977. 
George’s overriding message had always been that private security provision in 
Britain must conform to exacting and publicly determined standards of training and 
accountability so as to protect the British public.
51 Association o f Chief Police Officers, ‘Memorandum’, in HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f  the 
House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), 
pp.99-100.
52 HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f  the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p.78.
53 HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f  the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p.79.
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Strikingly, in addition to the industry, police and parliamentary actors, numerous 
other organisations submitted evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in favour of 
statutory regulation, ranging from the Association of County Councils to the civil 
rights group Liberty. Among these many ‘non-core’ pro-regulation organisations -  all 
of which served to strengthen the reformist-pluralist agenda -  one in particular 
deserves brief examination here: the British Retail Consortium (BRC). For the 
written evidence presented by this institution provides us with a rare opportunity to 
bring the quantified opinions of everyday British security consumers into this 
investigation. According to the BRC, the British retail industry in 1992-1993 
represented approximately 9 percent of the custom for the manned guard industry, 
amounting to something in the region of £63 million in contracts. In December 1994, 
the BRC sent a survey regarding the regulation o f the private security industry to a 
large number of its member companies, which together represented no less than 
22,000 retail outlets. And a resounding 90 percent of respondents were in favour of 
stronger regulation, 80 percent of whom wanted statutory regulation to be enforced by 
the state rather than through any self-regulatory mechanisms.54 This therefore 
represents clear evidence that a notable section of the British population did indeed 
expect security provision to be legitimately provided through state mechanisms and 
that the private security industry could meet this expectation using a system of 
statutory regulation. It demonstrates, in other words, that the image o f the state 
remained a prominent structural influence over the constitution'of the security sector. 
And it was precisely this ideational structure which informed the pluralist practices of 
the private security industry (together with the reformist practices of parliamentary 
actors and police).
So not only were the core and non-core members of the negotiations lobbying 
emphatically in favour of the statutory regulation, but the security consumers were 
adding their extremely important pro-regulation preferences to the proceedings. As a 
consequence, the Home Office’s neoliberal agenda was being pushed to breaking 
point. This was first evidenced in the Home Office’s submission of oral evidence to 
the Committee, which was delivered by David Maclean MP, Minister o f State for the 
Home Office. For rather than simply reiterating the Home Office’s neoliberal self­
54 British Retail Consortium, ‘Supplementary Memorandum’, in HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f  the 
House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), 
p. 159.
182
regulation rationale, which had been the standard policy stance for the past five years 
or so, he conceded that: “Our position is that I am coming to this Committee open- 
minded on where we should go for the future”.55 And in this new and supposedly 
open frame of mind, Maclean admitted that: “I could not fail but notice that there 
were a large number of people in favour of statutory regulation”.56 So although the 
Home Office declined to commit itself to statutory regulation, Maclean’s interview 
suggested that the department was accepting the inevitability o f this outcome. The 
neoliberal practices of the Home Office were thus coming to the end of their short­
lived lifespan.
This inevitability was then further compounded by the Committee’s report and 
subsequent debates in the House of Commons, both of which were resolutely pro­
regulation in their orientation. The report, which was published in May 1995, directly 
reflected the majority opinion of the pluralists and reformists, recommending that the 
contract manned guarding side of the industry should be regulated by a newly 
instituted public body.57 It is also particularly interesting to note the following 
observation made by the Committee in the report: “We have been impressed by the 
determination of the security industry to improve its own standards and the fact that 
the pressure for the introduction of regulation has come from within the industry 
itself’.58 This indicates that the pluralist practices of the industry were in fact able to 
exert a significant influence over the outcome of the policy-making process, as indeed 
it would continue to do as the blueprints for statutory regulation were developed over 
the subsequent few years. And very similar sentiments were expressed when the 
House of Commons debated the report sixth months later. For not only were the 
majority of the speakers pro-regulation but it was also re-emphasised by Christopher 
Mullin MP (Labour), who was a member of the Committee, that “[t]he industry is 
begging to be regulated”.59 The pluralist practices of the private security industry, 
then, had now penetrated the heart of the security sector negotiations, which 
represented a considerable progression when compared to the dismissive response to
55 HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f  the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 40.
56 HC 17-11 (1994-95) First Report o f the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 47.
57 HC 17-1 (1994-95) First Report from the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p.xxix.
58 HC 17-1 (1994-95) First Report from the House o f  Commons Home Affairs Committee: The Private 
Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1995), p.xxxii.
59 HC Deb (1994-95), vol.265, col.221.
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Securicor’s similar lobbying strategy forty years earlier. Yet despite these pro­
regulation forces the Home Office, for a short period, continued to procrastinate over 
the issue and continue with its neoliberal practices.
The final breaking point, however, seemingly occurred in February 1996 when 
during Opposition Day in the House of Commons, Jack Straw MP, then Shadow 
Home Secretary, moved that the government implement the recommendations o f the 
Committee.60 There is an interesting prologue to this decision by New Labour to 
suddenly politicise this issue. For frustrated by the Conservative government’s 
dilatory behaviour within the increasingly one-sided regulation debate, both Bruce 
George and Group 4 had shifted their attentions to the high-flying opposition party in 
the previous year. George recollects, for instance, that:
I shifted my tactics, persuading the opposition to take an interest in private 
security. That meant I went on endless Criminal Justice Bill committee stages 
where I made speeches, not aimed at the Tories but at people like Alun Michael, 
who was the opposition spokesman on criminal justice. I remember organising 
a conference in one of the committee rooms and inviting Blair who was then 
leader of the opposition. He said, ‘well you liaise with Alun and I ’ll support 
regulation’.61
In addition to this intra-parliamentary pressure, the Labour Party were also being 
subjected to a subtle form of persuasion from the industry, as a former executive of 
Group 4 recently explained:
Up until the election in 97 we still sensed a great deal of reluctance from the 
Tories. But we the gang at Group 4 made up our mind when we did the Labour 
Party Conference...[that]...they know they’re going to win, you could feel it, 
and so we decided that we’d be so nice that it hurt...w e’ve been highly 
successful at getting them behind the scenes.62
These re-directed lobbying tactics from the pluralists and reformists should certainly 
be considered as important contextual factors in the Labour Party’s decision to 
dedicate an opposition day debate to this matter.
The resulting parliamentary debate was a more heated and partisan affair than 
previous exchanges, which was perhaps inevitable given that it was framed in party
60 HC Deb (1995-96), vol.271 col.869.
61 Interview with Bruce George, conducted on 30U| October 2007.
62 Interview with a former executive of Group 4 who wished to remain anonymous.
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political terms with the next general election only one year away. In response to 
Straw’s opening requests for the government to implement the Committee’s 
recommendations, Maclean argued defensively that: “The security industry has 
expanded enormously over the past 25 years. It has had 25 years of success and 
achievement, which has been brought about because governments did not interfere 
with it”.63 This represented a restatement of the neoliberal interpretation o f the 
security sector which relied more upon deeply ideological post-hoc rationalisation 
than an in-depth understanding of the private security industry. For twenty-five years 
prior to this statement the Home Office was fighting the Committee on Privacy’s 
recommendations to regulate the industry precisely because such a policy would serve 
to legitimate the operations of the private security companies and facilitate their 
expansion -  in other words, the exact opposite of Maclean’s line of reasoning. In a 
way, then, this illustrates both the rapidity and the completeness o f the Home Office’s 
conversion from the monopoly to the neoliberal set o f practices. Yet his line of 
reasoning did not convince the Home Office’s opponents at the beginning of the 
decade and it certainly failed to do so now in the post-Committee context. 
Unsurprisingly, then, Maclean was followed by some very persuasive pro-regulation 
speeches delivered by both familiar campaigners such as Bruce George, Norman 
Fowler and Ivan Lawrence (who was Chair of the Committee), together with 
numerous recent converts. Arguing mostly from a reformist perspective, then, the 
House of Commons was overwhelmingly in favour of statutory regulation.
Against such concentrated countervailing forces, the Home Office was finally 
pressured into issuing a short response to the Home Affairs Committee in October 
1996 which announced a new joint consultation exercise with the police and the 
industry over the costs and benefits of implementing statutory regulation in the 
contract manned guarding sector of the private security industry.64 Then in December 
1996 the Home Office published another Green Paper which tentatively set out the 
beginnings of a regulatory regime. Most importantly, the Home Office conceded in 
this paper that there was a case for regulating the contract maimed guarding sector 
through statutory mechanisms -  although it was ambiguous about exactly how this 
could be done. For while the Home Office recognised that a new licensing body
63 HC Deb (1995-96), vol.271, col.882.
64 HC 744 (1995-96) Second Special Report from the House o f Commons Home Affairs Committee: 
Government Observations on the First Report From the Home Affairs Committee Session 1994-95: The 
Private Security Industry (London: HMSO, 1996), p.3.
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would have to be established, it prevaricated over details such as whether licensing 
should apply to all private security guards or only to those with previous convictions, 
whether a central register should be used or physical license should be issued, and 
whether an inspectorate would be required to enforce the regime.65 Nevertheless, 
behind this rather evasive attitude, it was clear that after a fifty year struggle a shaky 
pro-regulation consensus on the terms of the reformist-pluralist alliance had finally 
emerged.
After forty years of lobbying, then, the pluralist practices of the private security 
industry had finally taken the centre-ground of the security sector negotiations. The 
objections of the monopoly practices and, more recently, the neoliberal practices of 
the Home Office had finally capitulated to the mounting pressure of the pro-regulation 
lobby. The stage was now set, in other words, for the formal re-legitimation of 
private security via a system of statutory regulation. Yet it is important to note that 
this did not represent an out and out victory for the private security companies, for 
they only succeeded in capturing the centre-ground of these negotiations because of 
their alliance with the reformist practices of the parliamentary actors and the major 
police institutions. And although the reformists shared the pluralists vision of a state- 
regulated private security industry, they wanted to bring about such a system not to 
re-legitimate the industry but rather to control and reform it. There was therefore a 
clear trade-off in this political outcome. Nevertheless, this shaky consensus was a 
major step towards the re-legitimation of the private security industry in postwar 
Britain.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the security sector negotiations during the 1980s 
and early 1990s were characterised by a political contest between four contrasting sets 
of state and society practices. The purpose of each set of practices was to bring about 
a different ensemble of institutional arrangements within the postwar security sector 
and, once again, the content of these divergent ensembles was largely determined by 
different policy stances with regard to the statutory regulation of the private security 
industry. First, the pluralists wanted to bring about a pluralised system of security
65 Home Office, Regulation o f  the Contract Guarding Sector o f the Private Security Industry: A 
Consultation Paper (London: HMSO, 1996), pp.3-9.
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provision in which public and private security providers were able to legitimately 
function alongside one another in the postwar security sector and, moreover, they 
sought to accomplish this by lobbying for a system of statutory regulation. Second, 
the reformists wanted to institute a state-controlled system of security provision in 
which a reformed private security industry was placed at the foot of the security sector 
hierarchy and, as ever, they too sought to achieve this by lobbying for a system of 
statutory regulation. So, apart from a notable interval in the mid-1980s, the reformists 
and pluralists continued to form a pro-regulation alliance. Third, those institutions 
advancing the monopoly set of practices wanted to create a monopolistic system of 
security provision in which the state alone was endowed with the legitimacy to 
undertake security functions, and they accordingly opposed statutory regulation on the 
grounds that it would serve to confer legitimacy upon the private security industry. 
Finally, the neoliberals wanted to impose the logic of the unfettered market upon the 
security sector and, as such, opposed a system of statutory regulation since it 
represented an unnecessary bureaucratic constraint upon the commercial logic o f the 
private security providers. Despite their unified resistance to statutory regulation, 
however, no monopoly-neoliberal alliance emerged because, firstly, they did not exert 
influence at the same time and, secondly, they were ideologically incommensurable.
As this chapter has illustrated, during the course of the 1980s and early 1990s the 
balance of power between these different practices changed considerably. Alliances 
were broken and resurrected, old conflicts were buried and then revived in different 
forms, institutions changed their world views, and new sets o f practices emerged 
while others were sentenced to irrevocable decline. By the mid-1990s, however, it 
was the alliance between, on one side, the reformist practices o f the parliamentary 
actors and the police and, on the other, the pluralist practices of the private security 
industry which began to determine the agenda o f the security sector negotiations. 
And, as we have seen, this alliance in turn greatly enhanced the possibility o f the 
industry capturing legitimacy from the state through a system of statutory regulation. 
As the state-in-society approach would suggest, then, this political domain, which for 
many continues to represent the very heart of the modern state, was more and more 
defined by intense political contestation and negotiation between multiples sets of 
divergent practices.
This chapter has also demonstrated, however, that in parallel with these processes 
of contestation and change, the security sector during the 1980s and early 1990s was
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also characterised by clear processes of continuity. For the structural influence of the 
image of the state continued to shape and mould the course o f the security sector 
negotiations. The majority of the British population continued to believe in the 
monopoly myth -  that is, they continued believe that the state ought to be the only 
provider of security functions in postwar Britain -  even if this belief was diluted to 
some degree by the emergence of neoliberalism and the politicisation of law and order 
during this era. And the various public and private institutions within the security 
sector were therefore compelled to reflect this belief -  or this image o f the state -  
within their respective sets of practices if they wanted to avoid encountering cultural 
resistance. This was evident once again in the monopoly practices o f the Home 
Office and police during the early 1980s, for these institutions wanted to directly 
translate the image of the state into an institutional reality. It was clearly evident, too, 
in the reformist practice of the parliamentary actors and later on ACPO and the Police 
Federation, for these institutions sought to institute a state-controlled system of 
security provision in which a reformed private security industry was integrated into 
the lower rungs of the security sector. The structural influence o f the image of the 
state was once again less directly evident in the pluralist practices o f the private 
security institutions, who sought to reconcile their problematic status in the security 
sector by attempting to capture legitimacy from the state, primarily through a system 
of statutory regulation. Interestingly, the neoliberal practices of the private security 
industry and the Home Office actively eschewed the structural influence o f the image 
of the state and, as we have seen, encountered enough cultural resistance to undermine 
their operations. This explains the short-lived existence o f this particular set of 
practices. Importantly, then, because of the widespread influence of the image of the 
state, any outcome resulting from these negotiations would to some extent reflect key 
components of this image. As the state-in-society approach would suggest, then, the 
postwar security sector was characterised by both contestation between different sets 
of practices and, at the same time, continuity brought about by the structural influence 
of the image of the state.
It is important to emphasise once again, moreover, that it is this dialectical process 
of continuity and change, articulated here through the state-in-society concepts of 
image and practice, which serves to elucidate the complex political processes relating 
to the re-legitimation private security in postwar Britain. On one side, it was the 
contested and fluid nature of state and society practices in the security sector during
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the 1980s and early 1990s which demonstrates how the private security institutions 
managed to forge a sufficient number of political alliances to push their pluralist 
agenda above the other sets of state and society practices competing within the 
security sector. On the other, it was again the strong current of continuity created by 
the structural influence of the image of the state which explains why the private 
security institutions used their enhanced agency not to function as market actors 
within the security sector but rather to capture legitimacy from the state via a system 
of statutory regulation. It is the dialectical interplay between these two processes 
which allows us to understand the re-legitimation of private security in postwar 
Britain. Interestingly, the next chapter will demonstrate how these complex and 
contradictory political processes increasingly became more complementary and 
harmonious towards the end of the 1990s as a coherent and strong consensus evolved 
in line with the reformist-pluralist alliance. This in turn had the extremely important 
consequence of laying the foundations for the successful passage o f the Private 
Security Industry Act 2001, which represented a critical moment in the re-legitimation 
of private security in postwar Britain.
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BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
7New Labour, New Legitimacy (1997-2001)
7.1 Introduction
By the end of 1996, there finally appeared to be some degree o f consensus emerging 
within the security sector negotiations about the need to implement statutory 
regulation of the private security industry. It was an imperfect consensus, however. 
For while the police institutions, numerous parliamentary actors and the majority of 
the industry enthusiastically endorsed this policy stance, albeit for quite different 
reasons, the Home Office was not nearly so forthcoming. It had only reluctantly 
conceded to the pressure of the amassing pro-regulation reformist-pluralist alliance 
and as a consequence the ensuing Home Office Green Paper, though clear in its 
acceptance of statutory regulation, did not provide much in the way of a strategic 
vision for the future. Had the Conservatives won the 1997 general election, then, the 
road from the 1996 Green Paper to the statute book would in all probability have been 
a very uncertain one.
In the event, though, New Labour cruised to victory in this election with a massive
179 seat majority. And, more importantly for our present purposes, the incoming
government’s criminal justice policy, which formed a central part of their electoral
*
strategy, served to provide a much needed strategic vision for the future of private 
security provision. For not only were New labour committed to statutory regulation 
but, through their ‘partnership approach’ to crime control, they set down a political 
programme which aimed to both reform and re-legitimate the industry. This strategic 
vision thus served to unify the security sector negotiations like never before by 
satisfying both the reformist and pluralist agendas within a single policy stance and, at 
the same time, casting aside the vestiges of the monopoly and neoliberal practices. 
Building upon this unusual period of calm within the security sector, then, New 
Labour and its allies were able to set in motion the political and constitutional 
processes which resulted in the Private Security Industry Act 2001. Crucially, this 
Act marked a new and critical stage in the long process of the re-legitimation of the 
industry.
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The objective of this chapter is to trace the main political processes which 
characterised the four years from New Labour’s victory in the 1997 General Election 
to the passing of the Private Security Industry Act in 2001. These processes will be 
divided into six main phases. Section 7.2 will examine the development o f New 
Labour’s ‘partnership’ approach to criminal justice and show how this approach was 
applied specifically to the private security industry. Next, Section 7.3 will explore 
how this policy stance was received by both the reformist and pluralist members of 
the security sector policy network. Section 7.4 will then explore the political and 
constitutional processes by which the resulting reformist-pluralist consensus was 
translated into the 1999 White Paper on the regulation of the private security industry. 
Section 7.5 will then follow the passage of the resultant Private Security Industry Act 
2001, which is key to understanding the re-legitimation of private security in postwar 
Britain. Section 7.6 will provide a few theoretically-informed conclusions about this 
fifth and final phase of the negotiations. It will, more specifically, illustrate how the 
dialectical processes of contestation and continuity which were revealed in the 
preceding empirical sections -  and which were expressed through the state-in-society 
concepts of image and practices -  serve to explain the re-legitimation o f private 
security in postwar Britain. Finally, in the form of an epilogue, Section 7.7 -will 
briefly offer some very preliminary insights into how the resulting regulatory regime 
has so far impacted upon the status of the private security industry at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century.
7.2 New Labour’s Partnership Approach to Crime and Disorder
This section will examine the development of New Labour’s ‘partnership approach’ to 
crime control both in general terms and in its specific implications for private security 
provision. It will, in particular, show how this policy served to satisfy both the 
reformist practices of the police and parliamentary actors and the pluralist practices of 
the private security institutions, in turn setting down the foundations for the 
emergence of a much stronger consensus within the postwar security sector.
It is first necessary to understand the context in which New Labour addressed the 
issue of crime control. In recent years, David Garland has observed, “ ...high crime 
rates have become a normal social fact in Britain...the threat of crime has become a
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routine part of modern consciousness”.1 As a consequence, the issue of crime control 
has increasingly become a central component of electoral strategy over the past 
couple of decades. In order to gain office, political parties within contemporary 
Britain have had to convince the electorate that they can mount an effective battle 
against this threatening ‘social fact’. Traditionally, the Conservatives had been the 
most successful party in this policy area, with Thatcher’s successive governments in 
particular adopting a hard-line position with regard to criminal justice policy -  even 
though they did sometimes take this position too far in the eyes of the public, as their 
heavy-handed response to the 1984-85 miners’ strikes so vividly demonstrated. In a 
remarkable turnaround, however, during the early and mid 1990s New Labour 
launched an extremely effective campaign to capture this pivotal policy domain, as 
Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie note: “Crime was crucial to both the 
ideological rebirth of the Labour Party as ‘New Labour’ and its landslide victory in 
the 1997 General Election”.2 3 Armed with the rhetorically powerful slogan ‘Tough on 
Crime, Tough on the Causes of Crime’, New Labour soon persuaded Middle England 
that they represented the best solution to crime and disorder problems in late twentieth 
century Britain.
Once in power, this rhetoric was translated by the New Labour government into a 
‘partnership approach’ to crime control. In broad terms, this approach was premised 
on the argument that against the backdrop of crime as a deeply embedded ‘social 
fact’, it was important, in Garland’s words, “ ...to withdraw the'state’s claim to be the 
chief provider of security and to attempt to remodel crime control on a de- 
differentiated, partnership basis”. This was because recent experience showed that 
criminal justice policy based upon the ‘monopoly provider’ model was clearly not 
facilitating the realisation of criminal justice policy objectives and, from New 
Labour’s perspective, could not therefore be employed as the basis for their ‘Tough 
on Crime’ agenda -  indeed, this was a evidenced in the decline of the monopoly 
practices within the security sector negotiations during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
With this emphasis on partnership, then, it is important to recognise that from the 
outset New Labour were eschewing any vestiges of the monopoly set o f practices
1 Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State’, p.446.
2 Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie, ‘The Criminal Justice System: New Labour’s new 
Partnerships’, in New Managerialism, New Welfare? eds. John Clarke, Sharon Gewirthz and Eugene 
McLaughlin (London: Sage, 2000), p. 169.
3 David Garland, ‘The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some Preconditions o f Recent ‘Law and 
Order’ Policies’, British Journal o f  Criminology 40 (2000), p.348.
193
which aimed to translate the monopoly myth in an institutional reality. Furthermore, 
the new government were also creating a window of opportunity for the private 
security industry to push their pluralist agenda and the parliamentary actors and the 
police institutions to realise their reformist agenda, for both of these sets o f practices 
were, in different ways, predicated upon the establishment o f a concrete institutional 
partnership between the industry and the state.
In more concrete terms, the ‘remodelling’ of crime control on a ‘de-differentiated, 
partnership basis’, involved an ambitious attempt by New Labour to absorb the 
various public-private partnerships established by the Conservatives during the 
previous decade, together with numerous independent crime control initiatives, into a 
single ‘Third Way’ approach to criminal justice policy.4 The basic intention o f this 
approach was to put state agencies in control of ‘steering’ crime control strategies, 
while the corresponding ‘rowing’ functions were to be devolved to variety o f non­
state actors. Furthermore, while the state institutions were in theory supposed to 
assume the dominant role within these partnerships, non-state actors were 
nevertheless actively encouraged to contribute towards the development o f crime 
control initiatives so as to ensure that a degree of the responsibility for controlling 
crime was transferred away from the state. Non-state actors were, in other words, 
‘empowered’ within this new partnership approach. Importantly, once in office New 
Labour quickly formalised this partnership approach in the form of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 which, as Mclaughlin, Muncie and Hughes note, asserted that: 
“ ...for successful outcomes to be achieved, responsibility for crime reduction and 
community safety should be devolved from a central state to a series o f semi- 
autonomous local partnerships, made up of statutory and independent agencies and 
privatised bodies”.5 It should be recognised, however, that while this legislation 
constituted the central component of New Labour’s approach to crime control, it did 
not in fact represent a radical departure from some of the criminal justice policies 
which were implemented in a more piecemeal manner by the preceding Conservative 
government. The main difference was that New Labour arguably approached crime
4 Eugene McLaughlin, John Muncie and Gordon Hughes, ‘The Permanent Revolution: New Labour, 
New Public Management and the Modernization of Criminal Justice’, Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 1(3) (2001), pp.306-307; Gordon Hughes and Eugene McLaughlin, ‘Towards a New Paradigm 
of Sovereign Power?: Community Governance, Preventative Safety and the Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships’, in Selected Papers from the 2003 British Criminology Conference, Bangor 
eds. Simon Cottee, Catrin Smith and Emma Wincup (available at www.britsoccrim.org/v6.htm).
5 Eugene McLaughlin, John Muncie and Gordon Hughes, ‘The Permanent Revolution’, p.311.
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control policy in a far more strategic, committed and coordinated manner, with a 
clearer vision of what the relationship between state and non-state actors ought to look 
like -  that is, a comprehensive system of ‘joined-up’ governance.
This said, while it was always clear that New Labour were going to encourage 
partnerships with localised community organisations, it was far from certain whether 
it was always their intention to promote partnerships with market actors such as the 
private security companies. Indeed, during their period in opposition New Labour 
were often critical of the marketisation of public services within the criminal justice 
sector, for they judged this trend to be more threatening to the delivery of security as a 
public good than the devolution of powers to non-market community institutions, 
such as neighbourhood watch associations.6 As the previous chapter illustrated, 
however, around the time of the Home Affairs Committee enquiry into the private 
security industry, parliamentary actors such as Bruce George and private security 
companies such as Group 4 forced the private security regulation issue onto New 
Labour’s criminal justice agenda. And when New Labour subsequently targeted this 
issue during an opposition day debate in February 1996 they effectively committed 
themselves to the integration of a regulated private security industry into their 
partnership approach to crime control. Moreover, what is particularly interesting 
about this policy development is that, unlike the Conservatives, New Labour seemed 
to appreciate that for private security companies to be integrated into their partnership 
approach to crime control it was essential that they were both reformed and re­
legitimated using statutory regulation. Significantly, it was this recognition which 
facilitated the development of a much stronger consensus within the security sector 
policy network, for it satisfied the preferences of both the reformist and pluralists.
To understand how New Labour reached this line of reasoning, it is first important 
to explore the central dilemma inherent within British criminal justice policy during 
the mid-1990s. Garland captures this when he remarks that:
The predicament for government today, then, is that they (i.e. ministers, 
officials, agency executives etc.) see the need to withdraw or at least qualify 
their claim to be the primary and effective provider of security and crime 
control, but they also see, just as clearly, that the political costs of such a move 
are likely to be disastrous... [This is because]... the myth of the penal sovereign 
and its ‘law and order’ powers are too deeply inscribed, and too politically
6 Eugene McLaughlin, John Muncie and Gordon Hughes, ‘The Permanent Revolution’, p.305.
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potent, to be easily dismantled by rational critique and administrative reform, 
and we will continue to observe its invocation.7
Garland is effectively arguing that the transition from a monopoly to a partnership 
model of security provision within late twentieth century Britain was constrained by 
the image of the state as the only legitimate provider of security functions. For this 
image was so deeply ingrained within the collective world view o f the main part of 
the British population that it was extremely difficult for institutions to act against it, 
since in doing so they would soon meet cultural resistance -  as the fate o f the 
Conservative government’s neoliberal practices had clearly demonstrated. 
Consequently, it was essential for these partnerships to be constructed in a manner 
which to a large extent conformed with this image. And in the case of the private 
security companies, New Labour recognised that this required the implementation of 
statutory regulation which would in turn serve to reform and re-legitimate the 
industry, in the process bringing the private security companies closer to the majority 
of the British population’s normative expectations about how the security sector ought 
to be constituted.
This can be evidenced in New Labour’s rhetoric upon coming into power. For 
instance, on 15 July 1997, just a few weeks after the general election, the new Home 
Secretary Jack Straw communicated the following in a speech at the BSIA annual 
luncheon:
To solve the chronic problems of neighbourhood disorder will require co­
ordinated action by central and local government, by the criminal justice 
agencies and by the communities themselves. But the private sector -  and the 
private security industry -  also have a crucial role to play. To ensure that you 
are able to play that role to the full, we must get your industry onto a sound 
footing. This means proper regulation. But in reiterating my commitment to 
regulation, my message is not one of mistrust, but of confidence. I am confident 
that by working together for sound regulation, we can rid the industry of the 
‘cowboy’ operators and so restore public faith in your important role in the fight 
against crime. That is in the public interest as much as it is in the interests of 
the industry.8
This is a very revealing speech, for it elucidates clearly the crucial connections 
between New labour’s partnership approach, the government’s expectations of the
7 David Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State’, pp.449-450.
8 Jack Straw, Speech for the DS1A Annual Luncheon (Unpublished, July 1997).
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private security companies, the need to ‘restore public faith’ in the industry and the 
role that regulation can play. It underlying message was clear -  ‘sound regulation’ 
equates to reform and re-legitimation. In arriving at this conclusion, then, the sole 
noncommittal member of the security sector policy network, the Home Office, was 
now a firm champion of statutory regulation. Furthermore, the Home Office was also 
able to provide a clear strategic ‘Third Way’ direction for the future o f the private 
security industry in Britain -  a future in which it was a professional and legitimate 
partner of the state. This in turn laid the foundations for a strong consensus on the 
reformist-pluralist centre-ground within the security sector negotiations.
7.3 The Strong Consensus
This section will examine the responses of the major police institutions, the main 
parliamentary actors and the private security industry to New Labour’s partnership 
strategy. It will show how these core actors were on the whole highly supportive of 
this strategy, in the process leading to the creation of a strong consensus on the 
reformist-pluralist middle-ground. It will illustrate, in other words, that after decades 
of rising contestation with in the security sector, a period o f relative calm appeared to 
be descending upon the negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security 
functions within postwar Britain.
As we have already seen, from the late 1980s onwards ACPO and the Police 
Federation were increasingly in favour of regulating the private security industry. 
Initially, their motivation for supporting this policy was simply to eradicate the 
‘cowboy’ element from the industry -  a policy stance most clearly mapped out in 
ACPO’s 1988 report. Their approach, in other words, represented a classic example 
of the reformist set of practices which specified that a reformed private security 
industry was permitted to exist at the foot of a state-controlled, hierarchical security 
sector. Yet in tandem with New Labour’s more positive policy stance towards the 
industry, certain high-ranking members of ACPO now seemed to be enthusiastically 
encouraging the development of more proactive partnerships with the private security 
companies and were therefore beginning to shift their policy stance towards some 
kind of reformist-pluralist middle-ground.
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For instance, in an influential 1998 newspaper article published in the Financial 
Times, Ian Blair, then Chief Constable of Surry and until recently Commissioner of 
the Metropolitan Police, observed that:
The past 50 years have seen a steady but accelerating loss of the public police’s 
share of the broad market for security. The police has lost its monopoly over 
the guarding of cash-in-transit, the control of sports events and the escort of 
prisoners. Above all, the police has lost its monopoly over the patrol o f places 
where people congregate. Where once people shopped in high streets, which 
are public spaces where the police has a monopoly, now they go to shopping 
centres, which are private and patrolled by private security guards.9
Yet the police should not passively accept these trends, Blair contended, but rather
actively engage with these new security providers: “The service should put itself
forward as the central point for cooperation between all agencies that affect the
security of communities and as the central point of a system of patrols carried out by
police, volunteers, local authorities and private companies”.10 This proposed system
of institutional arrangements would, he continued, steer “ ...a  middle course between
the indefensible claim to a monopoly over patrol and the creeping, unregulated
extension of private security in public places. It is a kind of ‘third way’ for the
police”.11 Both in its rhetoric and its concrete proposals, this statement clearly
resonated with New Labour’s partnership approach to private security provision.
Crucially, then, it signified a willingness on the part of ACPO to support statutory
»
regulation of the private security industry not just to reform the industry but to 
actively build partnerships with the private security companies. The close alliance 
between the Home Office and police with regard to this contentious issue was 
therefore to a large extent restored, although in the inverse form of its previous 
monopoly-orientated incarnation. For, strikingly, both of these core state institutions 
in the security sector now wanted to both reform and re-legitimate the industry, 
thereby straddling both the reformist and pluralist set of practices.
Yet it is important to acknowledge that while in the late 1990s this partnership 
approach increasingly came to represent official ACPO policy -  as evidenced by the 
institution’s cooperative relationship with the industry over the next few years and, 
more symbolically, by Blair’s professional ascent to eventually become the highest-
9 Ian Blair, ‘The Police has Lost its Monopoly of Crime Patrols’, Financial Times 17th July 1998.
10 Blair, ‘The Police’.
"Blair, ‘The Police’.
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ranking police officer in the country -  there were still elements o f dissent towards this 
more proactive partnership approach within the major police institutions. For as Peter 
Davies, current ACPO lead on the private security industry, recently remarked, 
“ ...there has been mixed enthusiasm for closer engagement with the industry on the 
part o f ACPO's leaders, many of whom still lack trust and confidence in the private 
security industry".12 The most probable reason for this scepticism was actually 
indicated by Blair in his Financial Times article when he wrote that: “All o f us 
involved in policing have subconsciously adopted the image of the bobby on the beat, 
alone responsible for the safety of the community”.13 In other words, police officers 
have traditionally been strongly inclined towards a monopolistic world view which 
advocates a very direct fit between state and society practices and the image o f the 
state. And such deeply ingrained world views do not suddenly disappear without a 
trace. So while it can be observed that there was certainly a pronounced movement 
towards a more reformist-pluralist, or partnership, approach to the private security 
industry within ACPO at this time, this was not a straightforward and smooth 
transition since the traditional reservations towards the industry associated with the 
monopoly practices continued to hold some sway.
In addition to this generational element, there was also some evidence of opposition 
to the partnership approach from the Police Federation which, though supportive of 
the reformist agenda of employing statutory regulation to eliminate the cowboy 
companies from the industry, was far less enthusiastic about the pluralist agenda of 
actively re-legitimating the industry. This was because they considered that re­
legitimation would have the effect of threatening their professional domain: the 
standard foot patrol. The Police Federation thus ensured that their criticisms o f the 
pluralist agenda were raised during the passage of the Private Security Industry Bill 
through Parliament a couple of years later.14 This important police institution, in 
other words, remained firmly on the reformist side of the consensus. But in spite of 
these various objections, it is important to note that the most powerful section of the 
public police -  the new generation of Chief Constables -  was nevertheless 
increasingly in favour of New Labour’s partnership approach, in which the private 
security industry would be both reformed and re-legitimated through statutory
12 Interview with Peter Davies, conducted on 3ld August 2007.
13 Blair ‘The Police’ [italics added],
14 HC Deb (2000-01), vol.365, cols. 1005-1011.
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regulation. In other words, they embraced both sides o f the reformist-pluralist 
consensus.
In examining the response of the main parliamentary actors to New Labour’s 
proposals, we must again turn our attention towards Bruce George MP, who 
continued to be the most influential and outspoken member of parliament within this 
field. Significantly, in the short period between the publication of the December 1996 
Green Paper and New Labour’s landslide victory in the May 1997 General Election, 
George -  together with his research partner Mark Button, who was (and still is) a 
Lecturer at the University of Portsmouth -  wrote a response to the outgoing 
Conservative government’s tentative proposals to regulate the industry. In this 
document George and Button maintained that while they most certainly welcomed 
any proposals to regulate the private security industry, the regulatory regime mapped 
out in the 1996 Green Paper did not go far enough.15 In response to these 
deficiencies, over the subsequent year George and Button developed the following 
‘three-dimensional’ model of what their ideal regulatory framework would look like: 
first, it should be ‘wide’, including both the contract and in-house sides of all the sub­
sectors of the industry, and not just the contract manned guarding sub-sector; second, 
it should be ‘deep’, stipulating that both companies and individual employees must be 
licensed and that for a license to be attained certain minimum training standards must 
be satisfied; and third, the regulator responsible for administrating and enforcing the 
licensing system should be a statutory agency independent of the industry.16 For 
George and Button, only such a ‘Comprehensive Wide’ model would serve to 
eliminate the cowboy element from the industry and protect the public.17 George’s 
message was thus very clear: like the Police Federation, he would support New 
Labour’s proposals so long as the resulting regulatory regime was sufficiently wide, 
deep and independent to satisfy his reformist agenda; unlike the Police Federation, 
however, he seemed unconcerned about simultaneously re-legitimating the industry 
through a system of statutory regulation.
To complete the strong policy network consensus, the main private security industry 
representatives -  that is, the BSIA and the larger companies such as Group 4 and
15 Bruce George and Mark Button, Comments on the Home Office Consultation Paper -  Regulation o f  
the Contract Guarding Sector o f the Private Security Industry (Unpublished, March 1997).
16 Bruce George and Mark Button, ‘Private Security Industry Regulation: Lessons From Abroad for the 
United Kingdom’, International Journal o f  Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 2(3) (1997), pp.187- 
200.
17 Bruce George and Mark Button, ‘Private Security Industry Regulation’, pp. 196-197.
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Securicor -  were also extremely supportive of New Labour’s partnership approach. 
This is unsurprising given that in almost every respect this approach satisfied the 
pluralist practices that they had been consistently pursuing for the past half century. 
For it would enable the private security companies to finally establish a widely 
recognisable official-looking connection between themselves and the state, in the 
process allowing them to capture some of the much needed resource o f legitimacy 
within the security sector. This would in turn allow these companies to both 
consolidate and expand upon their operations within the security sector, thereby 
generating higher profit margins. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the industry 
responses to the New Labour’s early consultations repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of the means by which this connection would be communicated to the 
public -  that is, the physical license. For instance, the Managing Director of a 
medium-sized company outlined the following ideal-type scenario in a letter dated 
17th September 1997 to Alun Michael, Minister for Home Affairs:
...every security officer/guard would be issued with a registration card/license 
and a badge with the registration number. Such a badge could be worn on the 
uniform of which ever company the guard then works for and would become a 
recognised symbol of an approved, vetted and trained security officer.18
The license thus was considered to be critical to the process of re-legitimating the
operations of the industry. This specific issue aside, the most prominent industry
*
representatives in the BSIA also sought to keep the more generalised momentum of 
the security sector negotiations moving firmly in the pro-regulation direction, as 
Jorgen Philip-Sorensen comments: “It was a united effort to regulate by many, many 
companies. We maintained a very pro-active stance”.19
It is interesting to note, however, that during this period the BSIA were lobbying 
not, as one might expect, merely for a ‘light’ regulatory regime which did little more 
than secure the connection between the” industry and the state institutions through the 
issuing of a state-endorsed license, but like Bruce George they also wanted the 
resulting regulatory regime to be relatively wide, deep and independent.20 • This was
18 Private Information.
19 Interview with Jorgen Philip-Sorenson, conducted on 17th December 2007.
20 See, for instance: BSIA, The British Security Industry Association's Response to the Consultation 
Paper ‘Regulation o f  the Contract Guarding Sector o f the Private Security Industry ' (Unpublished, 
March 1997).
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in large part because they wanted the legislation to be sufficiently ‘heavy’ to eliminate 
the cowboy companies which for so many years had been consistently bringing the 
entire industry into disrepute with their criminal behaviour. John Cairncross, current 
Home Office lead for private security regulation, recently summarised this agenda as 
follows:
The industry welcomed legislation. When we consulted the industry, people 
within the industry had been campaigning for years because they wanted some 
recognition of professionalism, and the legitimate end of the industry wanted 
the illegitimate end kicked out because the cowboys were making the reputation 
of the industry poor for everybody else.21
This serves to demonstrate the two important ways in which statutory regulation 
would contribute towards the re-legitimation of the private security industry: first, 
through a more positive process it would serve to enhance the status o f the reputable 
end of the industry by establishing a connection between these companies and the 
state; second, through a more negative, proscriptive process it would eliminate those 
companies whose presence was detrimental to the status of the industry. Furthermore, 
in eliminating this less reputable end there was also the added possibility that the 
remaining companies could then move into the vacated market space. In summary, 
then, the BSIA and the larger private security companies were predictably highly 
supportive of New Labour’s partnership approach to criminal justice, primarily 
because it satisfied their pluralist practices, but also because it dovetailed with their 
secondary reformist requirements. Thus with such a strong pro-regulation reformist- 
pluralist consensus among the core actors of the security sector policy network, the 
Home Office set in motion the constitutional processes which would eventually result 
in the Private Security Industry Act 2001.
Interestingly, this section has illustrated how following the emergence o f New 
Labour’s partnership approach the degree of contestation between the different sets of 
practices within the security sector started to decrease. A strong consensus was now 
developing around the alliance between those institutions advancing the reformist and 
pluralist sets of practices. To be sure, there were still voices of dissent coming from 
both the fading monopoly practices of some police officers and some of the hard-line 
reformists who were sceptical about the movement towards a reformist-pluralist
21 Interview with John Cairncross, conducted on 15lh August 2007.
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middle-ground. Yet it seems that these voices of dissent barely registered on the radar 
of the ascendant reformist-pluralist movement.
7.4 The White Paper
This section will first explore how the Home Office translated the strong reformist- 
pluralist consensus into the White Paper entitled The Government’s Proposals fo r  
Regulation o f  the Private Security Industry in England and Wales, which was 
published in March 1999. It will then analyse the various reactions of the core 
security sector actors towards this White Paper. In doing this, this section will show 
once again how the negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security functions 
within the postwar security sector were increasingly being characterised less by 
contestation between multiple sets of practices than by a strong consensus on the 
reformist-pluralist middle-ground.
In his foreword to the White Paper, Jack Straw once again reiterated the 
government’s increasingly positive stance towards the industry:
The Government’s commitment to a partnership approach to crime and disorder 
as set out in the Crime and Disorder Act means that there will be the 
opportunity for the private security industry to play a wider role in security 
community safety. It has also been suggested recently that the private security 
industry might be able to assist the police by performing a form of 
complementary patrol service.22
This again demonstrates the synchronisation of New Labour’s partnership approach 
and the pluralist practices of the private security institutions, for it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the government, too, wanted the industry to legitimately 
function alongside the state within the security sector. The White Paper then 
proceeded to map out the proposed regulatory regime. For analytical convenience and 
clarity, this will initially be summarised here using George and Button’s previously 
introduced three-dimensional analytical framework of ‘width’, ‘depth’ and 
‘independence’.
The proposed legislation could most certainly be characterised as ‘wide’. For not 
only did it stipulate that both contract and in-house sides of the manned guarding
22 Home Office, The Government’s Proposals for Regulation o f  the Private Security Industry in 
England and Wales, Cm 4254 (London: HMSO, 1999), p.l.
203
sector were to be licensed, but the definition of manned guarding itself was broadly 
defined to include standard guarding and patrol services, door supervisors, cash-in­
transit, wheelclampers and the use of guard dogs. In addition, it also specified that 
those who install, monitor and maintain alarm systems were to be licensed. And, 
finally, it indicated that at some point in the future private investigators, security 
consultants, locksmiths, keyholders and contracted court enforcement officers would 
also be integrated into the regulatory regime.23 Indeed, with the small exception of 
safe deposit centres, these proposals covered every sub-sector mentioned in George 
and Button’s critical response to the 1996 Green Paper.24 In total, then, the White 
Paper estimated that the resulting regulatory regime would encompass approximately 
240,000 individuals employed by 8,000 companies.25 This figure serves both to 
illustrate the enormous proportions that the industry had reached by the close o f the 
twentieth century -  by this estimate it was double the size o f the police which in 
March 1999 totalled 123,84126 27-  and by extension the impact that developing a 
partnership with such a large industry would have upon the constitution o f the British 
security sector. By bringing so many private security officers into the regulatory 
regime, the re-legitimation of the industry was set to be a major turning point in the 
provision of security in the contemporary Britain.
But while the proposed regulation was ‘wide’ it was not, by contrast, particularly 
‘deep’. To be sure, all security personnel from the ground level up to director level 
were to be subjected to a criminal records check so to ensure that they were a “fit 
person” before they could be granted a license. This measure was specifically 
designed to eliminate much of the cowboy element from within the industry, which 
was one of the central purposes of regulation. However, the responsibility for 
maintaining reasonable training standards and high degrees of service delivery was 
packaged not within the compulsory licensing scheme for individuals but within a 
voluntary licensing scheme for companies. This meant that while companies which 
successfully satisfied certain British Standards quality criteria would receive official 
accreditation -  ‘approved contractor status’ -  it was not illegal to fall below these
23 Home Office, The Government's Proposals, pp.23-26.
24 George and Button, Comments on the Home Office Consultation Paper, p.3.
25 Home Office, The Government’s Proposals, p.26.
26 Home Office, Statistical Bulletin: Police Service Strength (London: Research Development and 
Statistics Directorate, 2"d edition, 2007), p. 15.
27 Home Office, The Government’s Proposals, pp.12-15.
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British Standards.28 In other words, the proposed regulatory regime would ensure that 
security personnel were not criminals, but it would not guarantee that they were 
effective at providing security functions. But although this seems like a weakness, 
subsequent experience would demonstrate that reputable companies were so keen to 
demonstrate their professionalism and eligibility for ‘partnership status’ so as to 
maximise their legitimacy within the security sector that they willingly entered into 
this voluntary accreditation scheme.
Finally, the White Paper provided for the establishment of a new public regulatory 
institution -  at this point to be called the Private Security Industry Authority -  which 
was, in principle at least, designed to have a significant degree o f independence from 
of the industry. For while the proposed Board would include representatives from 
police, the private security industry, local authorities, insurers, customers and the 
public, it was to be “ ...headed by a Chairman who has no personal interest in the 
private security industry”.29 30 Furthermore, this institution was to be directly 
accountable to the Home Secretary, thereby ensuring that the direction o f private 
security industry policy would remain in accordance with the Home Office’s 
interpretation of the public good, even though it was apparent that this interpretation 
increasingly dovetailed with that of the industry. So in undertaking its functions -  
which primary involved administrating and enforcing the licensing system and raising 
the standards of the industry -  the Private Security Industry Authority would in theory 
exercise a considerable degree of independence. In addition, it is worth noting that 
the Home Secretary, in consultation within the Authority, was also given the power to 
introduce secondary legislation through statutory instruments. This would, for 
example, allow the these actors to make the voluntary licensing scheme compulsory in 
the future.
But while depth, width and independence were undoubtedly important dimensions 
of the proposed regulatory regime, of equal if not more significance from the 
industry’s perspective was the way in which the official connection between the state 
and the industry was to be communicated to the public. For although it was certainly 
essential for the state to recognise the industry as a legitimate provider o f security 
functions, it was even more important for members of the general public to do so.
28 Home Office, The Government's Proposals, pp. 19-22.
29 Home Office, The Government's Proposals, p. 10.
30 Home Office, The Government's Proposals, p. 10.
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Indeed, it was the public’s normative expectations about how security ought to be 
provided that the private security companies were attempting to satisfy. If the average 
British citizen started to accept private security companies as legitimate providers of 
security, then the industry could really establish itself within the British security 
sector. It was the communication of this official connection to the public, in other 
words, which would serve to bring the industry’s operations in line with the structural 
influence of the image of the state. In this crucial respect, then, the White Paper 
asserted that: “The Authority will issue successful applicants with a physical license. 
This is likely to be in the form of a plastic card which incorporates measures to 
prevent fraud such as a photograph of the applicant and a hologram”. Furthermore, 
the White Paper continued, “[t]he Authority will be expected to publicise the 
appearance of the card. Businesses and members of the public will be encouraged to 
ask for sight of the license before allowing them onto their premises”.31 With regard 
to the process of re-legitimation, these were extremely significant proposals. Not only 
would the Private Security Industry Authority issue and publicise a personalised, 
official-looking license explicitly communicating the connection between the industry 
and the state, but it would also encourage the public to approach a private security 
officer carrying such a license in the same manner as they would a public police 
officer. For one of the most prominent and commonly used rituals o f the public 
police officer is ‘flashing their badge’ to a member of the public so as to demonstrate 
that they are legitimate, state-endorsed providers of security, and now the state was 
encouraging members of the general public and private security officers to enter into 
the same ritual. This therefore represented a critical contribution towards the process 
of orientating the activities of the private security industry in line with the image of 
the state.
Altogether, then, the White Paper generally seemed to satisfy the various reformist 
and pluralist preferences of all the core actors within the security sector policy 
network, and their responses certainly indicated that this was indeed the case. In their 
official response to the White Paper, for instance, ACPO stated that it
...broadly welcomes the proposals for regulation of the private security industry 
as laid out in the White Paper. We believe that they form a comprehensive and 
timely framework within which the Police Service and the private security
31 Home Office, The Government's Proposals, p. 16.
206
industry can co-operate to produce an industry in which the public can have 
confidence.32
ACPO was thus now consistently supporting New Labour’s partnership approach to 
private security provision, again consolidating its renewed alliance with the Home 
Office. It was, in other words, reinforcing its position on the reformist-pluralist 
middle-ground in which statutory regulation was seen to represent a means o f both 
reforming and re-legitimating the industry.
Bruce George, again writing with Mark Button, similarly welcomed the White 
Paper, although not so much for its strategic vision of a legitimate partnership 
between the industry and the state -  which was never George’s primary concern -  
than for its contribution towards his overarching reformist practices o f enhancing 
professional standards within the industry. To this end, George and Button 
contended, the proposals set forth in the White Paper “ ...do not go as far as we 
wished, but they do go a long way to laying the foundations for a system of regulation 
that is wide and will eventually -  we hope -  also be deep”.33 Understandably, their 
main concern was that the voluntary accreditation scheme would not induce all 
companies to raise their professional standards to an acceptable level and they 
accordingly argued that this component of the regulatory regime should be made 
mandatory. This aside, however, they were supportive the White Paper. Moreover, 
the significance of this endorsement should not be underestimated, for after twenty 
years of lobbying George had become the main link between parliamentary opinion 
and the industry. As the editor of Professional Security noted at the time: “Mention 
the words ‘Security’ and ‘MP’ and one name springs to mind -  Bruce George”.34 
And given that over the subsequent months he was one of the most active participants 
during the resulting Private Security Industry Bill’s second reading, seven committee 
stages, third reading and report, withdrawal of his endorsement would probably have 
proven to be problematic for both the government and industry.
The private security industry’s response to the White Paper was an interesting 
mixture of great enthusiasm and ambivalence. The trade publication Security 
Management Today unsurprisingly reported that “ ...reaction from the mamied
32 Association of Chief Police Officers, Response to the Government’s Proposals Regulation o f  the 
Private Security Industry in England and Wales (Unpublished, July 1999), p.l.
33 Bruce George and Mark Button, ‘Evolution or Revolution?: An Assessment o f  the Government’s 
Proposals for the Private Security Industry’, Professional Security 9(5) (1999), p.24.
34 Professional Security 9(5) (1999), p.24.
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services sector seems to be ecstatic”. David Fletcher, Chief Executive of the BSIA 
during the late 1990s, elucidated why this was so:
For more than 30 years, the BSIA and its members have been working to ensure 
that customers can have confidence in security products and services. This is 
why we welcome regulation; it will enable those companies who have operated 
to quality standards for many years to get official recognition for their efforts, 
and will help to achieve a positive image for the security industry.35 6 37
This quote serves to reinforce the link between ‘official recognition’ and ‘positive 
image’ -  in order to function effectively and legitimately within the British security 
sector, the private security industry had to associate itself with the state in the eyes of 
the average security consumer. It had to capture the ‘stateness’ which was considered 
to be so essential to the legitimate provision of security, since this would serve to 
orientate its operations in line with the structural influence o f the image of the state. 
Crucially, statutory regulation was now finally going to satisfy this long-standing 
pluralist objective. As Security Management Today succinctly put it: “In essence, 
private security won’t be so private anymore”. Indeed, one o f the only criticisms 
coming from the principal manned guarding representatives concerned the reliability 
and concreteness o f the means by which the official connection between the industry 
and the state would be communicated to the public -  that is, the form of the actual 
license. As Peter Black, Managing Director of Group 4 at the time, remarked at a 
June 1999 conference on the proposed regulation organised by the GMB:
The proposals are simply the best option for the future of the security industry. 
They have our full support, we would remove nothing and would only add a 
PIN number to the licensing scheme such that (as with health care 
professionals) false licenses can be easily traced.38
The logic behind these remarks was clearly that Group 4 wanted to ensure the 
integrity of the primary concrete symbol linking together the industry and the state 
and therefore conferring legitimacy upon the operations of the private security
35 Security Management Today, ‘Special Report: Regulation’ (May 1999), p.28.
36 Security Management Today, ‘Special Report: Regulation’ (May 1999), p.28.
37 Security Management Today’, ‘Special Report: Regulation’ (May 1999), p.26.
38 Peter Black, Speech to the West Midlands fringe meeting the GMB conference on the regulation o f  
the security industry (Unpublished, June 1999).
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companies. For a black market in false licenses would certainly have the effect of 
damaging the power and effectiveness of this symbol.
Interestingly, however, the security alarms systems sub-sector o f the industry was 
simply ambivalent about the regulatory regime. To begin with, Security Management 
Today reported: “The electronic sector has been caught off-guard, as it were, by the 
proposals, which many seem to have assumed was a discussion taking place in the 
manned security sector only”.39 And while representatives from this sub-sector did 
not explicitly contest the White Paper, their attitude towards the proposed regulations 
could only be described as passive acceptance. There was nothing approaching the 
enthusiasm of the manned guarding sector.40 It could convincingly be argued that the 
reason for this ambivalence was related to the fact that, historically speaking, the 
security alarms systems sub-sector had experienced a very different relationship with 
the structural influence of the image of the state when compared to the manned 
guarding sub-sector. For while the latter was performing security functions -  such as 
patrolling and guarding -  which had traditionally been claimed as the exclusive 
preserve of the modern state, the state had never sought to monopolise electronic 
security technology such as alarms. As a consequence, this technologically orientated 
sub-sector was at no point in its history compelled to capture legitimacy from the core 
state institutions so as to satisfy the majority of the British population’s normative 
expectations about how security ought to be provided. The security alarms systems 
companies were, for all intents and purposes, ordinary market actors. Thus statutory 
regulation represented for this sub-sector not so much an opportunity to expand their 
operations as an unnecessary exercise in extending bureaucratic red tape into their 
marketplace.
The security alarms systems sub-sector aside, however, the responses o f the core 
policy network actors to the White Paper were extremely positive. Indeed, the 
responses of the non-core actors were, it seems, equally enthusiastic: “Over 180 
responses [to the White Paper] were received from a broad range o f interests within 
the industry and outside. The great majority were supportive o f the proposals”.41 
Unlike previous consultation processes, then, the negotiations surrounding the 1999
39 Security Management Today, ‘Special Report: Regulation’ (May 1999), p.28.
40 Security Management Today, ‘Special Report: Regulation’ (May 1999), p.28. See also: National 
Approval Council for Security Systems, Response to the White Paper: The Government’s Proposals fo r  
the Regulation o f  the Private Security Industry in England and Wales (Unpublished, July 1999).
41 Home Office, Private Security Industry Bill [H.L.] Explanatory Notes (London: HMSO, 2000), p.2.
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White Paper were not characterised by contestation between numerous sets of 
practices over the implementation of statutory regulation, but were rather defined by 
an ever consolidating reformist-pluralist consensus in favour or statutory regulation. 
This in turn provided a conducive context for the government to introduce the 
corresponding bill into Parliament and set in motion the constitutional processes 
which would eventually serve to significantly enhance the legitimacy o f the private 
security industry in postwar Britain.
7.5 The Private Security Industry Act 2001
On 7th December 2000, the Private Security Industry Bill was presented to the House 
of Lords. With the exception of two changes, both of which served to narrow the 
scope of the regulatory regime, the Bill was basically the same as the White Paper. 
First, the security alarms systems sub-sector was removed from the Bill, which no 
doubt reflected their ambivalence to licensing. Second, and far more controversially, 
all in-house licensing, except in the case of door supervisors and wheelclampers, was 
removed from the Bill.42 Charles Clarke, then the Minister o f State for the Home 
Office responsible for steering the Bill through the House of Commons, subsequently 
explained the rationale behind this exclusion. To begin with, he argued, in-house 
security employees would be subjected to a more thorough internal vetting process 
than contract employees, thereby rendering an extra level of vetting unnecessary -  a 
line of reasoning which, understandably, convinced very few reformists within the 
security sector negotiations. In addition, and probably much closer to the underlying 
truth, Clarke noted that the inclusion of in-house personnel would take the estimated 
number of licenses needed to between 300,000 and 350,000 and would therefore 
overload the regulator.43 Either way, this modification is notable for being the main 
cause of controversy in the Bill’s subsequent progress through Parliament. And for 
our purposes it is important to note that it only impacted upon the reformist agenda -  
it did not have any repercussions for the pluralist practices of the private security 
industry and their attempts to capture legitimacy from the state through a system of 
statutory regulation.
42 HL Bill (2000-01) [4],
43 Stg Co Deb (2000-01) Co B Private Security Industry Bill, col.68.
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The Bill’s passage through the House Of Lords was nevertheless relatively smooth, 
although not as we shall see without a crucial intervention by the BSIA. To begin 
with, it is important to recognise that especially during its first term in office, before 
the invasion of Iraq created deep political divisions, New Labour was in a powerful 
position within the British political system and party discipline was very high. Thus 
upon its entry into the House of Lords, the Private Security Industry Bill experienced 
strong support from the Labour benches. The Conservative benches, however, were 
still characterised in part by a distinct anti-regulation neoliberal standpoint, and were 
not initially so enthusiastic. And it was only following a consultation with David 
Cowden, then the BSIA Chairman, that they decided to support the Bill. Cowden 
recalls the consultation as follows:
I remember getting a call, I was Chairman of the BSIA at that stage, not 
working for Securicor, and got this call to go and see a group in the 
Lords...They said, ‘Right, thank you for coming, now you don’t want this 
legislation at all do you?’ It was a Tory group, you know. And they were really 
flummoxed when I said, ‘Well, yes’. ‘You do?’, they said, ‘Oh crikey, but isn’t 
this interference?’ I said, ‘Yes, but for the last few years now the responsible 
end of the industry, and the BSIA as its mouthpiece, have been moving towards 
a regulatory process. The fact that we’ve been getting into prisons, airport 
security, seaport security, military establishment security, we deserve some 
degree of recognition. That’s what we’re talking about. We have to keep 
defending this position that we’re all a bunch of vandals, but w e’re not. Apart 
from being a huge industry, we deserve something better.’ And they said, ‘Oh 
right, so what do you want us to do?’ So I said, ‘All I really want you to do is 
tidy up.’44
It is therefore against the backdrop of this exchange that we must interpret the 
assertion made by Lord Cope of Berkeley, the Conservative peer who led his Party’s 
contribution towards the House of Lords debate on the Bill, that: “We accept the 
judgement of the Government that it is time to legislate”.45 And later in the Bill’s 
second reading Lord Viscount, another Conservative peer, confirmed this support 
when he remarked that this was “ ...no t...a  party politically controversial Bill”.46 
Given this fundamental consensus, greatly lubricated by a key industry representative, 
the Bill progressed through the committee and report stages in the Lords with only 
minor amendments -  although it is worth noting that in both o f these stages there
44 Interview with David Cowden, conducted on 19lh November 2007.
45 HL Deb (2000-01), vol.620, coi.581.
46 HL Deb (2000-01), vol.620, col.592.
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were unsuccessful attempts by reformists to bring in-house licensing back into the 
legislation.47 48
Having completed its route through the House of Lords, the Bill was then 
introduced into the House of Commons for its second reading on 15th March 2001. 
With New Labour’s enormous majority of 179 seats there should have been few 
difficulties in steering the Bill through the Commons. However, a potential problem 
did emerge in the form of Bruce George, who was considering withdrawing his 
support because of the removal of in-house licensing, which he judged to be a 
significant blow to his reformist agenda. While the loss of George’s endorsement 
would certainly not have endangered the government’s capacity to secure the Bill’s 
passage into the statute books, it would hardly have represented an auspicious 
beginning for the regulatory regime to have its main parliamentary supporter and 
campaigner stand against it. In the event, however, circumstances in the form of the 
impending general election prevented George from opposing the Bill, as he recalled:
Charles [Clarke] then said, ‘I don’t mind you speaking against the Bill, that’s 
your privilege, but if  you successfully move any amendments, and the 
amendment is carried in the Commons, then the Bill is the prisoner of the Lords. 
The election is going to be X date, and if one person objects to the Bill as it has 
come from the Commons then that’s the end of your Bill. And I can’t guarantee 
that the Bill will be in the next Queen’s speech’.49
This scenario was indeed very plausible, especially since the reinsertion of in-house 
licensing, George’s most likely first target for amendment, had already been rejected 
twice within the Lords. So faced with the choice of supporting a Bill he thought was 
not sufficiently ‘wide’ or losing the opportunity to regulate the industry after almost a 
quarter of a century of persistent campaigning, George understandably chose the 
former option. As a consequence, the Bill’s passage through the second reading, 
committee, report and third reading was, at least among the most prominent 
parliamentary actors involved, characterised once again by consensus. Indeed, in the 
last of seven committee sittings, Simon Hughes, the Home Affairs spokesman for the 
Liberal Democrats, commented that: “An important Bill, long in gestation, has been
47 House o f Commons Library, The Private Security Industry Bill [HL], Research Paper 01/34 
(London: HMSO, 2001), p.18.
48 Interview with Bruce George, conducted on 301'1 October 2007:
49 Interview with Bruce George, conducted on 30lh October 2007.
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dealt with in one of the least confrontational ways of any Home Office Bill that I can 
remember. I am glad that there was such consensus.. .”.50
This said, some fundamental concerns were nevertheless voiced by a few of the 
more peripheral parliamentary actors, who clearly held deep reservations about the 
reformist-pluralist consensus. For example, John Hayes MP (Conservative) remarked 
during the second reading that:
Unless the private security industry can, through the Bill and other measures 
that the House might introduce, conform to the constitutional role o f the police 
that I have described, maintain the public trust that I have illustrated, and -  
vitally -  ensure that those ethical standards for law enforcement are maintained,
I believe that we are heading towards a dangerous abyss, into which no member 
of the House, of whatever party, would wish us to tumble.51 52
Such concerns were given further credibility by the similarly grave warnings of the 
Police Federation, who ensured that their arguments regarding the dangers of 
legitimating the private security companies by supporting their pluralist practices 
were communicated through another Conservative MP, Peter Luff. These dissenting 
voices, which seemed to be pitched somewhere between the hard-line reformist and 
monopoly agendas, were clearly perturbed by the notion o f officially conveying to "the 
public that the industry was now a legitimate state-deputised partner in the high- 
profile fight against crime.
Yet these last throes from the diminishing monopoly lobby'and the disillusioned 
reformist lobby barely registered against the parliamentary majority o f satisfied 
reformers and pluralists. As a consequence, the Private Security Industry Act 
successfully reached the statute books on 11th May 2001, less than one month before 
the 2001 general election which had almost inadvertently derailed the Bill’s passage 
through Parliament. In form, partly due to the manner in which it was rushed through 
Parliament, but more as a result of the underlying consensus, the Act resembled the 
Bill in every crucial respect: a mandatory licensing system would ensure that the 
contract side of the manned guarding, private investigator, security consultant and 
keyholder sub-sectors, together with the contract and in-house sides of the door 
supervisor and vehicle immobiliser (i.e. wheelclamping) sub-sectors, were populated
50 Stg Co Deb (2000-01) Co B Private Security Industry Bill, col.232.
51 HC Deb (2000-01), vol.365, col. 1048.
52 HC Deb (2000-01), vol.365, cols. 1005-1011.
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by ‘fit and proper persons’ (which now meant non-criminals with a bare minimum of 
mandatory training, thereby making the regime ever so slightly deeper); a voluntary 
accreditation scheme would encourage companies to maintain high levels of training 
and delivery standards; these regulatory tools would be administered and enforced 
(using a created series of newly criminal offences) by the Security Industry Authority 
(SIA), a non-departmental public body directly accountable to the Home Secretary; 
and the Home Secretary, in collaboration with the SIA, was given the power to 
modify the regulatory regime through secondary legislation using statutory 
instruments.53
Significantly, however, the Act itself did not put forward any kind of strategic 
vision for the future development of the private security industry, for like all Acts of 
Parliament it was characterised by dense legalese which was purposely designed to 
narrowly define the Act’s implications. As a consequence, there were no allusions to 
the important partnership rhetoric which so strikingly characterised the content o f the 
White Paper and subsequent parliamentary debates. Yet this is not to say that this 
crucial rhetoric disappeared. For instance, John Cairncross, current Home Office lead 
for private security regulation, recently explained that the Home Office has used a 
combination of both the rhetorically powerful White Paper and the densely detailed 
2001 Act in constructing the resulting regulatory regime so as to ensure that the 
strategic vision of a partnership between the industry and the state has indeed been 
translated into some kind of institutional reality.54 In a sense, then, the entire process 
from the 1999 White Paper to the 2001 Act can be taken as one legislative package 
which served to map out the future of the private security industry in England and 
Wales (and eventually Scotland and Northern Ireland).
Crucially, it was a package which represented a historic turning point in the 
constitution of the security sector. For it demonstrated that the future of security 
provision in Britain was to be constructed upon a reformist-pluralist alliance. 
Drawing upon the reformist side of this alliance, the private security companies were 
to be reformed in order to bring the operations of these companies and their 
employees in line with state-determined notions of ‘good’ security provision. For 
instance, private security guards would now have to meet certain criteria to ensure
53 Private Security Industry Act 2001 (c. 12) (London: HMSO). See also: Bruce George and Mark 
Button, Understanding the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (Caltrop Online, 2002).
54 Interview with John Cairncross, conducted on 15th August 2007.
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that they were ‘fit and proper persons’, they would have to be better trained than 
before and their activities would be situated in clear lines o f accountability leading 
directly to the Home Secretary. More importantly for our purposes, however, drawing 
upon the pluralist side of this alliance, the industry was to be put through a formal 
process of re-legitimation. Private security companies were to become the official 
partners of the police within the ‘extended policing family’ and private security 
guards would now carry physical licenses asserting that they were state-endorsed 
security providers. In 2001, then, after more than half a century of lobbying, the 
private security companies had to a large extent realised their long-standing objective 
o f formally capturing legitimacy from the modern state through a system of statutory 
regulation.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that while the security sector in the years 1997-2001 
was again characterised by political negotiations between different sets o f state and 
society practices, it seems that in the months leading up to and during the passage of 
the Private Security Industry Act 2001 the formerly intense contestation between 
these practices was largely giving way to a degree of consensus. To be sure, it was 
still possible to see four distinct sets of practices being promoted by a variety of 
public and private actors during this period. And each of these sets o f practices 
continued to represent a concerted effort to bring about a particular ensemble of 
institutional arrangements within the security sector. For instance, it was once again 
possible to witness: the monopoly practices, which represented an attempt to create a 
monopolistic system of security provision in which the state alone is endowed with 
the legitimacy to undertake security functions; the neoliberal practices, which 
represented an attempt to inculcate the security sector with the logic of the unfettered 
market; the reformist practices, which represented an attempt to institute a state- 
controlled system of security provision in which a reformed private security industry 
was placed at the foot of a hierarchically ordered security sector; and finally the 
pluralist set of practices, which represented an attempt to bring about a pluralised 
system of security provision in which public and private security providers were able 
to legitimately function alongside one another in the postwar security sector. Given, 
then, that all of these sets of practices were evident in this phase o f negotiations, the
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security sector never became a completely uncontested domain, even during this 
period of relative calm. As the state-in-society approach would suggest, then, this 
core political domain, which many consider to be the impenetrable heart o f the state, 
was characterised by a degree of contestation.
Yet it is important to recognise that during this period the monopoly and neoliberal 
sets of practices barely registered at all within the security sector negotiations. For the 
institutional arrangements that the proponents of these two sets o f practices sought to 
realise were no longer regarded as being viable by the core actors within the security 
sector. Instead, the negotiations were completely dominated by the allied proponents 
o f the reformist and pluralist sets of practices, which included the parliamentary actors 
and some members of the police on the reformist side, the private security institutions 
on the pluralist side, and the New Labour government and ACPO in the middle- 
ground between these two positions. The final outcome of the negotiations in the 
form of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 thus reflected the joint preferences of 
the these two allied sets of practices. This in turn meant that the Act constituted an 
explicit attempt to both reform and re-legitimate the private security industry. 
Crucially for our present purposes, then, the Act was explicitly designed in part to 
directly confer legitimacy upon the operations of the private security companies -  in 
other words, it represented a critical moment in the re-legitimation of private security 
in postwar Britain. So, viewed historically, although the Act was brought about 
within the context of a strong political consensus, especially when compared to the 
dominance of the anti-regulation monopoly practices during the immediate postwar 
decades, the Act also serves to highlight the enormous degree o f change which had 
occurred as a direct consequence of the security sector negotiations. For the much of 
the postwar era, the re-legitimation of private security represented an anathema to the 
core state institutions, yet at the turn of the twenty-first century these very same 
institutions were in part responsible for setting in motion this very process.
This chapter has also illustrated, however, that despite this significant historical 
transformation in the constitution of the security sector brought about by the passage 
of the Private Security Industry Act 2001, this key political domain was nevertheless 
still characterised by a strong current of continuity. For the structural influence of the 
image of the state continued to shape the course of the security sector negotiations. It 
seems that at the turn of the twenty-first century a sizeable proportion of the British 
population continued to believe that the state ought to be the only legitimate provider
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of security functions in postwar Britain -  that is, they continued to believe in the 
powerful monopoly myth. Indeed, the 2001/2002 British Crime Survey discovered 
that 75 percent of the public considered that the police were doing a ‘very good’ or 
‘fairly good’ job.55 To be sure, this figure had fallen by 17 percent since the first 
British Crime Survey in 1982, which revealed that 92 percent of respondants thought 
that the police were doing a ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ job.56 57 Yet even with this 
decline, public support for the police was still comparatively high -  for instance, in 
2002 the National Institute of Justice in the United States found that only 59 percent 
of the American public expressed ‘a great deal’ of confidence in their public police. 
These statistics therefore seem to further corroborate the notion that the power of the 
monopoly myth among the British public remained strong at the beginnning of the 
twenty-first century. Within this cultural context, then, the miscellany of public and 
private institutions operating within the security sector were compelled to integrate 
this belief -  or image of the state -  into their respective practices so as to avoid 
encountering any cultural resistance towards their activities. As we have consistently 
seen throughout this and previous chapters, both the reformist and pluralist sets of 
practices, like the dominant monopoly practices, were consequently imbued with the 
structural influence of the image of the state. In the case of the reformists, this 
structural influence was relatively direct, reflected in their vision of a state-controlled 
security sector which permitted a reformed private security industry to exist at the foot 
of a hierarchically ordered system of security provision. In thé case o f the pluralists, 
this structural influence was less direct and was reflected in their attempts to obfuscate 
their commercial status by capturing legitimacy from the state through a system of 
statutory regulation. Given that the Private Security Industry Act 2001 was based 
upon the preferences of these two sets of practices, this important piece of legislation 
thus served to reproduce key elements of the image of the state. As the state-in- 
society approach would suggest, then, despite the considerable changes that had taken 
place within the security sector over the past five decades, this political domain was 
also characterised by a pronounced current of continuity brought about by the 
structural influence of the image of the state.
55 Jansson, British Crime Survey, p.21.
56 Jansson, British Crime Survey, p.21.
57 Tyler, ‘Enhancing Police Legitimacy’, p.90.
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It is important to emphasise once again that it has been this dialectical process of 
continuity and change, expressed here through the state-in-society concepts of image 
and practice, which serves to elucidate the complex political processes relating to the 
re-legitimation private security in postwar Britain. For on one side, it has been the 
ever-changing and fluid nature of state and society practices in the security sector 
which explains how the private security institutions managed to form such a durable 
and politically .powerful alliance with the parliamentary actors, the police and the 
government in order to push their pluralist preferences to the forefront of the security 
sector negotiations. On the other, it has been the strong current o f continuity created 
by the structural influence of the image of the state which explains why these private 
security institutions have consistently harnessed their agency not to function as 
market actors within the security sector but rather to capture legitimacy from the state. 
It is the interplay between these two processes, then, which explains the re­
legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
7.7 Epilogue
This investigation has now demonstrated that between 1945 and 2001 the private 
security industry struggled and toiled to shape its operations in accordance with the 
image, of the state -  that is, in accordance with the majority of the British population’s 
state-centric normative expectations about how security ought, to be provided. With 
the passage of the Private Security Industry Act 2001, it seems that the private 
security industry had finally accomplished this long-term objective. For in alliance 
with a number of state institutions, it had succeeded in establishing a clear and 
official-looking connection with the state which would theoretically serve to confer 
state legitimacy upon the operations of the private security companies. The aim of 
this epilogue is to offer some brief observations about the extent to which this strategy 
has actually worked over the subsequent years. This means exploring the following 
two questions: following the passage of the 2001 Act does the British population now 
think that the state-deputised and state-regulated private security companies ought to 
provide security functions in postwar Britain?; and have the institutional arrangements 
envisaged in the Act translated into the anticipated commercial advantage for the 
private security companies?
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In order to explore these questions, it first necessary to provide a brief time-line of 
the post-2001 regulatory regime. To begin with, the Security Industry Authority was 
officially instituted in April 2003 with the stated objectives of increasing public trust 
in the private security companies, improving standards and professionalism across the 
industry and strengthening the position of the industry within the ‘extended policing 
family’ -  objectives which clearly followed on from the intentions o f the White 
Paper.58 The SIA’s geographical remit initially included just England and Wales, but 
was then extended to Scotland in June 2006 and will be further stretched to cover 
Northern Ireland in 2009. The process of implementing the full licensing scheme 
began in earnest during March 2006 (door supervisors were given an earlier start point 
of June 2004), and by June 2008 over 250,000 licenses had been issued within the 
security guarding, close protection, door supervisor, cash-in-transit, public space 
surveillance, vehicle immobiliser and key-holding sub-sectors -  although it is 
important to note that security guarding accounted for over half o f the issued licenses 
and therefore continued to represent the most important sub-sector.59 In addition, by 
June 2008 a total of 498 companies had attained ‘approved contractor’ status through 
the voluntary accreditation scheme, including the largest multinational providers such 
as Group 4 Securicor (which was created through a merger o f Group 4 and Securicor 
in July 2004).60
Once the regulatory regime had been running for one year, the SIA commissioned 
an initial review of the impact of licensing upon the security 'guard sub-sector. The 
resulting research illustrated that while licensing was indeed serving to further 
legitimate the industry, in important respects progress was relatively slow. On the 
positive side, 83 percent of the security guards surveyed thought that the public 
trusted them more since they had been subjected to criminal records checks, 73 
percent judged that the public were now more aware of how security guards can 
enhance security and community safety, and 57 percent then reflected that this 
increased public trust and respect was attributable to the “national, recognisable
58 Security Industry Authority, Corporate and Business Plans 2003 to 2006  (London: SIA, 2003),
pp.10-11.
59 Security Industry Authority, Licensing Statistics, 16th June 2008 -  accessed online on 17lh June 2008 
at: www.the-sia.org.uk/home/licensing/stats_2.htm.
60 Security Industry Authority, Register o f Approved Contractors, 16th June 2008 -  accessed online on 
17lh June 2008 at: http://www.the-sia.org.uk/home/acs/roac.htm.
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license”.61 62 Furthermore, 33 percent declared that they have enjoyed a better
ft"}relationship with the police since the regulatory regime was implemented. 
Significantly, these statistics do seem to indicate a relatively direct relationship 
between intentions of the Act and its consequences. They suggest that the private 
security industry has gradually been assuming a more legitimate position within the 
British security sector.
Less encouraging from the industry’s perspective, however, is the fact that so far 
most companies have been unable to translate this increased legitimacy into rising 
profit margins. For only 13 percent of companies asserted that licensing had 
increased turnover, while 19 percent actually considered that licensing had 
contributed towards a decrease in turnover. The majority (54 percent) simply 
concluded that licensing had no impact upon their profit margins.63 The most 
probable reason for this can perhaps be found in the statistic that 69 percent of 
companies reported that while customers seem to recognise the positive impact of 
licensing, they are still motivated only by price, which in turn indicates that the 
‘grudge purchase’ is still a factor. This aside, however, it is also important to note 
that 27 percent reached the opposite conclusion: that it was possible to translate 
increased legitimacy into profit.64 Interestingly, the research indicated that it was the 
larger companies which were using the licensing scheme to successfully expand into 
more areas of security provision and to increase profits.65 This finding is further 
reinforced by the observations of Jorgen Philip-Sorensen, drawing upon his 
experiences with Group 4 Securicor, who recently commented that: “Today security 
guards are doing things which were never dreamed of a few years ago. Licensing is 
undoubtedly a key to this. It has been expensive, but it has made a dramatic 
difference”.66 An example of the new opportunities available to companies such as 
Group 4 Securicor was provided by the announcement in July 2008 that:
*
One of Britain’s largest private security firms [Group 4 Securicor] is to be 
awarded a £100 million contract to provide cover for the emergency services if
61 IFF Research, Security Guard Licensing, Research Report Prepared for SIA/COI (London: SIA, 
2007), p.34.
62 IFF Research, Security Industry Licensing, p.27.
63 IFF Research, Security Industry Licensing, p.42.
64 IFF Research, Security Industry Licensing, p.44.
65 IFF Research, Security Industry Licensing, p.46.
66 Interview with Jorgen Philip-Sorenson, conducted on 17th December 2007.
220
they are on strike or swamped by a national disaster, because the army is too 
stretched to offer back-up.67
This suggests that just as the larger companies led the industry into regulation, it is 
these same companies which are being the quickest to capitalise upon the increased 
legitimacy brought by the licensing system. Yet there are also some signs that the 
ability to transform legitimacy into profit is trickling down the industry, as Baroness 
Henig, current Chairman of the SIA, has recently commented: “ ...gradually people 
are now seeing that if they can actually improve the standard o f the industry and if 
they can improve its image, they can get more business”.68
In essence, what these preliminary research findings suggest is that the Private 
Security Industry Act 2001 has certainly not brought about some kind of historical 
end point in which the private security industry has been completely re-legitimated -  
indeed, as we have seen with the ebbing and flowing o f legitimacy throughout this 
thesis, such end points simply do not exist. Rather it has triggered another critical 
stage in the long process of re-legitimation. David Dickinson, former Managing 
Director of Group 4 and current BSIA Chief Executive, captured this state o f affairs 
very effectively when he remarked that “[licensing is the start of a journey”. He 
continued:
If the future forty years ago was to get public acceptability o f what we do, the 
future in the next forty years is to move up our people, 'their standing, their 
status, their skills, their accountability, into the area where the police officers 
are. If you go to Sweden [where there is a long history of statutory regulation], 
police officers and private security officers have the same esteem in public 
affection. That’s been achieved by upscaling the private security industry to the 
point where is can in its own way be as professional, accountable and useful as 
the police can in theirs.69
Yet while this is only one further stage in the long process of re-legitimation, it is 
likely to be a decisive one. For it is predicted here that over next few years we will 
see the private security companies gradually capturing ever greater degrees of 
legitimacy from the state as they increasingly conform to the majority of the British 
population’s state-centric normative expectations about how security ought to be 
delivered. If this is to be the case then in the future we will no doubt witness the
67 The Observer, ‘Group 4 Backup for Emergency Services’, 13th July 2008.
68 Interview with Baroness Henig, conducted 28lh June 2007.
69 Interview with David Dickinson, conducted on 25th October 2007.
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development of a security sector characterised by, on the one hand, an ever more 
complex, hybrid system of public-private security provision and, on the other, those 
state-centric notions of security provision which were originally set down in the 
enlightenment political thought of Hobbes and his contemporaries and have been 
perpetuated ever since by the powerful monopoly myth.
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BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL
Conclusion
8
8.1 The Route to Re-Legitimation
The research question posed at the beginning o f this investigation was: how have 
private security companies once again become legitimate providers of security 
functions within postwar Britain? In order to answer this question, it was first 
contended that we needed to develop an organising perspective for examining the 
relationship between three variables: the state, private security institutions and the 
legitimacy to undertake security functions. We could not utilise the monopoly 
paradigm, it was argued, because in asserting that the state can and should be the only 
institution with the legitimacy to undertake security functions it severely underplays 
and obfuscates the way in which both public and private security providers have 
contested the institutional space within the security sector. This said, it was also 
argued that the state-centric ideas about security provision put forward within the 
monopoly paradigm have nevertheless served to profoundly influence the way in 
which politicians, intellectuals and everyday citizens think about security provision, 
which in turn influences the nature of this contestation between these public and 
private security providers. The monopoly paradigm has therefore been viewed not as 
an organising perspective but rather as a powerful myth throughout the course of this 
investigation. It was thus reasoned that in order to understand the re-legitimation of 
private security in postwar Britain, we needed to develop an organising perspective 
which accounted for the complex, dialectical relationship between the public-private 
contestation within the security sector and the ideational influence of the monopoly 
myth.
This dialectical relationship, it was then argued, could be successfully articulated 
using the state-in-society model. For this approach makes an important distinction 
between, on one side, the inherent complexity and messiness of the institutional 
‘practices’ of state and society actors in all political domains and, on the other, the 
cohesive and unifying ideational influence of the ‘image’ of the state, especially 
within core political domains such as the security sector. By analysing the conflicting 
and contrasting ‘practices’ of state and private security institutions within the security
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sector, together with the unifying influence of the ‘image’ of the state within this 
sector (the monopoly myth), it was thus asserted that the state-in-society approach 
represented the most effective organising perspective for answering the research 
question. Against this theoretical backdrop, the majority of this thesis has proceeded 
to demonstrate that in order to comprehend the re-legitimation of private security in 
postwar Britain, we need to understand the interactions between four distinct sets of 
practices and their respective interpretations of the image o f the state (or monopoly 
myth) within the security sector. These four sets of practices have been categorised as 
follows.
1) Monopoly Practices. Beginning with a very literal and direct interpretation o f the 
image of the state, those institutions advocating the monopoly set o f practices believe 
that only state institutions such as the public police have the requisite legitimacy to 
provide security functions within postwar Britain. Private security companies are 
accordingly viewed as illegitimate ‘private armies’ which advance a particularistic 
and atomised vision of social order. They are seen to be invading institutional space 
which only state institutions have the legitimate right to occupy. As a consequence, 
those institutions advancing the monopoly practices attempt to undermine the 
operations of private security companies so as to ensure that security provision 
remains a universal, state-centred public good. Moreover, they are firm opponents of 
statutory regulation, for they regard this institutional mechanism as a dangerous 
device which could serve to re-legitimate private security provision.
2) Reformist Practices. Like the monopoly practices, those institutions advancing 
the reformist practices interpret the image of the state in quite a straightforward 
manner to mean that state institutions such as the public police ought to exercise a 
legitimate monopoly over security provision. Unlike the monopoly practices, 
however, they recognise that this institutional formula represents an unachievable 
ideal within postwar Britain and they  ^in turn accept the reality o f private security 
provision in the security sector. Yet this is not a passive acceptance, for as far as 
possible the reformists seek to bring the operations of the private security companies 
in line with the idea of security provision as a universal and egalitarian public good, 
as specified in the image of the state. Crucially, they aim to accomplish this by 
enforcing state-determined standards of security provision upon the private security 
companies through a system of statutory regulation. While they recognise that this 
strategy might also serve to indirectly re-legitimate the private security companies,
225
this is regarded as an acceptable unintended consequence in the name of enhancing 
public safety. Insofar as the reformists both support statutory regulation and accept its 
unintentional consequences, then, they represent the indirect facilitators of the re­
legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
3) Pluralist Practices. Compared to the monopoly and reformist practices, those 
institutions advancing the pluralist practices interpret the image of the state in a more 
indirect manner. To be sure, they recognise the structural influence of its key 
principles, in particular the state-centric notions o f legitimacy. But they do not view 
this legitimacy as being the non-transferable quality of state institutions. Instead, they 
regard it as a free-floating resource which can be colonised by state and non-state 
institutions alike. In the case of the state institutions, the colonisation of this key 
resource is seen to be relatively straightforward, for they simply have to follow 
constitutionally defined standards and lines of accountability. In the case of non-state 
institutions such as the private security companies, the colonisation of this key 
resource is viewed as a much more complicated affair. For these companies need to 
somehow develop official connections with those state institutions already endowed 
with this legitimacy in order to capture it from them. Their main strategy for bringing 
about this complicated institutional set up is to lobby for statutory regulation. With 
their attempts to bring about a system of statutory regulation in order to capture 
legitimacy from the state, then, those institutions advancing the pluralist practices are 
the main agents of the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
4) Neoliberal Practices. Unlike the other three sets of practices, those institutions 
advocating the neoliberal practices largely disregard the structural influence of the 
image o f the state upon the postwar British security sector. State-centric notions of 
legitimacy and the idea of security as a universal public good are considered to be 
unimportant. As such, the security sector is viewed as an ‘open-house’ in which any 
security provider, public or private, can unproblematically establish its operations. 
Furthermore, the neoliberals view statutory regulation of private security companies 
with suspicion, for they consider it to be a constraint upon the ability of commercial 
organisations to provide security through the logic of the unfettered market. To the 
extent that those institutions advancing the neoliberal practices challenge the idea of 
statutory regulation, then, they can be viewed as opponents of the re-legitimation of 
private security in postwar Britain.
226
It has been demonstrated over the preceding chapters that in order to comprehend 
the processes relating to the re-legitimation of private security, it has been necessary 
to analyse the intense political contestation and negotiation which has occurred 
between these four sets of practices in postwar Britain. As we have seen, these 
processes of contestation and negotiations have unfolded in five distinct phases. 
Phase one (1945-1959) was characterised by the gradual development of and 
subsequent clash between the pluralist practices by Securicor and the monopoly 
practices by the Metropolitan Police. During these immediate postwar years, the 
Metropolitan Police completely dominated Securicor within the negotiations over the 
constitution of the security sector. For while at this time Metropolitan Police were 
endowed with considerable reserves of political, economic and administrative 
resources, Securicor were vastly inferior in these important respects. Yet, crucially, it 
was the inventive and calculated strategising of these pluralists which began to lay 
down the strategy o f capturing legitimacy from the state institutions so as to enhance 
their status within the security sector.
Phase two (1960-69) witnessed the consolidation of this emerging contest between 
the monopoly and pluralist sets of practices. On the monopoly side, the Metropolitan 
Police were reinforced by the Home Office and other high-ranking police officers 
who coordinated their agenda through a series of Home Office Working Parties. On 
the pluralist side, Securicor were joined by other large private security companies 
who, following the instructions of the Home Office, started to organise their lobbying 
agenda through the British Security Industry Association. While the Home Office 
and police still had a clear advantage in terms of bargaining resources, the private 
security institutions were much stronger than in the preceding decade and were 
accordingly able to collectively advance their pluralist practices with more and more 
success. Moreover, during this phase statutory regulation became the central issue 
around which the negotiations revolved. On one side of the regulation debate, the 
private security institutions were ardent advocates o f regulation, for they conjectured 
that it would allow them to capture a significant degree of legitimacy from the central 
state institutions. Conversely, the flome Office and police were equally resolute 
opponents of regulation because they wanted to prevent any such transfer of 
legitimacy. During this period the anti-regulation monopoly practices of the Home 
Office and police continued to control the security sector negotiations, but the pro­
regulation pluralist practices of the private security institutions were nevertheless
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making considerable headway. At this time, then, the re-legitimation of private 
security in postwar Britain gradually began to look more plausible.
Phase three (1969-79) saw the establishment of the reformist practices by a number 
of parliamentary actors. Importantly, the reformists soon entered into an alliance with 
the pluralists since both positions supported statutory regulation, albeit for different 
reasons. This alliance started to shift the balance of the negotiations away from the 
anti-regulation monopoly agenda of the Home Office and police. Yet after almost a 
decade of often intense debates, these institutions nevertheless managed to once again 
reassert their monopoly practices upon the security sector negotiations. This said, it 
was becoming increasingly clear that the reformist-pluralist partnership did have the 
potential to fundamentally reshape the nature of security provision within postwar 
Britain by creating a broad pro-regulation consensus, which would in turn have the 
effect of both reforming and re-legitimating the private security industry.
Phase four (1979-1996) did indeed see the emergence of a consensus around the 
pro-regulation agenda of the reformists and pluralists, thereby laying the foundations 
for the formal re-legitimation of the private security industry. However, the path to 
this consensus was complex. After reassessing the shift in political-economic context 
brought about by the rise o f neoliberalism in the early 1980s, many private security 
companies moved from a pluralist to neoliberal set of practices, in the process 
undermining the reformist-pluralist alliance. Towards the end of the 1980s, however, 
this neoliberal experiment began to falter, plunging the industry into a further 
legitimation crisis. Most of the private security companies accordingly returned to the 
pluralist position and entered back into partnership with the reformists. This new 
permutation of the reformist-pluralist partnership was, however, strengthened by the 
growth of the private security companies during the 1980s and the addition o f ACPO 
and the Police Federation on the reformist side of the alliance. As consequence of this 
newly empowered partnership, when the reformists and pluralists pushed once again 
for statutory regulation during the mid-1990s they eventually succeeded, thereby 
setting in motion the political processes which resulted in the Private Security 
Industry Act 2001. It is important to mention that during the mid-1990s the Home 
Office, now in a rather isolated position, did continue to oppose statutory regulation. 
However, after a radical transformation in the world view of the Home Office during 
the 1980s, this opposition was now advanced from a neoliberal perspective rather than 
monopoly one. Either way, with the reformist-pluralist constructed consensus, both
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the monopoly and neoliberal sets of practices, together with their very different 
objections to statutory regulation, were by the mid-1990s cast into the periphery of the 
negotiations.
Phase five (1997-2001) witnessed the reformist-pluralist alliance, now further 
concretised by the support of the New Labour government, firmly assert itself upon 
the middle-ground of the negotiations over the constitution o f the security sector. A 
variety of state and non-state institutions adopted positions within the reformist- 
pluralist spectrum, all of which supported the implementation o f statutory regulation. 
Building upon this strong consensus, the preferences of the reformist-pluralist alliance 
were accordingly translated into the Private Security Industry Act 2001. For the 
pluralists, this Act set down the official institutional connection through which 
legitimacy could be transferred from the state institutions to the private security 
companies. It signified, for them, a crucial stage in the ongoing process of re­
legitimating the private security industry in postwar Britain. For the reformists, it 
established the institutional and legal mechanisms by which to impose wider and 
deeper standards of training and accountability upon the private security companies. 
They recognised that this would have the additional effect o f re-legitimating the 
industry, but this was generally regarded as nothing more than an acceptable 
unintended consequence. The few remaining institutions advancing the monopoly 
and neoliberal agendas were now completely marginalised and had virtually no 
influence whatsoever over the construction of the Private Security Industry Act 2001. 
In expressing the preferences o f this reformist-pluralist alliance, then, the Private 
Security Industry Act 2001 was central to the process of re-legitimating the private 
security industry in postwar Britain and represented a historical moment in the 
changing constitution of the security sector more generally.
Regardless of these pronounced processes of political change and contestation, 
however, there was nevertheless a striking current of continuity coursing throughout 
the entire duration of the security sector negotiations. For the structural influence of 
the image of the state was inextricably intertwined with all o f these processes of 
contestation. This was because during the second half of the twentieth century, it 
appears that the majority of the British population continued to more or less believe 
that the state ought to be the only provider of security functions in postwar Britain -  
that is, they continued to believe in the powerful monopoly myth. And with the 
notable exception of the unsustainable neoliberal practices, each set of practices
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necessarily reflected elements of the image of the state so as to avoid encountering 
any cultural resistance. This was most clearly evident in the monopoly practices, 
which were designed to directly translate the monopolistic image o f the state into an 
institutional reality. It was quite clearly evident, too, in the reformist practices, which 
were designed to institute a state-controlled system of security provision in which a 
reformed private security industry was integrated into the lower echelons of the 
security sector. And, most importantly, it was indirectly evident in the pluralist 
practices, which were designed to reconcile the problematic status o f the industry with 
the monopoly myth by attempting to confer state legitimacy upon the private security 
companies through a system of statutory regulation. In addition, it was not evident at 
all in the neoliberal practices, which in large part explains why they were so 
unsustainable. Due to the widespread structural influence of the image o f the state, 
then, any political outcome resulting from negotiations between these sets of practices 
would inevitably contain elements of this image. This was certainly the case with the 
Private Security Industry Act 2001. For the regulatory regime legislated for in this 
Act essentially had two purposes: first, to reform the industry in line with state- 
determined standards of security provision (the reformist preferences); second, to 
transfer legitimacy from the state to the private security industry so as to communicate 
to the public that the industry is a legitimate provider of security functions (the 
pluralist preferences). To the extent that these outcomes are now being realised -  and 
as we have seen in the Epilogue early evidence indicates that this is indeed the case -  
then it is possible to conclude that the Private Security Industry Act 2001 has served 
to both usher in a radical new era of security provision and, at the same time, 
reproduce those state-centric notions of security provision which have their origins in 
the enlightenment.
This said, it is both significant and interesting to mention that the degree to which 
these state-centric notions of security provision have been reproduced over the 
postwar decades has gradually diminished. This important trend has been related to 
notable shifts in the dominant sets of practices during this period. For instance, 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the monopoly practices o f the Home Office 
and police largely determined the political outcomes within the security sector. The 
aim of these institutions was to directly translate the image of the state -  or, more 
specifically, a hierarchical state-monopolised security sector -  into some kind of 
institutional reality. Of course, they never actually managed to completely realise this
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objective, as evidenced by the steady expansion of the private security companies. 
And this is why the monopoly myth has remained just that -  a myth. Yet they did 
nevertheless succeed in bringing about this institutional ensemble to some extent. As 
a consequence, during the years that the monopoly practices o f the Home Office and 
police dominated the negotiations, it was possible to observe that the institutional 
arrangements within security sector did quite strongly resemble the monopoly myth 
(and this, no doubt, serves to explain why the monopoly paradigm became the default 
position for understanding security provision in postwar political science). By the 
turn of the twenty-first century, however, the monopoly practices had long since faded 
away and the security sector negotiations were now dominated by the reformist and 
pluralist practices of the private security institutions, parliamentary actors, the police 
and the New Labour government. Although these institutions did integrate the image 
of the state into their sets of practices to varying degrees, none of them interpreted this 
image as directly and literally as the Home Office and police did in the immediate 
postwar decades. The political outcomes brought about by these reformist and 
pluralist institutions -  most notably the Private Security Industry Act 2001 -  therefore 
reflected the image of the state to a slightly lesser degree than was the case in the past. 
As a result, it can be observed that the distance between the monopoly myth and the 
institutional reality of the security sector has increased over the course o f the postwar 
era. •
Against this backdrop, then, it is also interesting to question whether the content of 
the image of the state correspondingly changed over the postwar decades. For the 
image of the state does not have some kind o f cocooned, independent existence. It is 
located in a dialectical relationship with the different state and society practices. So 
as the dominant practices within the security sector shifted, did the set o f ideas 
embodied within the image of the state change as well? No definite answer can yet be 
given to this question, for it is concerned with recent a very transformation in an 
intangible and subjective variable. Nevertheless, it seems likely that as the 
institutional reality of the security sector moved further away from the normative 
blueprints of the monopoly myth, so the content of the image o f the state to some 
extent transformed. For instance, a security provider interpreting the image of the 
state in 2008 might see a slightly different series of social norms than would have 
been the case half a century earlier. The state-centric notions o f security provision 
would no doubt still be there, but probably in a less absolute maimer than fifty years
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before. If this is indeed the case, then it is possible to conjecture that future 
generations of security providers will in all likelihood be structured by an even more 
diluted image of the state. And this in turn suggests that those state-centric notions of 
security provision which were crystallised over the course of modern political history 
perhaps experienced their high-point in the middle of the twentieth century and have 
since been subjected to a process of slow and steady dilution.
It is critical to highlight, however, that the rate of this dilution really has been 
nothing more than ‘slow and steady’ and should certainly not be over-emphasised. 
For as we have seen, the image of the state during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century was still sufficiently powerful and state-centric to compel the private security 
companies to continue with their long-term strategy of capturing legitimacy from the 
state so as to conform with the majority of the British population’s state-centric 
expectations about how security ought to be provided. This is unsurprising given that 
the monopolistic, state-centric image of the state was one o f the central political 
principles to emerge from the enlightenment and has influenced the world views of 
countless politicians, intellectuals and everyday citizens in Britain ever since. We 
would not therefore expect this profound idea to disappear over the course o f two or 
three generations. Even in a diminished and diluted capacity, then, we can expect the 
image of the state to cause a state-centric current of continuity to course through the 
secuiity sector for many decades to come.
To conclude our charting of the route to re-legitimation, then, it is crucial to once 
again emphasise that it is this combination of continuity and change, examined here 
through the image-practice dialectic, which serves to explain the re-legitimation of 
private security in postwar Britain. For on one side, it was the highly contested and 
fluid nature of state and society practices in the postwar security sector -  the 
supposedly impenetrable heart of the state -  which serves to explain how the private 
security institutions managed over the. course of five decades to fashion a sufficient 
number of political alliances with a variety of state institutions to advance their 
pluralist practices within the negotiations over the legitimacy to undertake security 
functions (although it must be acknowledged that the changing political-economic 
context also had an important impact upon this process). On the other side, it was the 
ever prominent current of continuity generated by the structural influence of the 
image of the state which served to explain why the private security institutions used 
their enhanced agency not to function as purebred market actors within the security
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sector but rather to capture legitimacy from the state via a system of statutory 
regulation. It is the dialectical interplay between these two processes, then, which 
explains the re-legitimation of private security in postwar Britain.
In addition to elucidating this highly significant trend, however, it is important to 
recognise that this theoretically-informed discussion also has a great deal o f relevance 
for the broader academic debates about the nature o f British sovereignty at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, as we will now see.
8.2 The State, Security and Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century
The arguments put forward in this thesis contribute towards two important, and in 
many ways parallel, debates currently rumiing in the disciplines of criminology and 
political science. Within the criminology discipline there is an ongoing contention 
over the extent to which the security sector in Britain is witnessing either the 
emergence of a radical new era of networked, non-state policing or the gradual 
evolution and extension of a traditional, state-centred system. One strand of this 
debate has already been introduced in this thesis during our discussion o f the nodal 
governance and anchored pluralism paradigms. For the nodal governance theorists, 
we are entering into a new networked system of security provision, whereby a 
miscellany of public and private auspices and providers come together in order to 
create security solutions which are sensitive to localised (or nodal) problems of 
disorder. Conversely, the anchored pluralism theorists recognise that private security 
is becoming increasingly prominent, yet they nevertheless regard its expansion as 
being structured by state’s ‘explicit directions’ and ‘implicit permissions’. Private 
security provision is therefore viewed by the anchored pluralism theorists as an 
extension of state rule.
Significantly, by drawing upon the state-in-society approach, which as we have seen 
cuts a middle way in between these two paradigms, this investigation has succeeded 
in capturing elements of both perspectives within a single analysis, and thereby 
advances a new position within this Criminology debate. For it is first asserted here 
that we are indeed witnessing the emergence of new trends within the British security 
sector. Private security companies are now providing core security functions -  such 
as emergency services during times of national disaster, when social order is at its 
most vulnerable -  not directly for the public good but rather to increase their profit
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margins. This represents a radical shift away from what Robert Reiner calls the 
. .Enlightenment’s modern conceptions of social justice”.1 Yet as we have seen with 
the pluralist practices of the private security companies throughout this investigation, 
the commercial logic of the industry nevertheless remains infused with the these 
‘modern conceptions of social justice’. For instance, in order to maximise their profit 
margins, these companies have actively sought to be regulated by the British state in 
order to associate themselves with these very same ‘modern conceptions of social 
justice’. They have, in other words, enthusiastically entered into a trade-off with the 
reformists in which they have openly sacrificed a degree of market autonomy through 
a system of statutory regulation so as to conform with the British population’s state­
centric normative expectations about security ought to be legitimately provided. It 
can be contended, then, that the market signals within the British security sector are 
deeply entangled with the state-centric notions of security provision which have their 
origin in the enlightenment. Indeed, as Paul Verkuil observes: “Because security is a 
traditional public good, privatisation must be integrated into that framework, not the 
other way around”.2 Thus the British security sector is neither dominated by the 
modern state, nor has it progressed to a postmodern pluralist system of security 
provision. We are instead currently in an acute moment of social, political and 
economic flux in which a radical new era of networked, public-private security 
provision is overlapping with the traditional, state-centred system which dates back to 
the enlightenment. It is argued here, then, that a greater appréciation of this complex, 
overlapping process would potentially lead to an interesting new avenue of enquiry 
within contemporary criminological analysis, which draws upon a combination of the 
nodal governance, anchored-pluralism and state-in-society models.
Over the past fifteen years or so a similar debate has been played out within the 
political science discipline, although at a slightly higher level o f abstraction. This 
debate revolves around the degree to which the modern, bureaucratic and hierarchical 
British state as a whole is currently being either ‘hollowed out’ or ‘re-constituted’. 
While both schools of thought recognise that the line between public and private is 
becoming increasingly blurred, the degree to which this signifies the beginning o f a 
new, ‘hollowed out’ postmodern order or the ‘re-constitution’ of the traditional, 
modern state-centred order is highly contested. The arguments put forward in this
1 Robert Reiner, ‘Policing a Postmodern Society’, Modern Law Review 55(6) (1992), p.781.
2 Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.67.
234
thesis are particularly apt for cutting into this contention because the security sector is 
widely considered to be the quintessential state function -  that is, the very essence of 
state sovereignty. Therefore, the dynamics of security provision -  and in particular 
the relationship between security provision and regulation -  have a great resonance 
for this debate.
Significantly, it is asserted here that the answer to this ‘hollowing out’ or ‘re­
constitution’ conundrum once again probably lies somewhere in the region between 
these two counterposed positions. For as we have seen, the re-legitimation o f private 
security exposes the British social order in a period of deep and pronounced 
transition. It shows how one of the vanguard industries of an emerging postmodern 
era has actively been reconciling its activities with the state-centric structures and 
norms of the modern era. Moreover, this industry has attempted to accomplish this 
complex process of reconciliation through a system of statutory regulation. For on 
one side, the statutory regulation of private security represents the extension of state- 
controlled governmental mechanisms over this postmodern industry -  that is, it serves 
to ensure that ‘enlightenment conceptions of social justice’ shape and mould the 
operations of the private security companies. On the other side, however, statutory 
regulation represents a mechanism for consolidating the status o f the private security 
industry within the contemporary state-society sphere -  that is, it serves to empower 
the operations of the private security companies. We are witnessing, in other words, 
the simultaneous ‘hollowing out’ and ‘re-constitution’ of thé British state. The re­
legitimation of private security in postwar Britain therefore illustrates that in many 
ways the modern state is gone but it is certainly not forgotten.
8.3 Future Research
This final section will provide an initial indication of how the key arguments and
*
concepts developed throughout this investigation can be used to contribute towards 
the understanding political issues which fall outside the immediate scope of the 
research question. It will focus in particular upon two areas o f emerging research: 
first, comparing systems of private security regulation in different countries; and 
second, the development of regulatory regimes for controlling the activities of 
international private military companies. Before proceeding with this analysis, 
however, it must first be emphasised that when extending this research into these
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other political domains, we are less interested in comparing specific historical 
moments -  which are inevitably unique to the British case -  than we are with 
translating the more abstract and generalised concepts and arguments developed 
throughout this thesis into these new research areas.3 This type o f comparative 
process is often termed ‘analytical generalisation’ and coheres with ‘good’ social 
science research practice (for a more in-depth discussion o f this process, see 
Appendix 1).
First, then, we are concerned with seeing how this investigation can contribute 
towards the project of comparing systems of private security regulation in different 
countries. There have been notable efforts to begin this comparative research by, for 
instance, Jaap De Ward and Mark Button.4 The main reason given by these authors 
for undertaking this research is that such comparative studies can disclose important 
lessons on how best to maximise the quality and effectiveness of security provision in 
a different countries. And, they continue, this matter takes on greater urgency against 
the backdrop of political processes such as European integration, which will 
potentially require the harmonisation of different types of national regulatory regime. 
These are certainly compelling reasons. However, these existing studies suffer from a 
common problem -  they are rather formal, legalistic and constitutional in-their 
approaches. They tend to concentrate on how the modern state can and should reform 
the industry using various regulatory mechanisms and, by extension, they generally 
disregard the agency and preferences of the private security co'mpanies.
This approach is highly problematic because, as we have seen throughout this 
investigation, regulation in Britain is an ongoing process of political negotiation in 
which both the state and private security institutions are situated in a dialectical 
relationship. The regulatory relationship is not one of unidirectional reform, but 
rather a two-way, iterative process of both reform and re-legitimation. This insight 
implies that it is certainly possible -  perhaps even probable -  that private security 
regulation in other countries is similarly characterised by such dialectical political 
processes. Private security companies outside of Britain may be advancing some 
permutation of the pluralist set of practices and therefore embarking on a parallel
3 Richard Rose, ‘Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis’, Political Studies 39 (1991), pp.446-462.
4 Jaap De Ward, ‘The Private Security Sector in Fifteen European Countries: Size, Rules and 
Legislation’, Security Journal 4 (1993), pp. 58-62; Jaap De Ward, ‘The Private Security Industry in 
International Perspective’, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 7 (1999), pp.143-174; 
Button, ‘Assessing the Regulation of Private Security Across Europe’, pp. 109-128.
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strategy of re-legitimation. Against this backdrop, then, it would be interesting go 
beyond the formal and legalistic comparative studies of De Ward and Button and 
instead put together a multi-country study in which the history of private security 
regulation in each country is compared using the state-in-society approach as the 
comparative framework. In this new study it would be assumed that both state and 
private security institutions were endowed with agency and that both sets of 
institutions were structured by broad state-centric socio-cultural norms. We could 
then see whether similar sets of state and societal practices emerged within the 
different countries -  that is, monopolists, pluralists, reformists and neoliberals. If 
divergent practices did emerge, as the state-in-society approach would suggest, then 
we could go about developing a more nuanced understanding of private security 
regulation across the globe and in turn draw more historically-sensitive, process- 
orientated lessons on how to maximise the quality and effectiveness o f security 
provision in different countries.
This is, of course, an ambitious and long-term project. A more immediate and 
manageable study -  a study which, furthermore, would feed into this more extensive 
project -  would be to conduct an initial comparison along these lines between Britain 
and one other country. An interesting case for this more narrowly defined comparison 
would be Sweden. For private security companies industry in Sweden -  as was 
pointed out in Chapter 7 -  are endowed with extremely high levels of legitimacy, 
similar to the levels enjoyed by the public police. And, perhaps not coincidentally, 
these companies have been regulated by the Swedish state since 1973. It would be 
very interesting to investigate, then, the evolving relationship between these high 
levels of legitimacy and the industry’s regulatory relationship with the state. For we 
could hypothesize that comparable processes of re-legitimation are at work, but at a 
more advanced stage. If this is the case -  and if  we regard this as a positive 
development, given the concomitant enhancement of professionalism which this 
entails -  then we could draw upon the experience o f Sweden to guide the future 
direction of private security regulation in Britain.
In addition to contributing towards this cross-country comparative project, the 
concepts and arguments mapped out in this investigation could also be used to add 
value to the current debate over the regulation of international private military 
companies. While these companies -  at least in their more corporate contemporary
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form -  have been operating on the international scene since the 1960s,5 they first 
really came to prominence in Britain at the time of Sandline’s involvement in the 
Sierra Leone civil war during 1998, and they have since become even more notorious 
with their participation in the Iraq war in recent years. In tandem with this increase in 
notoriety, so the academic debate on how best to regulate these organisations has 
gained momentum. Yet in manner similar to the extant literature comparing different 
domestic regulatory regimes, this debate has often been conducted at a relatively 
formal, legalistic and constitutional level, simply examining how states should use 
different regulatory mechanisms to reform those private military companies based 
within their territories.6 The abstract, legalistic nature of these debates is certainly 
understandable considering that any future legislation will, of course, be drafted in 
this form. But as a consequence the debate seems to lack an appreciation of 
regulation as a two-way political process, expressing the preferences o f both the
7regulated and the regulators.
Again, then, the insights into private security regulation developed throughout the 
course of this investigation could perhaps be used to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of the nature of private military regulation. This seems especially 
appropriate considering that high profile members of the private military industry 
have long been calling for governments to impose statutory regulations on their 
activities. Against the backdrop of this investigation, it thus seems pertinent to 
question whether this is equates to a strategy for re-legitimating the private military 
industry in a similar manner to the strategy pursued by private security companies in 
postwar Britain. It could be, in other words, that the long-established notion that
5 For the rise of UK private military companies, see: Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and 
International Security: The Rise o f Private Military Companies (London: Routledge, 2007).
6 For an example of such arguments in an academic context, see: Kevin A. O’Brien, ‘What Should and 
What Should Not be Regulated’, in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation o f  Private 
Military Companies, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp.49-64. For an example of such arguments in a more official context, see: HC 577 (2001- 
2002) Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation (London: HMSO, 2002).
7 One notable exception to this trend is: James Cockayne, ‘Make or Buy? Principal-agent theory and 
the regulation of private military companies’, in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and 
Regulation o f  Private Military Companies, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 196-216.
8 See: Lt Colonel Tim Spicer, ‘Memorandum’, in HC 922 (2001-2002) Ninth Report o f  the House o f  
Commons Defence Committee: Private Military Companies (London: HMSO, 2002), pp.Evl-Ev4; 
Gurkha International Group of Companies, ‘Memorandum’, in HC 922 (2001-2002) Ninth Report o f  
the House o f  Commons Defence Committee: Private Militaiy Companies (London: HMSO, 2002), 
pp.Ev63-Ev65; ArmorGroup Services Limited, ‘Memorandum’, in HC 922 (2001-2002) Ninth Report 
of the House o f  Commons Defence Committee: Private Military Companies (London: HMSO, 2002), 
pp.Ev66-Ev79.
238
states in the international sphere exercise a ‘collective monopoly’ over the legitimate 
use of physical force has created some kind of diffuse state-centric socio-cultural 
constraint upon the activities of private military companies. And as a consequence 
these companies might be attempting to employ state regulation as a means of 
overcoming this constraint. If this is indeed the case, then the regulation of private 
military companies would not be a straightforward process of reform -  as envisioned 
by many o f the participants in the current debate -  but also one o f re-legitimation. To 
be sure, at the present time this is only a hypothesis, but it is certainly one worthy of 
further exploration. And, moreover, it also serves to demonstrate that the arguments 
and concepts developed throughout the course of this investigation could be used as 
novel starting points to conduct research which falls outside the immediate locus of 
the research question.
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Appendix 1
Methodology
This methodology appendix will outline the methods employed to generate data for 
the research question: how have private security companies once again become 
legitimate providers of security functions within postwar Britain? The data needed to 
answer this question must relate to the complex relationship between the private 
security industry and the British state in the period 1945-2001. Given the relatively 
long period of time covered, this investigation will largely draw upon historical, 
qualitative methods -  specifically, document analysis (predominantly from archives) 
and oral reconstructions in the form of elite interviews. The first half of this 
methodological discussion will map out how these data gathering techniques have 
been used throughout the course of this investigation. The second half will then 
evaluate the status of the data generated by these techniques in accordance with 
following ‘trustworthiness’ criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability.1 Before commencing with this discussion it is important from the 
outset to briefly take note of the metaphysical assumptions underlying this 
investigation. Following the critical realist position, it is contended here that while 
there is an independent and real social world ‘out there’ (ontological realism), the 
subjective nature of the human mind means that the we can only generate imperfect, 
partial and value-laden interpretations of this world (epistemological relativism).2 As 
we will see, these assumptions become particularly important when assessing the 
status of our research data, for these value-laden interpretations enter the research 
process at numerous stages, each time impacting upon the subjectivity o f our 
arguments and conclusions.
To begin with, then, the primary method used to generate data throughout this 
investigation has been document analysis. This choice has been determined by both 
necessity and preference. Necessity because the time-frame of the research question
1 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2004), pp.272- 
276.
2 For a clear and concise depiction of critical realism, see: David Marsh ‘Explaining Change in the 
Postwar Period’, in Postwar British Politics in Perspective eds. Marsh, D. et al (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1999), 1-19.
2 4 1
in some part covers the (recently) ‘dead’ past, where none of the main protagonists are 
alive and available for interview. Consequently, documents are the only source of 
data for this period of time. Preference because documents, especially when richly 
textured as they are in this instance, are the most dependable and confirmable source 
of data from which to infer arguments and conclusions (as will be demonstrated later 
in this section). For this reason, document analysis has been selected as the primary 
research method not just for the ‘dead’ past covered by the research question but also 
the more contemporary period where the main protagonists are alive and available for 
interview (although where possible interviews have still been undertaken so as to 
provide valuable supplementary data).
In order to fully understand the re-legitimation process identified in the research 
question it has been necessary to draw data from documents created by both state and 
private security institutions. On the state side, documents have been used from two 
main sources. The first has been the national archives public records office in 
London. This location has provided a wealth of relevant documents, mostly private, 
internal communications written by ministers and civil servants. Furthermore, it has 
also facilitated access to a miscellany of written submissions from the private security 
industry, thereby providing a window into both sides of the security sector 
negotiations. Although these archives are not exhaustive, for as Nicolas Cox notes 
they' do not always disclose references to telephone conversations and informal 
‘corridor’ discussions,3 they are relatively far-reaching and have represented the 
largest and most valuable repository of information for this investigation. The 
obvious drawback of the national archives is that, under the stipulations o f the Public 
Records Act 1967, documents can only be publicly released thirty years after their 
creation -  the ‘thirty year rule’. As a consequence, the national archives have only 
been used for the era 1945-1974 and have therefore been supplemented with other 
state documents to cover the remainder of the period set out in the research question.
The second main source of state documents has been the wide range of publicly 
available, open access documents produced by different parts o f the British state. 
These include: parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, House of Lords and 
standing committees which are published in the Official Record (better known as
3 Nicolas Cox, ‘National British Archives: Public Records’, in The Contemporary History Handbook 
eds. Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 
p.265.
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Hansard); government bills and private members’ bills; the various white and green 
papers issued by central government departments; the reports o f the numerous select 
and special committees; and finally reports produced by non-departmental public 
bodies such as the Security Industry Authority. While these sources do provide a 
great deal o f extremely useful data on the activities and policies of the key ministers 
and civil servants involved in the security sector negotiations, together with the 
responses to these policies of many private security institutions, much of this data is 
inevitably diluted and manipulated before its public release in order to justify the 
policies of the government of the day. These openly available public documents do 
not therefore provide such a clear indication of the private, internal machinations of 
ministers and civil servants as do the declassified national archives material. Yet 
precisely because these documents have been created for public release, they are 
available for the entire period of time covered by the research question. They have 
thus been used in tandem with the national archives between 1945-1974 and then 
independently from 1975 onwards (although in this latter period they have been 
complemented with elite interviews, as will be discussed below).
On the private security side, documentary data has been taken from three main 
depositories. As already indicated, two of these have been the main state sources 
identified above: the national archives public records office and the open-access state 
documents. These state sources have come to store private security documents 
because institutions such as the Home Office and the police have over the years been 
both targets of private security lobbying and instigators of various private security 
consultation processes. And these processes have served to bring together private 
security and state documents in these locations. In one sense this can be seen as 
problematic since these private security documents will to varying degrees have been 
filtered by the state institutions responsible for their storage. This said, both o f these 
sources do nevertheless represent very useful collections o f private security 
documents and should not be overlooked. The third source of private security 
documents is probably the most important, however. For during the course o f this 
investigation, I have negotiated access to the private archives of the British Security 
Industry Authority, which is located in Worcester. This institution was established in 
1967 and ever since has been the main private security industry trade association, 
representing the interests of the biggest companies in the sector and providing the 
primary channel of communication between the industry and the state institutions. As
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a consequence this private archive, which runs from BSIA’s inception to the present 
day and comprises all of the association’s minutes and annual reports, has proved to 
be an excellent source of private security documents for a significant part o f the era 
covered by the research question.
In searching through these various archives it was not necessary to employ an 
explicit sampling technique, for (so far as I am aware) it was possible to read virtually 
all of the relevant documents stored in the three locations identified above. For 
instance, where an online catalogue exists (as it does in the national archives and 
hansard), there was enough time within the remit of the research project to read 
through every ‘hit’ relating to private security. And where there was no such 
catalogue (in the private archives of the BSIA, for example), it was possible to read 
every single document in the collection. The analysis of documentary evidence 
conducted in this investigation has therefore been extensive and exhaustive. Yet this 
is not to say that these documents provide all the research data necessary to answer 
the research question -  far from it. As most contemporary research methods experts 
agree, although historical documents are generally regarded as the most dependable 
and confirmable sources of data, they do not give the whole picture o f any social 
process. As a consequence, it is generally agreed that where possible document 
analysis should be supplemented with other data gathering techniques, such as 
interviews.4 This methodological principle has been adhered to throughout this 
investigation, as we will now see.
The secondary research method employed within this investigation has been elite 
interviewing. Once again this choice has been determined by both necessity and 
preference. Necessity because there are gaps in the documentary historical record, 
(especially in the post-1974 period which is not covered by the national archives) 
which require filling in with other forms of data. In this sense, as Anthony Seldon 
notes, elite interviews can represent important stop-gap solutions in the absence of 
documents.5 Preference because of the unique, additional dimension that elite 
interviews bring to the data gathering process. For they can enable the researcher to 
develop a much deeper understanding of the ‘world views’ of those actors identified 
in the documentary historical record -  that is, “ ...his/her perceptions, beliefs and
4 See, for instance: Anthony Seldon, ‘Elite Interviews’, in The Contemporary History Handbook eds. 
Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
5 Seldon, ‘Elite Interviewing’, p.358.
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ideologies”.6 This has proven to be especially important in this investigation where 
the complex and often subtle ‘world views’ o f different institutions and actors have 
had an enormous impact upon the course of the security sector negotiations.
In conducting these interviews every effort was made to speak to knowledgeable 
elites from a range of both private security and state institutions so as to generate the 
most representative data set possible.7 8To a large extent this was successful, as the list 
of interviews conducted demonstrates (see Table 1 on page 251). However, this 
sample was skewed towards elites who were participating in the security sector 
negotiations during the 1980s and 1990s, since most of the elites working during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s are either no longer alive or untraceable. Throughout the 
course o f this investigation, the interviewees were encouraged to chronologically 
reconstruct their role in the negotiations, which as Richards notes is a logical and
n
highly effective semi-structured interviewing technique. It is also particularly 
appropriate for generating the type of historical data required to answer our research 
question. Of the fourteen interviews conducted in this investigation, thirteen were 
recorded using a dictaphone in order to maximise the accuracy o f the data generated. 
Significantly, only two interviewees requested that their comments be treated as 
‘anonymous’ or ‘private information’. For the most part, then, the arguments and 
discussions resulting from the interview data are clearly attributable. By request, 
however, most of the full transcripts are not available for public dissemination. As 
evidenced by the widespread use of interview quotes throughout this thesis, this 
secondary data gathering technique generated some highly illuminating information, 
which in turn undoubtedly served to deepen our understanding o f the re-legitimation 
of private security in postwar Britain.
Now we have outlined the two main research methods employed to generate data 
for the research question, it is necessary to evaluate the status of the data. This is an 
important exercise since it will allow us to assess the trustworthiness of the arguments 
and conclusions inferred from this data. This evaluation will proceed by cross- 
referencing the methods used and data generated here with accepted academic 
‘trustworthiness’ criteria. While this might seem to be relatively straightforward task, 
it should be acknowledged that there is some debate about what actually constitutes
6 David Richards, ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls’, Politics 16(3) (1996), p. 199.
7 For elite interviewing sampling techniques see: Seldon, ‘Elite Interviewing’, p.356.
8 Richards, ‘Elite Interviewing’, p.202.
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accepted criteria, especially in regard to historical, qualitative data. Standard criteria 
such as measurement validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability, it has 
recently been contended, have been developed in order to evaluate the status of 
quantitative data and are perhaps inappropriate for the evaluation o f historical, 
qualitative data. Instead, research methods experts such as Alan Bryman argue that 
qualitative data can and should be evaluated using alternative criteria which, though 
reflecting the general intention of the standard criteria used to evaluate quantitative 
data, are more nuanced towards the idiographic nature of qualitative research.9 In 
many ways this actually entails watering down the standard criteria used to evaluate 
quantitative data so as to make them more compatible with the less controlled and less 
structured nature of qualitative data. In accordance with Bryman’s reasoning, then, 
the qualitative data generated within this investigation will be evaluated by utilising 
the following four-part trustworthiness criteria which have been designed specifically 
to evaluate qualitative data. These are: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability.
The ‘credibility’ criterion (which parallels the standard quantitative criterion of 
internal validity) questions the trustworthiness of the lines of causality inferred from 
the data by the researcher. More specifically, it is concerned with the following 
conundrum: considering that each individual interprets the social world differently, 
how can we be certain that the line of causality implied in a document or interview 
constitutes an accurate representation of any given sequence o f  events? The simple 
answer to this question is that we cannot be absolutely sure of the accuracy -  this is an 
unavoidable pitfall of qualitative research. Yet it is important to recognise that we can 
guard against misinterpretations by utilising what Philip Davies terms “multi- 
methodological triangulation”.10 This firstly involves using a variety o f data sources 
to generate a “parallax view upon events”.11 This can be done by gathering data 
relating to a particular decision-making process from primary documents, interviews 
and perhaps even secondary sources as well. Once these multiple views have been 
collated it is then possible to compare accounts of a sequence o f events. When the 
accounts broadly correspond, we can say that they have been ‘triangulated’, and we 
can as a result be more confident about employing this data to infer conclusions.
9 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp.272-273.
10 Philip H. J. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation o f Elite Interview Data 
in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics 21(1) (2001), p.75.
11 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants’, p.75.
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Significantly, where possible this technique has been employed throughout this 
investigation. Data from a variety of sources has been used to reconstruct events and 
lines of causality as accurately as possible. It cannot be said that the result is a perfect 
set of arguments and conclusions, but efforts have at least been made to minimise any 
misinterpretations.
The ‘transferability’ criterion (which parallels the standard quantitative criterion of 
external validity) involves “ ...making judgements about the possible transferability of 
findings to other milieux”.12 In order to determine the transferability of the arguments 
and conclusions advanced in this investigation, it is necessary to recognise that while 
this research is first and foremost a historical study, it is in another sense also a case 
study.13 Case study research intentionally focuses upon the particular as opposed to 
the general: “[t]he case is a specific, and complex, functioning thing”.14 And to the 
extent that this investigation concentrates upon the British private security industry 
and the British state, it can be classified as a (historical) case study at the level o f the 
state. Once this is acknowledged it becomes clear that this investigation has limited 
transferability. The empirical arguments and conclusions apply only to Britain and 
cannot be readily transferred to other states -  at least, not without the development of 
a carefully constructed comparative study across states. Yet this is not a problem as 
such, just a limitation. It would only become problematic should someone attempt to 
directly employ the empirical analysis advanced here to draw conclusions about the 
re-legitimation of private security in other countries, for this-would contravene case 
study ‘good practice’. This said, it may be appropriate to transfer some of the 
conceptual, as opposed to empirical, arguments to other states since these are more 
abstract and therefore less shackled by an inherent Britishness -  this is what Yin terms 
‘analytic generalization’.15 For instance, the concepts of ‘pluralist’, ‘monopoly’, 
‘reformist’ and ‘neoliberal’ practices which are developed throughout this 
investigation could potentially be used to analyse interactions between private 
security and state institutions in other countries. The ‘dependability’ criterion
12 Bryman, Social Research Methods, p.275.
13 It is common for histories and case studies to be viewed as mutually exclusive research designs -  see 
for instance: Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2nd edition, 1994), 
p.6. This seems to be an unnecessary distinction, however. For they can each share the characteristics 
of the other: case studies can be historical in their orientation and histories can be viewed as single 
cases.
M Robert Stake, The Art o f  Case Study Research (London: Sage, 1995), p.2.
15 Yin, Case Study Research, p.10 and p.35.
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(which parallels the standard quantitative criterion of reliability) basically probes the 
degree to which the research can be audited. This can be assessed by posing the 
question: could other researchers follow your methodology in order to undertake 
similar research and reach similar conclusions?16 The research conducted in this 
investigation is generally auditable because, for the most part, it does not draw upon 
any ‘private’ or ‘anonymous’ information. The documents used are all clearly 
referenced and, with the exception of the BSIA archives material and a scattering of 
privately obtained documents, are all publicly accessible. As a result, these 
documents could easily be checked out by an auditor. Furthermore, all but two of the 
interviewees have consented to having their identities disclosed, so an auditor could 
potentially approach any of these individuals to confirm information. However, this 
fact-checking process is dependent upon elites making themselves available to speak 
about their role in the private security negotiations for a second time, which due to 
time and resource limitations is certainly not guaranteed. Moreover, auditing elite 
interviews is reliant upon the further criterion of ‘confirmability’, which as we will 
now see is perhaps the most complex dimension trustworthiness to navigate.
The ‘confirmability’ criterion relates to the extent to which subjective, personal 
values have entered into the research process (this has no parallel in the standard 
quantitative criterion where objectivity is generally assumed as a default position 
throughout the research process).17 Personal values enter into the research process at 
two main stages: first, the data generated by the research subjects (through either the 
creation o f documents or the communication of information during the interview); 
second, the interpretation of this data by the researcher. Each will be briefly 
examined here. The nature of the data generated by research subjects differs 
depending on whether it comes in the form of a document or an interview. 
Documents, on the whole, are less permeable to the influence of subjective, personal 
values. To be sure, they certainly do not represent an objective interpretation of 
events. For they are ingrained with what Peter Calvert calls “ ...the phenomenon of 
cognitive dissonance” -  that is, the proclivity “ ...to smooth away inconvenient details 
which conflict with the evolving self-image of competence and honour”.18 But on the 
positive side they are not constructed purely for the benefit of academic researchers
16 Bryman, Social Research Methods, p.275.
17 Bryman, Social Research Methods, p.276.
18 Peter Calvert, ‘Using Documentary Sources’, in The Contemporary History Handbook eds. Brian 
Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 121.
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(this is especially true with archive documents)19 20and they do not therefore change 
their opinions and perspectives over time (unlike interviewees). This in turn means 
that the influence of personal values tends to be minimised within documents. 
Conversely, interviewees, as Jarol Manheim and Richard Rich note, are particularly 
‘reactive’ to the researcher and the aims of his or her research project.21 2 This means 
that the distorting effect of ‘cognitive dissonance’ is higher and subjects might even 
provide divergent accounts of the same events to different researchers (hence the 
auditing problems referred to above). As research methods, then, interviews are more 
value-laden than documents. To return to an earlier point, this is the predominant 
reason why documentary data has been prioritised within this investigation -  that is, it 
is more confirmable than interview data. Yet it is important to acknowledge once 
again that neither method produces completely objective accounts of the phenomenon 
under investigation.
A further layer of personal values is then added when the researcher interprets the 
documentary and interview data. The researcher’s interpretation o f this data is 
influenced by his or her theoretical position, which will inevitably prioritise certain 
concepts, arguments and values over others. In this investigation, for instance, the 
data generated by the research subjects has primarily been interpreted through the lens 
of the state-in-society approach, which represents just one way o f viewing the 
enormously complex relationship between state and societal actors. The arguments 
and conclusions advanced here would have been different if  the research data had 
been interpreted, for instance, primarily through the lenses o f either the nodal 
governance or anchored pluralism perspectives. The choice of theoretical framework 
thus adds an extra layer of subjectivity to the investigation. This is why Chapter 2 
maps out in detail the theoretical framework employed in this investigation. For it is 
crucial that the reader is fully aware of personal values of the researcher.
It is important to conclude this section by asserting that while these layers of 
interpretation are unavoidable, they should not be viewed as a license to put forward 
unsubstantiated claims and conclusions about social reality under the banner of 
‘inevitable subjectivity’, for we can both minimise and control the influence of
19 Cox, ‘National British Archives’, p.254.
20 Seldon, ‘Elite Interviews’, p.357.
21 Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political 
Science (New York, Longman, 411' edition, 1995), p. 155.
22 Marsh, Richards and Smith, Changing Patterns o f  Governance in the UK, p.4.
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personal values. They can be minimised by following the various trustworthiness 
protocols outlined above -  that is, by triangulating wherever possible, resisting over­
generalisations and setting down a clear path for auditors. They can be controlled by 
explicitly stating the theoretical framework underpinning the investigation, thereby 
enabling readers to trace the influence of researcher’s personal values. By following 
these protocols, then, it is intended that the arguments and conclusions advanced here 
can be classified as ‘trustworthy’ research and can therefore be used with confidence 
in the ongoing academic and political dialogue about the nature of security provision 
in twenty-first century Britain. To repeat, though, this thesis (like any other social 
science thesis) should not be approached as an unproblematic and objective piece of 
research -  all of the above caveats must be borne in mind at all times.
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T a b le  1: D e ta ils  o f  In te r v ie w e e s  (lis ted  in th e  o r d e r  th e y  w e r e  co n d u c te d )
INTERVIEWEE
NAME
POSITION(S) INTERVIEW
DETAILS
Sir John Wheeler Director General, British Security Industry 
Association (1975-1989); Member of 
Parliament, Conservative (1979-1997)
18'" May 2007, 
Email
Baroness Ruth Henig Chairman, Security Industry Authority (2007- 
present)
28th June 2007, 
House of Lords, 
London
Andy Drane Director, Security Industry Authority (2003- 
2004); Deputy Chief Executive, Security 
Industry Authority (2004-2007); Acting Chief 
Executive, Security Industry Authority (2007)
29"’ June,
SIA HQ, Holborn, 
London
Patrick Somerville QPM Chairman, International Professional Security 
Association (2001 -present)
29th June, 2007 
Thistle Hotel, Victoria 
Station, London
Jim Harrower Managing Director, Group 4 Securitas (1988- 
2003); Chairman, BSIA (1992-1996 and 2004- 
2006)
17th July 2007,
BSIA HQ, Worcester
David Owen QPM CBE Chief Constable, North Wales Police (1982- 
1994); Chairman, Association of Chief Police 
Officers Crime Committee (1982-1994); 
President, Association o f Chief Police Officers 
(1990-1991)
24'" July 2007, 
Community Health 
Clinic, Llandudno
Peter Davies Assistant Chief Constable, Lincolnshire Police 
(2003-present); Security Industry Lead, 
Association of Chief Police Officers (2003- 
present)
3ra August 2007, 
Lincolnshire Police 
HQ, Lincoln
John Cairncross Head of Security Industry Section, Home Office 
(2005-present)
15“' August 2007, 
Home Office, London
David Dickinson Managing Director, Group 4 Securitas (1988- 
2002); Chief Executive, BSIA (2002-present)
25“’ October 2007, 
BSIA HQ, Worcester
Bruce George Member of Parliament, Labour (1974-present)
*
30“' October 2007, 
Portcullis House, 
London
David Cowden Various Positions, Securicor (1969-2000); 
Chairman, BSIA (2000-2002)
19“’ November 2007, 
Carlos Place, London
Jorgen Philip-Sorensen Chairman and Chief Executive, Group 4 
Securitas (1964-2000); Chairman, Group 4 
Falck (2000-2004); Chairman, Group 4 
Securicor (2004-2006)
17111 December 2007, 
Farncombe Estate, 
Broadway, 
Worcestershire
Anonymous Former executive of Group 4 2007
Anonymous Former executive of a large private security 
company
2007
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